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This dissertation aims to prove the existence of a democratic dimension in the oeuvre of the 
American writer David Foster Wallace. To do so, the thesis focuses on four of his works, with 
a chapter devoted to each. These texts are, in order of how they appear by chapter, the short 
story ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ (2004), the novel Infinite Jest (1996), the nonfiction 
text is Signifying Rappers (1990), and the posthumous and unfinished novel The Pale King 
(2011).  
The theoretical framework created to elucidate this democratic dimension is based on 
the philosophical work of the American Pragmatist Richard Rorty. Particular use is made of his 
concepts of Private and Public vocabularies, as developed in the books Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, (1979) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (1989) and Achieving Our Country 
(1997). 
By demonstrating the democratic capacity of Wallace's literature, I also aim to show the 
civic capacities and intent of his texts. By this, I mean that Wallace’s texts aim to represent a 
democratic and civic belief to the reader and, at the same time, the texts themselves are attempts 
of civic participation aimed to influence the democratic conversation of the United States.  
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 “All I am entitled to say is that it is a useful way,  
useful for particular purposes.” 
Richard Rorty, ‘A World without Substances or Essences’ (1994). 
 
This dissertation attempts to redescribe the writings of David Foster Wallace as a democratic 
tool. To achieve this, I will interpret a selection of Wallace’s writings through Richard Rorty’s 
philosophy, one of the prominent and more recent contributions to the American Pragmatist 
tradition. Although I will provide evidence of Rorty’s influence on Wallace, this is not an 
academic investigation that aims simply to prove the presence of Rorty’s thought in Wallace’s 
work, nor to present Rorty as one of Wallace’s main influences. Instead, I plan to show that 
placing Wallace in the frame of Pragmatist theory opens his texts to a democratic interpretation 
that has been either ignored or underdeveloped by his academic readers, who have mostly 
focused on his literary influences (John Barth,1 Don DeLillo,2 Thomas Pynchon3) and his 
relation to new literary movements,4 his use of irony and sincerity,5 and his more overt 
philosophical references, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida.6  
                                               
1 One of the most detailed studies of the relationship between Barth and Wallace is Charles B. Harris’s ‘The 
Anxiety of Influence: The John Barth/David Foster Wallace Connection’ (2014), which focuses on Wallace’s 
novella ‘Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way’ as a response to Barth’s ‘Lost in the Funhouse’. 
2 D. T. Max’s biography of Wallace, Every Love Story is a Ghost Story, tells how “struck up a correspondence” 
with DeDillo thanks to “the encouragement of Franzen” (176) and the biography often references Wallace’s 
letters. 
3 Tore Rye Andersen’s “Pay Attention! David Foster Wallace and his Real Enemies” (2014) shows the influence 
of various novels by Pynchon, as well as by Vladimir Nabokov, on Wallace’s novels.  
4 Robert L. McLaughlin’s “Post-Postmodern Discontent: Contemporary Fiction and the Social World.” (2004) 
and Stephen J. Burn’s  Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism, (2008), for instance, read Wallace’s work 
in the light of the emergence of “post-postmodernism”. Burn groups Wallace with Franzen and Richard Powers 
as part of a post-postmodern generation that responds to the writings of Barth, Pynchon, as well as Robert Coover 
and William Gaddis. These connections and movements are deftly traced and defined in the first chapter of the 
book: ‘A Map of the Territory: American Fiction at the Millenium’ (1-27). 
Timothy Jacobs’s ‘American Touchstone: The Idea of Order in Gerald Manley Hopkins and David Foster 
Wallace’ (2001) as one of the first readings of Wallace’s aesthetic through the lesser known influence of 
Hopkins.  
The seminal text for these readings is Marshall Boswell’s book Understanding David Foster Wallace (2003), 
specifically the first chapter, ‘Cynicism and Naïveté: Modernism’s Third Wave’, where Boswell establishes a 
critical biography of Wallace, and then places Wallace’s oeuvre in relation to the English literature tradition of 
the twentieth century and what seemed to emerge at the start of the twenty-first. (cf. 1-20) 
5 Iain Williams considers Wallace in relation to “new sincerity” in ‘(New) Sincerity in David Foster Wallace's 
“Octet”’ (2015). 
In ‘The Changing Face of Post-Postmodern Fiction: Irony, Sincerity, and Populism’ (2017), Jon Doyle reads 
Wallace as the post-postmodern origin of art that tries to insert sincerity as one of the principal social values for 
Western society. Doyle moves beyond Wallace by considering other books and movies that expand and continue 
Wallace’s conception of sincerity. 
6  Lance Olsen was one of the first critics to address Wittgenstein’s influence, in his essay, “Termite Art” (1993), 
which reads The Broom of the System through Wittsgentein and its possible responses to postmodern art.  
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 To establish the potency of this new philosophical approach to Wallace’s work, I 
interpret four of his texts, devoting a chapter to each one. My chosen texts draw on Wallace’s 
fiction and nonfiction to showcase both his literary range and his critical depth. I begin with his 
short story ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ (2004) because its title is the same title as 
Richard Rorty’s first major publication, which establishes an undeniable connection between 
both authors, though the story itself is an amalgamation of a structure, a voice, and an ethic that 
Wallace took from different sources.7 Then comes my reading of Infinite Jest (1996) arguably 
Wallace’s best-known text, which earned him a great deal of public and academic attention.8 
Similar to The Divine Comedy or Ulysses for their authors, Infinite Jest towers over the rest of 
Wallace’s bibliography as the work that justifies canonization. Through Rorty, I also pair the 
novel with the work of George Orwell and Marcel Proust, writers that are rarely mentioned in 
wallace studies. The third text is Signifying Rappers (1990), a long essay he co-wrote at the start 
of his career on the then nascent genre of rap music. Although mostly ignored by Wallace critics, 
it reveals his Pragmatist capacity9 to understand the divisions between communities and the 
possibilities of communication between them. I finish with his posthumous and unfinished novel 
The Pale King (2011) which, in the context of this dissertation’s argument, is the culmination 
of the career-long interest in civics that I traced in its previous chapters. Although I do not follow 
the strict chronological order of Wallace’s career in order to more effectively introduce his 
engagement with pragmatism, it is worth noting, nevertheless, that my chosen texts give a sense 
of Wallace’s overall development as a writer, since I look at one of his first publications 
(Signifying Rappers) and at his posthumous work (The Pale King). This historical variety helps 
underline my claim that the democratic is a constant in Wallace’s career.  
                                               
Patrick Horn’s ‘Does Language Fail Us? Wallace’s Struggle with Solipsism’ in Gesturing Toward Reality, David 
Foster Wallace and Philosophy (2014) analyzes Wallace’s relationship with both the early and later Wittgenstein, 
proving their influence in Wallace through his use of solipsism (a constant trope in his career), and exemplifies 
its presence with a reading of the short story ‘Good Old Neon’. 
‘“Then Out of the Rubble”: David Foster Wallace’s Early Fiction’, in David Foster Wallace and “The Long 
Thing” (2014) by Bradley J. Fest analyzes the philosophical influences of Wallace’s first novel, The Broom of the 
System, focusing on Wittgenstein and Derrida, as well as Paul de Man.  
The aforementioned Understanding David Foster Wallace also establishes a strong link between Wallace’s work 
to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. (18-9)  
7  Apart from Rorty, Wallace made use of Flannery O’Connor’s short story ‘Everything that Rises Must 
Converge’ and Gordon Grices’s book “The Red Hourglass: Lives of the Predators” (1999). 
8  There are at least 48 published academic articles with Infinite Jest in their title (cf. 
https://davidfosterwallaceresearch.wordpress.com/), and in 2005 it was included in Time magazine’s Top 100 
novels published since 1923: http://entertainment.time.com/2005/10/16/all-time-100-novels/ 
9  As I’ll show later on, this ‘Pragmatist capacity’ has been noted by readers such as Clare Hayes-Brady in The 
Unspeakable Failures of David Foster Wallace (2016), Thomas Tracey’s “The Formative Years: David Foster 
Wallace’s Philosophical Influences and The Broom of the System” (2014), and Lucas Thompson in Global 
Wallace. However, I don’t believe they don’t achieve the depth and specificity of my own reading. 
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 Although Rorty wrote eight books in English and was the editor of three, five of the 
eight books mentioned are compilations made up of the articles, reviews, and lectures he wrote 
throughout his career (Brandom 378-392). The theoretical framework of my reading makes 
specific use of the remaining three books, which I also consider to be the three major books 
from Rorty’s career: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,10 (1979) Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity,11 (1989) and Achieving Our Country12 (1997). An argumentative narrative unites 
them: briefly put, the first argues for the philosophical abandonment of epistemology and 
metaphysics; the second explains what both philosophy and literature can do after said 
abandonment; and the third considers the application of his arguments to a specific time and 
place: the U.S. at the end of the twentieth century.  
 Drawing from these texts, the most pertinent elements of Rorty’s philosophy for my 
thesis are the concepts of private and public vocabularies. The construction and argumentation 
for both concepts constitutes the majority of the chapters in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
In this text, Rorty exemplifies each vocabulary through the work of various novelists and 
philosophers, with Proust, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida in the field of private 
vocabularies, (cf. 96-137) and Nabokov,13 Dickens, and Orwell on the side of public 
vocabularies (cf. 141-188). Explanations of these concepts appear throughout my dissertation, 
yet a good introductory description of Rorty’s initial conceptualization would be that the 
abandonment of epistemology and metaphysics also leads to a renunciation of the belief in and 
the search for a universal language, one that unites and describes all of existence. What we have 
instead are various vocabularies that can communicate a limited number of beliefs. These limits 
also include a divide between the language of the self and of the community. In other words, a 
private vocabulary would address beliefs such as self-understanding and intimate desires, while 
a public vocabulary would describe something like beliefs tied to a nation or an institution. This 
                                               
10  In Rorty and his Critics, Jürgen Habermas calls this text “Rorty’s important book” (34). 
11  In his monograph on Rorty, Alan Malachowski calls Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity as part of “the sequence of books that earned Rorty his notoriety” (12). The other book 
Malachowski includes in the ‘sequence’ is Consequences of Pragmatism, (1982), a collection of essays that 
doesn’t really say anything that isn't present in the previous two titles.. I believe the list doesn’t include Achieving 
Our Country because it was written in the last stage of Rorty’s career, once his ‘notoriety’ had been gained. Also, 
Malachowski only devotes one page of his book to Achieving Our Country (173) probably because its content 
strays too much from the philosophical into the political. 
12  In Richard Rorty; Education, Philosophy, and Politics (2001) this book is described as Rorty’s “latest-and 
most-ambitious project in the field of political philosophy” (145). 
13 Later in this Introduction, I’ll make use of Rorty’s reading of Humbert Humbert to read a character by 
Wallace. It’s worth noting that Tore Rye Andersen also makes use of Rorty’s reading of Lolita in “Pay Attention! 
David Foster Wallace and his Real Enemies”. However, Andersen only uses Rorty to strengthen his own reading 
of Nabokov at the end of his essay and he never really bridges Wallace with Rorty.  
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conceptual divide guides the organization of my chapters, since my examination of the first two 
texts (‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ and Infinite Jest) is mostly established through the 
concept of private vocabularies, while the other two texts (Signifying Rappers and The Pale 
King) are read in terms of the concept of public vocabularies. However, the two concepts should 
not be taken as opposites, they are not separated by essences. Therefore, there is no clear 
distinction for where one vocabulary starts and another begins, as Rorty explains, “I have no 
criterion of individuation for distinct languages or vocabularies to offer, but I am not sure that 
we need one” (CIS 7). Any distinction will be made by a given use of a vocabulary by an 
individual or a community rather than by a neutral, permanent criteria. 
Philosophy was a constant presence throughout Wallace’s life and had an undeniable 
influence on his literary work. His father, James D. Wallace, is a professional philosopher in the 
Pragmatist tradition and the author of various books on ethics.14 His son almost followed his 
footsteps: David Foster Wallace graduated from Amherst College with two theses, one in 
Philosophy and one in Creative Writing, which would become his first published novel. (Max 
39) Four years later he began a PhD in Philosophy at Harvard University but he dropped out 
before the end of the first semester due to addiction and mental health issues15 (132-4). This 
information has been used by some readers to justify or introduce the presence of philosophy in 
his work.16 However, these biographical details were not commonly known while he was alive. 
What Wallace brought to the fore in various interviews were his philosophical and critical 
interests and influences rather than his own academic studies. For example, in what are arguably 
his most famous interview, he talks to Larry McCaffrey about at some point having “a coldly 
cerebral take on fiction and Austin-Wittgenstein-Derridean literary theory” (C 41). A similar 
take appears in the posthumous interview with David Lipsky, where he describes his first novel, 
The Broom of the System, as “a conversation between Wittgenstein and Derrida, and presence 
versus absence” (C 35). Biographies and interviews aside, Wallace’s writing has various overt 
philosophical references that suggest his interest and training. There are overt ones, such as 
Leonore Beadsman, the protagonist’s grandmother in The Broom of the System, who was “a 
                                               
14  These are Virtues and Vices (1978), Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict (1988), Ethical Norms, Particular 
Cases (1996), and Norms and Practices (2008). He is also the author of several articles 
(https://philpapers.org/s/James%20D.%20Wallace). 
15 It seems, however, that Wallace would not have finished the PhD even if he hadn’t been interned at McLean 
Hospital. Max tells us that, upon arrival, “the realization he’d made a mistake was nearly immediate” to Wallace. 
He was disillusioned with Stanley Cavell’s seminar, “a philosopher who held a special place in Wallace’s 
esteem” (132), the course books were “impossibly dense”, and Wallace felt “too old to go back to school” (133). 
16  Consider Charles B. Harris’s biographically charged article, “David Foster Wallace: ‘That Distinctive 
Singular Stamp of Himself’” (2010). 
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student of Wittgenstein” (BS 63) at Cambridge and who once broke a kitchen window with a 
broom to exemplify Wittgenstein’s philosophy.17 (BS 149-50) Infinite Jest is ripe with 
philosophical references, from a bar called “The Unexamined Life”, (IJ 476) to an addict using 
a copy of William James’s “Principles of Psychology and The Gifford Lectures on Natural 
Religion” to stash Cocaine, (IJ 544-5) to an apocryphal Deleuze publication: “Gilles Deleuze’s 
posthumous Incest and the Life of Death in Capitalist Entertainment” (IJ 792). These 
philosophical references and tropes rarely seem gratuitous but instead help build narratives, as 
the Lipsky quote suggests. An example of this can be found in the short story ‘Oblivion’, that 
includes a logical formulation to describe an analyst’s theory of love and fear as the two main 
orientations in life (cf. O 164). The formulation isn’t just an embellishment; rather it shows the 
reader the level of over rationalization and solipsism the character reaches when considering 
different “models or angels” (O 164) for the existential dilemma of his life.  
Maybe the clearest example of the philosophical proclivity of Wallace's work is the 
many critical publications written on his work from a philosophical angle. The 2014 publication 
Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace and Philosophy, is a 280-page book of 14 
different essays on Wallace featuring a wide range of approaches: Scott Korb’s ‘How we Ought 
To Do Things with Words’ is based on Wallace’s ‘Authority and American Usage’ essay, and 
he uses it to argue for both the defense of prescriptive language and against the discrimination 
improper language use. In ‘This Is Water and Religious Self-Deception’, Kevin Timpe considers 
Wallace’s This Is Water speech as a warning of intellectual arrogance and religious self-
deception. Andrew Bennett, in ‘Inside David Foster Wallace’s Head: Attention, Loneliness, 
Suicide, and the Other Side of Boredom’,  writes about boredom in The Pale King, using both 
Schopenhauer and Csikszentmihalyi to interpret the negative, self-denying capacities of 
boredom, as well as it’s positive, self-overcoming capacities. Blakey Vermeule also uses 
Schopenhauer in ‘The Terrible Master: David Foster Wallace and the Suffering of 
Consciousness (with guest Arthur Schopenhauer)’, but instead of focusing on one novel he reads 
various texts by Wallace. ‘The Lobster Considered’ by Robert C Jones gives a mostly analytical 
approach to the moral dilemma of eating animals presented by Wallace in ‘Consider the 
Lobster’. In ‘Philosophy, Self-Help, and the Death of David Wallace’, Maria Bustillos looks at 
the Christian self-help elements of Wallace’s literature. Robert K. Bolger’s  ‘A Less “Bullshity” 
Way To Live: The Pragmatic Spirituality of David Foster Wallace’ mostly considers This Is 
                                               
17  Wittgenstein’s presence in Wallace’s first novel is probably best described by Clare Hayes-Brady: 
“Wittgenstein’s influence on Broom is pervasive, partly because it is explicit” (2010, 25). 
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Water as a presentation of secular spiritualism, using interjections from e-mails the author 
received from Wallace. In ‘The Subsurface Unity of All Things, or David Foster Wallace’s Free 
Will’, Leland de la Durantaye brings together Wallace’s undergrad philosophy thesis and This 
Is Water to argue that instead of trying to trace the limits of choice and freedom, it's better to 
give yourself fully to love and life. As explained in footnote 6, Patrick Horn, in ‘Does Language 
Fail Us? Wallace’s Struggle with Solipsism’, reads Wallace’s short story ‘Good Old Neon’ 
through Wittgenstein and solipsism to understand the limits of language and the relation to 
‘Mystery’ in existence. In ‘Beyond Philosophy: David Foster Wallace on Literature, 
Wittgenstein, and the Dangers of Theorizing’, Randy Ramal brings together different sources, 
such as Wallace’s undergrad philosophy thesis, ‘Consider the Lobster’, Wittgenstein, and Sartre 
to analyze the creation of value for the individual in Wallace. Allard den Dulk, in ‘Good Faith 
and Sincerity: Sartrean Virtues of Self-Becoming in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest’, uses 
Sartre to read the role of sincerity in Infinite Jest. In ‘Untrendy Problems: The Pale King’s 
Philosophical Inspirations’, Jon Baskin looks at Wallace’s possibilities for maturity through 
wisdom in the philosophical questions raised in The Pale King. Ryan David Mullins, in 
‘Theories of Everything and More: Infinity is Not the End’, uses Wittgenstein and Kant, as well 
as different sources from the fields of physics and mathematics, to form a metaphysical reading 
of Infinite Jest. In ‘The Formative Years: David Foster Wallace’s Philosophical Influences and 
The Broom of the System’, Thomas Tracey looks at the influence of American Pragmatism in 
Wallace’s philosophical development. Because of this essay’s relevance to my thesis, I analyze 
it later in this Introduction. 
Gesturing Toward Reality was followed by a similar publication in 2015 titled Freedom 
and the Self: Essays on the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace,  collects six essays that orbit 
around Wallace’s undergrad philosophy dissertation. Williams Hasker’s ‘David Foster Wallace 
and the Fallacies of “Fatalism”’ praises Wallace’s semantic critique of Richard Taylor’s fatalism 
(which is the topic of Wallace’s dissertation) but concludes that Wallace’s ultimately fails at 
refuting fatalism. Similarly, M. Oreste Fiocco’s ‘Fatalism and the Metaphysics of Contingency’ 
commends the quality of Wallace’s dissertation but concludes that Wallace does not fully refute 
Taylor’s fatalism. In ‘Wallace, Free Choice, and Fatalism’ Gila Sher praises Wallace’s 
dissertation by noting that some of the dissertations arguments anticipate arguments that would 
be made years later in the academic field of Logic. For the fatalist, the future is set and cannot 
be altered, in ‘Fatalism, Time Travel, and System J’ Maureen Eckert considers the possibility 
of time travel in the light of Wallace’s arguments against Taylor’s fatalism, concluding that, 
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following said arguments, one cannot travel back in time to change the past. Daniel R. Kelly, in 
‘David Foster Wallace as American Hedgehog’, quotes from various texts by Wallace to analyze 
the author’s interest in self-consciousness and free will. As the title suggests, in ‘David Foster 
Wallace on the Good Life’ Nathan Ballantyne and Justin Tosi look at different texts by Wallace 
to understand his position to live a life in accordance with the various narratives that make up a 
self. 
Although not a compilation, Allard den Dulk’s Existentialist Engagement in Wallace, 
Eggers and Foer: a Philosophical Analysis of Contemporary American Literature, published in 
2015, offers a reading of Wallace based on Western philosophy. As the title suggests, den Dulk 
mostly uses Existentialist philosophy to read how Wallace, Dave Eggers, and Jonathan Safran 
Foer present problems in their contemporary society caused by excessive self-consciousness 
and constant irony. den Dulk then presents the solution each author offers in their fiction to both 
of these social problems. The fiction of John Barth and Bret Easton Ellis is used to exemplify 
fiction that narrates each social malaise without offering a possible solution to them. The book’s 
theoretical framework is built with the philosophy of Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Camus, as well 
as that of Derrida and the late Wittgenstein. den Dulk systematically reads the fiction of each 
writer under the various concepts of these philosophers. With regards to Wallace, den Dulk 
focuses on his representations of sincerity, the possibility of choice, and the importance of 
paying attention. I will make use of this book in my chapter on Infinite Jest, since den Dulk 
mostly reads Wallace through that novel, making observations and arguments in the same field 
as mine. 
In the last chapter of this dissertation, I make extensive use of Jeffrey Sever’s David 
Foster Wallace’s Balancing Books; Fictions of Value. Although I mostly utilize his reading of 
The Pale King, it’s worth noting that Severs constructs a cohesive reading of all of Wallace’s 
fiction with a philosophical framework. His “most important philosophical guidepost” (14) for 
achieving this reading is axiology. He uses Wallace’s words to define the term, “the study of 
values and value judgements,” (BF 34-5) yet the philosophical depth of the signpost comes from 
Heidegger’s understanding of the term “as part of his call to return to the ancient question of 
Being that had been abandoned by modernity” where there is a search for “a language in which 
ground could only be ascertained” (Severs 15). Severs quotes John Caputo’s succinct 
explanation to understand Heidegger’s reliance on the ancient Greek axioma: “the Greeks had 
no ‘theory of values’ in which a ‘value’ is something added on to a ‘fact’ by the representational 
(vorstellend) thought of the ego […] For the Greek a thing stands in the highest regard, not 
14 
 
because man has conferred a value on it, as in modern theory, but rather because it stands forth 
of itself” (Caputo 53). Rorty considered Heidegger “the greatest theoretical imagination of his 
time (outside the natural sciences)” (CIS 118) and his philosophy is essential for Rorty’s 
conception of self-creation and the creation of vocabularies. Rorty critiques Heidegger’s 
aforementioned ‘call to return to’ and search for “words which had, or should have had, 
resonance for everybody in modern Europe, words which were relevant not just to the fate of 
the people who happen to have read a lot of philosophy books but to the public fate of the West” 
(CIS 118). In other words, Heidegger searched for “elementary words” (CIS 119) that contained 
and conveyed the same meaning to others that he found in them. Sever’s reading avoids this 
critique because it isn’t searching for the axioms of Being but of value in Wallace’s writing. His 
interpretation is therefore based on Wallace’s language specifically instead of a belief in the 
atemporal meaning of words, and so because of this he constructs a reading that ‘stands forth of 
itself’ without the aid of an epistemological or metaphysical system. I believe that part of the 
affinity of my work with Severs’s lies in how my dissertation also constructs its own meanings, 
not only in the way each chapter builds on the previous ones, but also in the way words such as 
civics, conversation, or mirror should have ‘stand forth’-meanings throughout the dissertation. 
Rorty’s philosophy is key for this construction of meaning; I will establish a dialogue between 
the writings of both Americans, and although this will show the relevance of Rorty’s philosophy 
to Wallace’s literature, it should also result in a clearer understanding of the civic quality of his 
oeuvre. 
As mentioned, Wallace titled a short story after Rorty’s 1979 book, Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature. I use this signpost to read the story in a Rortyan manner that is unprecedented 
in academic discussions of Wallace’s work. In the subsequent chapters I extend this reading to 
three other texts by Wallace. I’ve picked texts that exemplify the plurality and variety of 
Wallace’s work, as well as the dimensions and capacity of Rorty’s theory. It is mostly because 
of these goals that half of the texts I analyze are at the center of Wallace studies (Infinite Jest, 
The Pale King)18 and the other two are at its periphery (Signifying Rappers, ‘Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature’). It’s a Wallacian approach to pay equal attention to both the focus of public 
interest and what the public gaze ignores.19 This peripheral style may be the most evident in his 
                                               
18 It’s these two texts that, understandably, receive most of the attention in the BBC documentary Endnotes: 
David Foster Wallace, created around the time of the publication of The Pale King in 2011. This documentary is 
also proof that interest in Wallace grew after his untimely death.  
19  The relation between the center and the periphery could be related to Wallace’s lifelong interest in Jacques 
Derrida and the philosopher’s concepts of différance and deconstruction.  
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essays, where, for example, when writing on David Lynch and the making of Lost Highway, he 
also focused on the film crew. Another example could be that he has an essay on one of the 
greatest tennis players of all time (Roger Federer) and another on an unknown professional 
player (Michael Joyce).20 This is also similar to the Pragmatist approach to cultural production, 
which does not make hierarchical differences between forms, content, or  audience. Instead, it 
focuses on the creation of new imaginative forms that can help a community reach a better 
future. This does not mean that, for Rorty, cultural production should be oriented towards a 
single goal or interest. The division could instead be simplified between the books21 that can aid 
a community and those that cannot. In Rorty’s words, “to reconstr[uct] the standard moral-
aesthetic division” we can “separate books which supply novel stimuli to action […] from those 
which simply offer relaxation” (CIS 143). In this sense, I consider Wallace’s books to be part 
of the first category. The philosophical generality of Rorty’s statements should dissipate as its 
intricacies are presented throughout the dissertation. For now, just as it is helpful to understand 
Rorty’s philosophy by what it is not (i.e. anti-essentialist, anti-metaphysical) it might be helpful 
to state that the ‘books which supply novel stimuli to action’ do not “gear in with their readers’ 
fantasies without suggesting that there might be something wrong with those fantasies, or with 
the person who has them.” (CIS 143) In my reading, one of the ‘stimuli to action’ in Wallace’s 
books is pertinent to the advancement of democratic beliefs and the civics of democratic 
citizens. My analysis aims to highlight and comprehend the oeuvre’s ‘stimuli’. It’s also worth 
noting that this division of books “does not parallel the traditional lines between the cognitive 
and the noncognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, or the ‘literary’ and the nonliterary. Nor does 
it conform to any standard distinctions of form of genre.” (CIS 143)  The absolution of these 
distinctions explains why my reading is able to seamlessly take in Wallace’s novels, short 
stories, and nonfiction without any kind of theoretical complications. This theoretical approach 
allows me state that Wallace’s oeuvre promotes the Rortyan kind of action and thus each text 
that each chapter focuses on. At the same time, the generality of the description also allows me 
to specify how the four texts I analyze have different methods and objectives for their call to 
                                               
20  ‘Federer Both Flesh and Not’ (BF 5-33), and ‘Tennis Player Michael Joyce’s Professional Artistry as a 
Paradigm of Certain Stuff about Choice, Freedom, Discipline, Joy, Grotesquerie, and Human Completeness’ (FT 
213-55).  
21 I say ‘books’ not only because of the literary and philosophical focus of this dissertation. Rorty’s arguments, 
especially those in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, revolve around published texts, mostly of literature and 
philosophy. On one hand, this bookish argumentation highlights the importance of literacy for democracy and 
emancipation. On the other hand, there is nothing that prevents a Rortyan analysis of other modes of cultural 
production. Therefore, his focus on books seems due to the circumstance that he was more of a bibliophile than, 
for example, a cinephile.  
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action. As Rorty states, a book’s stimuli works “sometimes straightforwardly and sometimes by 
insinuation” and the degree of the action itself, of the change it seeks can vary “in some major 
or minor respect” (CIS 143). This is why theoretical coherence is maintained when my reading 
of Wallace’s short story ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ presents an indirect suggestion 
to notice the suffering of others around us, while in the posthumous novel The Pale King I direct 
call to change the civic attitudes in the United States. In Achieving Our Country, Rorty tried to 
write a book that stimulated Pragmatist democratic action in his nation. In this dissertation I’ll 
prove that a similar democratic stimulation is part of Wallace’s literature.  
This democratic Pragmatist approach is present in Wallace’s writing style as well. I read 
his interest in literary innovation and his aversion to cultural elitism, which might otherwise 
seem contradictory, as a result of this approach. The following four chapters will detail said 
style, one that strove to balance complex and meaningful literary writing with the capacity to be 
read and understood by all. This dissertation stems from an interest in that tension, a belief that 
Wallace created an imaginative solution to it, and the desire to understand how it functions. To 
generalize it in another way, Wallace mostly wrote complex or intricate literature that, although 
often challenging, does not require a double major in philosophy and creative writing to 
understand and enjoy. The ideal instrument to understand Wallace’s resolution of said tension—
as I will demonstrate—is Richard Rorty’s philosophy. 
Rorty’s American Pragmatism begins with the negation of absolute Truth as a 
philosophical possibility. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he presents the arguments of 
other philosophers, both Analytical and Continental,22 to make his case. Only at the end of the 
book does he present something that we could call his philosophy, as if he wanted to show that 
he considered all arguments for Truth before arguing that epistemology “may be replaced by a 
pragmatist conception of knowledge which eliminates the Greek contrast between 
contemplation and action, between representing the world and coping with it” (11). With his 
argumentative base established, he develops his philosophy in his two books, Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity and Achieving Our Country, and proposes what philosophy, the 
humanities, and his country could aim for after dropping the search for Truth. A key element in 
Rorty’s philosophy is the belief in a public or national conversation, one similar to and 
influenced by Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere.23 Rorty considered his approach 
                                               
22  The main names are Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Dewey, and Sartre. 
23 cf. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society by 
Jürgen Habermas (1989). Specifically, I think that the historicized and contingent description of the public sphere 
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to public philosophy to be similar to Habermas’,24 with the caveat that Habermas finds no use 
for private vocabularies. Rorty argues this by comparing Habermas to other philosophers: 
“Whereas Habermas sees the line of ironist thinking which runs from Hegel through Foucault 
and Derrida as destructive of social hope, I see this line of thought as largely irrelevant to public 
life and to political questions”25 (CIS 83). Another key element from Rorty’s philosophy is what 
Cornel West calls the “future-oriented instrumentalism”26 (5) characteristic of American 
Pragmatism. If one abandons the belief in an eternal structure of thought then one can 
accommodate the suspicion that new challenges and new imaginative ways of thinking will arise 
in time. Rorty’s construction of a philosophy that values a democratic community and 
imaginative creations for better ways of being in part comes from one of his greatest influences: 
the American Pragmatist and Socialist John Dewey, who Rorty quoted as saying “imagination 
is the chief instrument of the good … art is more moral than moralities”27 (Dewey 348). It’s 
vital for my dissertation to highlight and keep in mind Rorty’s intent that his philosophy be not 
merely descriptive, but be a tool to instigate and facilitate conversations between humans and 
                                               
in Europe (cf. ‘Section II Social Structure of the Public Sphere’ 27-56) is in line with Rorty’s understanding and 
use of the concept.  
24 In Rorty and his Critics, we read a series of essays written by Rorty’s critics followed by his response. The 
first of these is an essay by Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’ (31-55). In his response, Rorty makes 
statements such as “[Habermas’] The philosophical discourse of modernity made an enormous impression on 
me” (56) and “I entirely agree with Habermas when he says that the philosophical ‘paradigms do not form a an 
arbitrary sequence but a dialectical relationship’” (63). It seems that the main point of contention is that 
Habermas believes that when “I make an assertion I am implicity claiming to be able to justify it to all audiences, 
actual and possible” (56). Rorty sees this as a belief in ahistorical, permanent truths, free of circumstance. It’s 
worth mentioning that this book was edited by Robert B. Brandom, a ‘disciple’ of Rorty, who wrote one of the 
essays in the book (‘Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism’ [156-83]) and, it 
turns out, was supervised by Richard Rorty as a graduate student. I consider him to be a living philosopher who 
has continued to work with and evolve the Rortyan concept of vocabularies (as proven by his aforementioned 
essay).  
25  Rorty makes an interesting case for private and public vocabularies by using Habermas as the philosopher 
who would agree with the concept of public vocabularies but not private ones, and Foucault as the philosopher 
who would agree to private vocabularies but not public ones (CIS 61-9). I believe Rorty would agree with 
Habermas’ critique of the “refeudalization” and the “neomercantilism” of the public sphere (cf. Habermas 28-41), 
partially because in the sections cited above Rorty seems to consent to Habermas’ work and quibbles only on the 
absence of a ‘private sphere.’ Rorty’s use of Habermas and Foucault approach irony is explored by David L. Hall 
in his book Richard Rorty; Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism (cf. 146-160). 
26  This orientation can be seen in the conclusion of Achieving Our Country, describing the users of his 
Pragmatism as “romantic utopians trying to imagine a better future” (140). Since there is no belief in a timeless 
knowledge, the Rortyan project aims to open more imaginative avenues for an improvement of humanity. The 
links that unite this sweeping statement will be developed through each chapter of this thesis. 
27 It’s worth adding a part that Rorty left out from his formulation of the quote: “the primacy of the imagination 
extends far beyond the scope of direct personal relationships. Except where ‘ideal’ is used in conventional 
deference or as a name for a sentimental reverie, the ideal factors in every moral outlook and human loyalty are 
imaginative.” (Dewey 348) In this we can read the roots of Rorty’s belief in the capacity of imagination to bridge 
vocabularies and shift culture. Moreover, it indicates how supposed ahistorical foundations and permanent 
obligations are not grounded on anything eternal.  
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communities, all with the goal of reducing human suffering. : “We should stay on the lookout 
for marginalized people - people whom we still instinctively think of as ‘they’ rather than ‘us.’ 
[…] philosophy is one of the techniques for reweaving our vocabulary of moral deliberation in 
order to accommodate new beliefs” (CIS 196). I will make the case that one of the goals of 
Wallace’s literature is to help the reader ‘stay on the lookout.’ 
To reiterate, Rorty’s work is not a vast investigation or dialectic that concludes with the 
negation of Truth; instead, this is his starting point. This parallels my conception of Wallace as 
an author, since this thesis tries to grasp the possibilities of a work of literature once we drop 
the notion of the writer as the wielder of Truth and the reader’s quest to grasp it. This is not a 
novel claim, and it is one that Wallace, influenced by the postmodernist theories of Roland 
Barthes and Jacques Derrida, often made. A useful conceptual template for my research appears 
at the end of his short story ‘Octet’, (BI 111-36) where the narrative voice asks the reader and 
itself what kind of writer it wishes to be. The narrator informs the reader that to “puncture the 
fourth wall and come onstage naked” (BI 133) the author of a piece of fiction will “look 
fundamentally lost and confused and frightened and unsure”, yet that position is better than the 
holier-than-thou posture, as Wallace concludes after an ellipsis: 
… more like a reader, in other words, down here quivering in the mud of the trench with 
the rest of us, instead of a Writer, whom we imagine (at least I sure do …) to be clean 
and dry and radiant of command presence and unwavering conviction as he coordinates 
the whole campaign from back at some gleaming abstract Olympian HQ. (BI 136) 
 
It’s fair to claim that Wallace developed his views on the writer, the reader, and the relationship 
between the two, from Barthes and Derrida’s poststructuralism. Rorty also read the 
poststructuralists28 and, although I’m not concerned with investigating the precise influence of 
this movement on either of them, it could be taken as another reason why both thinkers coincide 
in their support for a more democratic conversation between author and audience. One of the 
factors for establishing said dialogue is that literature is no longer sent down from the ‘Olympian 
HQ’ but instead shared horizontally, communicating the vocabulary and experiences of the 
‘muddy trench.’ However, this statement might appear as somewhat problematic when applied 
to Wallace’s oeuvre, since his work is so vast and varied, one could easily find baroque 
compositions that seem far removed from the ‘muddy trench.’ If a clear and direct prose is the 
mark of a horizontal style, then Rorty is more consistent in producing accessible and straight-
                                               
28  I will make use of Rorty’s reading of Derrida later in this Introduction. 
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forward texts, even when writing for professional philosophers. ‘Octet’ is not a conventional or 
simple story, and its originality makes it one of the most commented upon stories from Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men.29 Zadie Smith wrote that ‘Octet’ will “make or break you as a 
reader of Wallace” since the short story asks the reader “to have faith in something he cannot 
possibly ever finally determine in language […] His urgency, his sincerity, his apparent 
desperation to ‘connect’ with his reader in a genuine way” (287). My reading also considers a 
reader willing to engage with Wallace’s literature. But also, and this is no longer what Smith 
wrote about, that he does not offer eternal arguments or assurances in his literature. In this sense, 
the ‘faith’ lies in accepting the contingency of vocabulaires, both the reader’s own and 
Wallace’s. Moreover, another part of the ‘make or break’ quality of ‘Octet’ in my reading is its 
difficulty.  ‘Octet’ is an unconventional short story, it has the form of an incomplete pop quiz 
that contains various narrations. This particularity ‘makes’ the reader willing to engage with the 
story’s originality, while it ‘breaks’ the reader unwilling to do so. The four main texts I analyze 
in my dissertation present a similar demand from the reader. My reading of the end of ‘Octet’ 
might seem to contain a certain essentialism, betraying the idea that there is a single, perennial 
way of writing from ‘the trench with the rest of us.’ This interpretation is suggested by the 
dualism of Wallace’s image, with the ‘Olympian HQ’ as a kind of realm of forms and the muddy 
trench as empirical reality. Yet in the reading sustained by my thesis, writing in the ‘Olympian 
HQ’ equals to writing with a metaphysical view of Literature in mind, as well as a disinterest in 
expanding either public or private vocabularies. To write while ‘quivering in the mud’ is 
therefore the experimental effort to create texts that can expand vocabularies and instigate or 
aid conversations between people. The clearest example of this effort will appear in the last 
chapter of this dissertation, where I argue that in The Pale King Wallace wrote literature that 
redescribes the democratic citizen in the United States. Not only that, I also argue for a 
redescription of how the literary text can itself participate in a democracy.  
To expand my presentation of Rorty, I’ll now offer critiques of his pragmatism from the 
book Deconstruction and Pragmatism, (1996) an edited registry of a conference in Paris that 
included Rorty and Derrida. Since Rorty is given a chance to respond to the critiques of his 
                                               
29  It’s worth mentioning, as an example, that in his survey of Wallace’s short stories, Chis Power chooses 
‘Octet’ as an exemplary piece of Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (2015). In ‘David Foster Wallace’s OCTET 
and the ATTHAKAVAGGA’ Mary K. Holland reads the story’s metafictionality through Buddist philosophy, 
broadening the depth of the story. In the aforementioned ‘(New) Sincerity in David Foster Wallace's “Octet”’, 




work, the discussion offers better descriptions of his theory. Rorty is the only pragmatist in the 
book. The motor of the debate is that other participants, including the editor, dislike Rorty’s 
placement of Derrida and deconstruction in the field of private vocabularies, claiming that there 
is little direct utility for that philosophy in the public-political conversations.  
 Even though Rorty reads Derrida as sharing “Dewey’s utopian hopes”, he does not see 
Derrida’s “work as contributing, in any clear or direct way, to the realization of these hopes” 
(16). He does see it as aiding with an individual's self-realization or, in other words, with the 
construction of their private vocabulary. The ensuing conversation revolves around the use and 
definition of vocabularies, which prompts this useful description by Rorty:  
I do not see how to ‘theorize’ the nature of the partition between the private and the 
public, except to say that by ‘the private’ I mean the part of life in which we carry our 
duties to ourselves, and do not worry about the effects of our actions to others. By the 
public I mean the part in which we do worry about such effects. (74)   
 
This definition is clear enough for the concepts to be useful for my reading. However, Rorty is 
pressed for a more precise definition, yet one too close to a metaphysical or absolute reasoning, 
as if the concepts are read as transcendental in order to criticize them. Consider Chantal Mouffe's 
description of how Rorty insists “on the need to keep completely apart the private and the public 
realms and by envisaging politics solely in terms of pragmatic, short-term compromises” (3). 
It’s true that Rorty sees politics as “a matter of pragmatic, short-term reforms and compromises” 
(17), yet this definition drains Rorty’s pragmatism of its contingency, its praise of imagination, 
and its future-orientation by placing it in unmovable terms (eg. “completely apart”). The other 
philosophers repeat the same error.  
 Simon Critchley makes the valid observation that “Rorty’s definition of liberalism is 
ethico/political and pays no attention to the economic liberalism” (23). It’s true that Rorty does 
not discuss economics in his theory, yet I don’t think he saw it as his role as a philosopher to do 
so. Consider his description of Marx as an example of this separation of roles: “I think that it 
was a misfortune for the left that Marx, a brilliant political economist, happened to have taken 
a degree in philosophy when he was young” (75). I believe that Critchley’s critique is the result 
of a habit of asking philosophers for an epistemological system that surveys and judges all 
human endeavours. This doesn’t mean that American Pragmatism rejects economic theory; such 
theories and discussions on economy in general could easily be placed in the realm of public 
vocabularies. However, such theories are probably a job for an economist, not a philosopher. 
Critchley’s error is reading the contingency and openness of Rorty’s concepts and vocabularies 
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as imprecisions, and his demands are ultimately metaphysical ones.30 Further evidence of this 
are Critchley’s doubts on someone being a (private) ironist and a (public) liberal at the same 
time: “After having given no compelling reasons as to why a liberal should also be an ironist, 
Rorty goes on to claim, ‘There is no reason the ironist cannot be a liberal’” (25). Critchley wants 
what Rorty cannot give: a metaphysical reason, an ahistorical and neutral argument. This is seen 
in his conclusion that an ironist “cannot display the same degree of social hope as the liberal 
metaphysician. But isn’t this just to suggest that the liberal ironist is regressive, sedentary, and 
hopeless” (25).  Critchley demands permanent definitions from Rorty. A metaphysician can 
show a higher degree of hope because there is a supposed assurance in their beliefs: the end of 
time, the arrival at utopia, eternal heaven. Pragmatism cannot offer such assurances, however, 
this does not mean it is a hopeless or nihilistic project. This dissertation shows (specifically in 
the fourth chapter) that hope permeates Rorty’s pragmatism, since hope drives the effort to 
create a better future when no eternal assurances can be given.  
 Ernesto Laclau makes valid observations while also falling into a similar error to 
Critchley. His useful definition of Rortyan irony notes that it alludes “to an absence of 
foundation which creates a gap or distance between strong belief and rational underpinning of 
that belief” (64). However, Laclau also feels the word irony suggests “offhandish detachment.” 
This critique is then expanded to the concept of vocabularies, claiming that Rorty is “never 
entirely clear about the theoretical status of the basic distinctions which govern its categories.” 
(64) Rorty replies that the term irony might not be “a suitable description of moral courage” but 
by that point in his career he was simply “stuck with it” (74). With regards to the critique of 
vocabularies, Rorty responds he is “unclear about the utility of the notion of ‘theoretical status’” 
and there is no fixed separation of private and public vocabularies since he “wasn’t interested 
in stabilizing anything” (74). The separation I make between texts by Wallace that have either 
a private or a public function does not mean that this is the only use that can be given to them. 
This follows Rorty’s use of theory, where “as a good pragmatist, I think that theories are like 
tools: you only reach for them when there is a specific problem to be solved. There is no criterion 
of inadequacy of theorization apart from the specification or such a problem” (74). With this 
                                               
30 For example, when Critchley states that “by restricting irony and ironists to the private sphere, Rorty might be 
said to refuse the possibility of a critique of liberal society that would use the strategy of public irony to uncover 
the violence of liberalism” (24) it is really only himself who is making this strict relegation of irony as a 
rhetorical device to a specific sphere of discourse. When he asks “is [Rorty] not in fact attempting to base moral 
obligation and political practice upon a recognition of the other’s suffering?” (26) The answer is no, since Rorty 
never talks about obligations. Also, Critchley’s question is somewhat unclear in the sense that he does not clarify 
if, for him, the ‘moral obligation’ he talks about is to notice the suffering of others or to act upon it.  
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simile in mind, I’ll present a final point by Laclau. He sees a “danger” in Rorty’s pragmatism 
of “parochialism - its reduction to only those strategic moves that are possible within the 
discursive universe of American liberalism” (67). The concern over said parochialism is valid, 
even for this thesis, since it revolves around two thinkers from the U.S.31 However, maintaining 
Rortyan irony should be enough to minimize it; anything more could fall into a demand for a 
‘neutral’ theory. Rorty however understands this as part of the limits of his vocabulary: “Perhaps 
the best Laclau and I can do is keep on reminding each other of the dangers of these two32 forms 
of parochialism” (75). The non-metaphysical antidote to said parochialism is a continuous 
conversation.  
It’s worth reiterating that this dissertation doesn’t aim to prove Rorty’s influence on 
Wallace, nor to decipher Wallace’s intentions. I certainly have and will continue to make use of 
biographical information about Wallace’s engagement with Pragmatism, but these are critical 
footholds that clarify and promote my reading of his texts. They serve the goal of opening 
Wallace’s work to Rorty’s brand of American Pragmatism and add to the qualities that readers 
consider characteristic of Wallace’s writings: texts that try to participate in the life of the muddy 
trench. I am also not suggesting or implying that this kind of reading can only be Rortyan. A 
less philosophical and more biographical approach is possible by studying Wallace’s widely-
acknowledged interest in Lewis Hyde’s The Gift and Joseph Campbell’s Myths to Live By:33 the 
former studies art as something that exists beyond a market economy; the latter, the common 
role of myth in all cultures. Both texts find a unifying quality in literature for a society and the 
individual, and in this broad sense they parallel Rorty. All three thinkers consider the positive 
effects of literature on civilization without engaging with aesthetics; if a poem rhymes or not, if 
a novel is in first- or third-person is ultimately unimportant to their readings; their ultimate 
measure is the effect the text has on the reader. Both Hyde and Campbell’s theories are, 
however, limited by their use of absolute concepts and essences (this a Rortyan critique) since 
                                               
31 It’s worth specifying that the concern is valid in the sense that one should always be on the lookout for 
possible parochialism during public dialogues (i.e. within a country or between countries, institutions, 
communities, etc.). The point being that a statement cannot be made free of historical or cultural circumstances. 
I’ll make this point with regards to Wallace’s oeuvre, specifically in the chapters on Signifying Rappers and The 
Pale King, interpreting the fact that Wallace so often wrote from the purview of middle class white Americans 
not as insularity but as a recognition of the limits of his vocabulary and always aware of the threat of said 
parochialism.  
32  French parochialism being the other one.  
33  Jeffrey Severs saw Wallace’s copy of The Gift at the archive in Austin, Texas and tells us that “annotations in 
many different pens suggesting multiple readings of The Gift (common in Wallace’s beloved books).” (122) He 
also notes that next to a blurb in his edition of Myths to Live By Wallace write “This is my pt,” (2017: 265) which 
I assume means ‘personal truth.’ Both books are in the Wallace Archive of The Ransom Center.  
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their concepts of Gift and Myth, respectively, act as eternal constants in human culture. The 
field of Wallace’s studies would benefit from further investigation of the influence of both texts 
on Wallace, however, for my aims, they would only serve to validate Wallace’s literature. In 
other words, the end point of Hyde’s and Campbell’s concepts of Gift and Myth is to show that 
stories have a specific positive use in civilization, and the conclusion of a reading of Wallace 
with those concepts is to prove that his literature functions as Gift and/or Myth, so that it fulfils 
the set requirements. How is this different from stating that it’s read as a Rortyan anti-essentialist 
literature? As mentioned in the opening paragraph, I’m interested in a redescription of Wallace, 
one that ultimately gives his oeuvre a broader theoretical utility. Therefore, a more robust 
understanding of Wallace should be the result of opening and exposing a democratic element in 
his work that has been either ignored or underdeveloped. That being said, contingency is an 
integral part of Rorty’s theory and therefore part of my reading as well: I don’t hold that Rortyan 
theory is the only theory that can elucidate said aspect of Wallace, simply that it’s the most 
useful one I found for my aims. In this sense, I hope that the aspects of Wallace’s work that I’ll 
present through the course of this thesis become part of the greater conversation on his oeuvre. 
I also believe that it is with Rortyan philosophy, and not the approaches listed above, that 
Wallace’s writing can be linked to and integrated into various social and political debates. If, 
over time, the role of Rorty’s Pragmatism, like Wittgenstein’s ladder, is cast aside, it would have 
still proven its usefulness.  
It’s now worth mentioning that although I use the term democracy throughout the 
dissertation, I never address its nuances as a political system. Neither Wallace nor Rorty do so 
either. An attempt to extract a precise democratic structure from their writings would miss the 
point. Rorty often addressed this intent: “Asking for pragmatism’s blueprint of the future is like 
asking Whitman to sketch what lies at the end of that illimitable democratic vista. The vista, not 
the endpoint, matters” (PSH 28). Following that description, this dissertation offers an 
understanding of Wallace’s vista.  
The majority of Wallace’s approaches to politics are tangential. In his fiction he often 
imagined hyperbolical futures (looking forward to the 1990s from 1987’s Broom, or to 2009 
from 1996’s Infinite Jest), taking an element from his present to its ultimate conclusion to 
highlight an inherent symptom.34 In various essays he addressed politics through the ethics and 
morals of topics such as linguistics, entertainment, and lobster festivals. In 2000 Wallace wrote 
                                               
34 An example of this could be the fictional movie ‘Infinite Jest’ which is so addictive people watch it until they 
die. This could be read as an extreme sign of the United States’ addiction to entertainment.  
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“Up, Simba”, a long essay on the campaign of the then Republican presidential candidate John 
McCain. This could seem to be his most political text, and yet even with a clear political topic 
Wallace’s peripheral style,35 as exemplified above with his article on Lynch, is present: in “Up, 
Simba” Wallace pays a great deal of attention to the people working ‘behind the scenes’ of the 
campaign trail and to all the media surrounding the campaign.36 However, to introduce the 
political in Wallace I will intead briefly analyze “Deciderization 2007”, the introduction he 
wrote for the 2007 edition of The Best American Essays, from the The Best American Series 
collection, which he co-edited. Although this essay—one of the last texts Wallace wrote—does 
not have an extensive discussion of politics, it’s concise in a way that sums-up Wallace’s 
political interests at the end of his career. Essays like “Up, Simba” are less useful for my reading 
since Wallace wrote them before 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, two events that affected his 
politics. So “Deciderization 2007” is an amplification of “Up, Simba”, not in the word-count 
but in its conceptual aspect.  
Wallace uses his characteristic non-fiction voice in “Deciderization 2007”, a mix of 
sincerity, clarity, metatextuality, and a bit of self-deprecation to both welcome and disarm the 
reader. He explains his role as guest-editor and his biases for selecting essays, opening up a 
discussion on the triages of freedom, even though, at first, there’s a potential irony in his 
statements where the promises of American democracy are empty statements: “the reader has 
more freedom of choice, which is of course what America is all about” (299). The sentence ends 
with the same phrase that ends the chorus of the “Hokey Pokey,” which might not suggest 
seriousness. However, as we read on it’s apparent that there is no cynical or demeaning irony in 
the text. Wallace also repeats certain phrases or words throughout the text, and when we 
consider Wallace’s vast lexicon and mastery of form this is more than a stylistic tic.  
                                               
35  In the essay’s opening “OPTIONAL FOREWORD” (CL 156) Wallace state’s that the essay isn’t “so much” 
about “the campaign of one impressive guy, but rather what McCain’s candidacy and the brief weird excitement 
it generated might reveal about how millennial politics and all its packaging and marketing and strategy and 
media and spin and general sepsis actually makes us US voters feel, inside, and whether anyone running for 
anything can even be ‘real’ anymore - whether what we actually want is something real or something else.” (CL 
159) 
36  As a part of analyzing the role and importance of public media and advertising in political campaigns, Wallace 
includes in the essay a ‘GLOSSARY OF RELEVANT CAMPAIGN TRAIL VOCAB, MOSTLY COURTESY 
OF JIM C. AND THE NETWORK NEWS TECHS’ (cf. CL 167-70) The term ‘VOCAB’, of course, sounds very 
Rortyan, and its intention is, too. Appearing at the start of the essay, the glossary helps bridge the unique event 
that is a presidential campaign in the U.S., creating its own industry and cultural significance every time they 
come around. The relevant words from the ‘VOCAB’ not only brings the reader ‘closer’ to the event, it indicates 
what is spoken of the most: what has the most relevance in conversations during the campaign trail.  
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Over the length of 19 paperback-pages he uses the phrase “U.S. culture right now” three 
times in the first half of the text. This repetition contextualises Wallace’s aesthetic and political 
criteria for the reader, as well as freeing them from metaphysical or atemporal uses. To continue 
the Rortyan concepts, Wallace presents a contingent definition of and approach to his country's 
culture, highlighting the circumstances that led to his country’s present. The term “Total Noise” 
appears 4 times in the essay to name a condition of “U.S. culture right now”; “a culture and 
volume of info and spin and rhetoric and context that I know I’m not alone in finding too much 
to even absorb” (BF 301). It also serves to describe the setting where the selected essays come 
from and what they face, and which Wallace addresses and responds to at the end of the essay. 
His concern for the “overall roar of info and context” results in the search, study, and creation 
of “models and guides for how large or complex sets of facts can be sifted, culled, and arranged 
in meaningful ways” (312). The movement from the ‘roar’ to the ‘arranged’ is also present in 
the structure of the essay, which works like a paced confession. This appears in the essay’s title, 
which is a reference to a 2006 remark by president George W. Bush in a press conference: “I’m 
the decider.”37 It’s a comic choice that, again, eases the reader into certain topics. The Bush 
administration and invasion of Iraq haunt the start of the essay and we may get the impression 
that although referenced they will never be directly named. For example, Bush is not named 
when Wallace mentions the ‘Decider’ term for the first time (cf. 303).  
Wallace’s references become more overt and direct in the last pages of the essay, 
declaring that: “we are in a state of three-alarm emergency---‘we’ basically meaning America 
as a polity and culture” (BF 313). This emergency is obviously tied to specific historical and 
temporal circumstances that Wallace addresses directly. The reelection of Bush in 2004 
impacted his criterion as editor, admitting he “would have selected more memoirs or descriptive 
pieces on ferns and geese” if it wasn’t because said reelection “rendered me, as part of the U.S. 
electorate, historically complicit in his administration’s policies and conduct” (313). Wallace 
then refers to the invasion of Iraq as an event that involves too much information, too much 
‘Total Noise,’ for one citizen to absorb and sort through. It is this pertinent sorting that Wallace 
believes most of the selected essays do, therefore referring to those texts as “the service essay, 
with ‘service’ here referring to both professionalism and virtue” (315). In other words, the 
essays he selected try to aid the civic life of a democratic citizen. They are also “pieces that 
                                               
37  http://edition.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld/ 
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undercut reflexive dogma” and counter the citizen’s temptation to “retreat to narrow arrogance” 
(316) when the ‘Total Noise’ becomes unbearable and ineluctable.  
This kind of thinking, I will argue, is the result of a meditation on ethics and civics that 
Wallace held throughout his literary career. His concept of the ‘service essay’ applies also to 
Wallace’s writing. It’s fair to claim that Wallace admired the ‘models and guides’ he found in 
some of the essays he collected because he had similar goals for his writing. In this sense, when 
I call Wallace’s writing democratic, I’m not solely referring to a prevalent theme in his work or 
an intellectual interest; instead, it’s a belief that influences the content, form, and purpose of his 
literature. This dissertation will show that Wallace’s literature does more than discuss 
democratic ideas. An understanding of his redescriptions, an engagement with the narratives 
and definitions he presents, is potentially accessible to all citizens of a democracy. This, 
however, does not mean simple texts or mere entertainments, on the contrary: the complexities 
of each text have a civic and ethical intent. Similar to his criterion as ‘decider’, Wallace’s 
literature has the capacity to help the reader escape the ‘Total Noise’ of ‘U.S. culture right now’ 
through more than an argumentative or emotional appeal to the reader. In “Deciderization 
2007”, Wallace adds that in the selected essays he found “not templates, but models” (BF 317) 
for how to live and think in our world. Through Rorty’s philosophy, this dissertation shows the 
civic models of Wallace’s literature and their relation to either of the aforementioned public and 
private vocabularies. The conflation of these elements allows us to consider the texts themselves 
as objects of democratic participation. In other words, Wallace’s texts are potential active 
participants in a democratic community. Rorty’s hope, following Dewey, is for a culture that “is 
no longer dominated by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement” 
(PMN 13). This dissertation proves how Wallace’s literature can act like a democratic agent that 
supplements or increases civic beliefs. I read ‘aesthetic enhancement’ as the expansion of a 
public vocabulary through the Pragmatist capacity of fiction. 
In Thomas Tracey’s ‘The Formative Years: David Foster Wallace’s Philosophical 
Influences and The Broom of the System,’ Tracey effectively studies the influence of American 
Pragmatism on Wallace. Tracey differs from my approach by making biographical information 
a core part of his argument. He also incorporates different American Pragmatists such as Dewey, 
Pierce, and James and, as the title indicates, Tracey focuses on The Broom of the System, a novel 
that receives little to no attention in this thesis. However, the key difference between our texts 
is his aim to “demonstrate a number of important points to enrich our understanding of the uses 
to which David Foster Wallace puts philosophy in the service of his fiction” (157). My reading, 
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on the other hand, uses philosophy to enrich our understanding of Wallace. The slight difference 
lies in that my main objective is to elucidate the democratic quality of Wallace’s writing, which 
shows the use of philosophy to this end being secondary. Nonetheless, I will present some of 
the salient results of Tracey’s research as a sort of conclusion that cements the field of Wallace 
and American Pragmatism.  
Tracey shows a connection to Pragmatism “via Wallace’s upbringing and intellectual 
association with his philosopher-father, James Donald, whose own ethical philosophy was 
firmly rooted within a vibrant American Pragmatist tradition” (175). The books that James D. 
Wallace published during Wallace’s lifetime, draw “deeply on American Pragmatism, 
especially on the work of John Dewey.” It’s highly likely that Wallace read all of his father’s 
publications, and we have evidence that he read38 Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict (1988). 
This is pertinent to my project because, as mentioned, John Dewey is one of Rorty’s main 
influences. This description of Dewey as intermediary between Rorty and Wallace Senior, and 
consequently his son, is grounded later in the essay when Tracey states that Rorty’s historicized 
view of moral consciousness39 is a “tenet” that is “much-emphasized in the work of James 
Donald Wallace” (168). Tracey extends the biographical information to prove that “there has 
always been a connection between Amherst Philosophy and American Pragmatist thought.” He 
lists a seminar on Pragmatism that both Wallace senior and son could have attended while in 
Amherst. In his analysis of Broom of the System, Tracey reads parts of the novel through Rortyan 
philosophy, specifically that of the aforementioned Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. One of 
the results of his approach is the following: “Implicit here is the claim that the social function 
of fiction in a secular world is that of moral guidance and spiritual nourishment” (168). As with 
Tracey’s study, this dissertation also works to ‘uncover’ said ‘substratum’ and that it’s 
motivated by a belief in the ‘social function of fiction in a secular world.’ In analyzing Broom 
of the System, he asks the Rortyan question, “What purpose does this book serve?” concluding 
that:  
                                               
38  To be precise, in the book’s preface, after stating “I have benefited considerably from the comments and 
criticisms of students, colleges, and others” a list of names appears, in which David Foster Wallace’s name is the 
second to last place. The list is then concluded with “all helped. I am indebted to them and others too.” (1988, ix) 
David’s name does not appear in his father’s next publication, Ethical Norms, Particular Cases. Since it came 
out in 1996, it’s fair to guess that David was too busy editing Infinite Jest to also read the proofs of his father’s 
book. 
39  Tracey quotes Irony, Contingency, and Solidarity to exemplify Rorty’s understanding of moral consciousness 
“as historically conditioned, a product as much of time and chance as of political or aesthetic consciousness.” 
(168 [ICS 30]) 
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A definite answer, set in stone, would be contrary to the spirit of the novel’s own 
Pragmatist sensibilities, which favor re-description over a monolithic final vocabulary. 
The question will extend in complexity and implication when examining whether and to 
what extent Wallace’s work employs irony in any straightforward or uncritical way--not 
to mention what useful artistic and social purpose he may thereby imply contemporary 
fiction ought to serve. (172)  
 
I quote the entire paragraph because it could be read as a brief introduction to this thesis.  I also 
‘examine’ the ‘extent’ of the ‘useful artistic and social purpose’ of Wallace’s literature. The 
only difference is that I don’t look much at irony, which has enough attention to consider it an 
entire branch of Wallace’s studies. In Adam Kelly’s ‘David Foster Wallace: the Critical 
Reception’ (2015), he argues that the first wave of Wallace criticism was greatly shaped by the 
author’s “challenge to prevailing artistic assumptions,” one of these being “the role of irony.” 
(47). By 2009, when the “second wave of Wallace scholarship” reached its “crest,” (49) the 
organizers for one of the first academic conferences on Wallace stated that they hoped to leave 
behind “the author’s own articulation of his project as a response to irony” (50). This is an 
interest shared with the “third wave of scholarship” however,  in the move between the two “one 
debate that has remained vital in Wallace’s critical reception relates to how irony and sincerity 
should be understood to function in his fiction” (52). In other words, irony has been a constant 
topic of interest in Wallace studies. It might however sound incorrect to say state that I don’t 
need to engage with this ‘branch’ when I in fact do mention irony in my arguments. Yet, when 
I do so, it is used purely as a Rortyan term, whereas Tracey oscillates between Wallace’s and 
Rorty’s usage of the term. It’s worth repeating, for clarity, Rorty’s definition of the term, quoted 
in page 19 of this introduction, as a “description of moral courage.”  
One of the few other scholarly arguments to make a connection between Rorty and 
Wallace comes in one of the most recent and prominent publications in Wallace scholarship, 
Marshall Boswell’s The Wallace Effect, David Foster Wallace and the Contemporary Literary 
Imagination40 (2019). Boswell maps the influence of Wallace in American literature and he 
brings in Rorty to analyze Richard Powers’s Prisoner’s Dilemma. He connects these three 
thinkers by first stating that “[i]n both Wallace and Powers, the claims of postructuralism are 
both honored and overcome via a pragmatic affirmation of usefulness within a larger suspicion 
of metaphysical certainty.” (38) Boswell believes that Powers’s contribution to this response 
has been somewhat eclipsed by Wallace’s popularity, and he uses Rorty, whose “work dovetails 
                                               
40  This book is the academic sequel to Lucas Thompson’s Global Wallace, the first book in the David Foster 
Wallace Studies series. I’ll make extensive use of Global Wallace in the first chapter of my dissertation.  
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with that of” Powers (41), to give “Powers his due in this regard” since “Powers sounded this 
call in 1988, whereas Wallace finally clarified his own set of ideas five years later, in 1993” 
(38). Although Boswell focuses on reading Prisoner’s Dilemma through Rorty, one of the goals 
of his interpretation is to demonstrate that “Power’s own take on the problem both antedates and 
amplifies Wallace’s arguments” (38). Despite Boswell’s astute recognition of Wallace’s 
Rortyan approach to theory, however, I won’t make further use of this text in the dissertation 
since in the quoted chapter on Powers and throughout that book his interest lies in the way other 
writers predated or paralleled aspects of Wallace’s work. There is not much else to quote or 
dialogue with regarding Boswell’s observations of the connection between Wallace and Rorty.  
The academic that’s done the most extensive reading of Wallace via Rorty, however, 
must be Clare Hayes-Brady in her 2016 book The Unspeakable Failures of David Foster 
Wallace: Language, Identity, and Resistance. Hinging on the eponym connection of 
“Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature”, Hayes-Brady’s approach is similar to Tracey’s in that 
she interprets in Wallace a direct response to Rorty. Also similar to Tracey, Hayes-Brady 
focuses on a reading of The Broom of the System. I believe this repetition is the result of the 
critical practicality dialogue formed by Wallace, Wittgenstein, and Rorty. Since Wallace read 
both thinkers, Rorty read Wittgenstein, and Broom constantly interacts with Wittgenstein, the 
connections between thinkers and texts seem to beg an intricate reading.  
Hayes-Brady studies the concept of failure in Wallace’s oeuvre “occurring in three 
modes: abject, structural, and generative” (4). In chapter four of her book, after a close reading 
of the characters and dialogues in Broom, she states that in the novel “Wallace both propounds 
and undermines the outcome of Rorty’s dogma of pragmatism” (85). Hayes-Brady’s 
argumentation for this statement seems somewhat unclear, since she does not make a critical 
differentiation between private and public vocabularies. She picks a passage from Broom as an 
example of Wallace ‘propounding’ and ‘undermining’ Rorty’s concept of vocabularies, 
discussing both the possibilities of communication and also ethical and moral issues. I will show 
(both here and throughout the dissertation) that not only is Rorty aware of these issues, they are 
clearly at the center of his project. Here is Hayes-Brady’s example of Wallace ‘undermining’ 
Rorty: 
If LaVache understands his fathers intention when he asks whether his son has a phone, 
and replies in the negative [LaVache calls it a ‘lymph node’], which negative holds true 
in his private vocabulary, but not, as he is aware, in the social vocabulary his father is 




I believe that one does not need Rorty to consider that LaVache may be acting in bad faith, that 
it’s all a pompous ruse to avoid speaking to his father. Access to a supposed final vocabulary 
does not mean that lying disappears, only that we could always judge with certainty if a 
statement is true or false. So, if LaVache’s father gained access to the metavocabulary of 
existence, it would only serve him, in this situation, to know if his son is lying to him or not. 
Yet the scene can be easily explained by ‘Rorty’s dogma of pragmatism’ without it being 
‘undermined’.  
Considering the aforementioned prominence given to Derrida in Broom, it seems fitting 
to look at the use of Derrida in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity to explain private 
vocabularies and their place in Rorty’s pragmatism. I think that Hayes-Brady is right in seeing 
the clash between father and son as an issue between private and public vocabularies (I’m not 
entirely sure why she uses the word ‘social’ but it works nonetheless). Rorty makes an example 
of the creative and constructive use of private vocabularies by presenting Derrida’s 
unwillingness to engage directly with John Searle in a discussion about the work of J.L. Austin. 
Searle’s critiques of and questions about Derrida’s take on Austin were made in the vocabulary 
of analytic philosophy and could only be addressed within it: “Derrida systematically evaded 
this dilemma” (CIS 132). Rorty defends Derrida’s response (as well as Derrida’s texts written 
with a similar intention)41 as a great creative, innovative, and critical private vocabulary to a 
philosophical tradition: 
I take it that Derrida does not want to make a single move within the language game 
which distinguishes between fantasy and argument, philosophy and literature, serious 
writing and playful writing - the language game of la grande époque. He is not going to 
play by the rules of somebody else’s final vocabulary. (CIS 133) 
 
This could be LaVache’s stance and motivation for establishing and maintaining a private 
vocabulary of his own creation, even if the clash is familial instead of philosophical. However, 
the father/son connection in Broom only strengthens this reading, since Rorty, following 
Derrida’s words, plays with the terms of a philosophical genealogy by giving the dispute 
parental terms:  
[Derrida] refuses not because he is “irrational,” or “lost in fantasy,” or too dumb to 
understand what Austin and Searle are up to but because he is trying to create himself 
                                               
41  Rorty makes a distinction between the early and the late Derrida, stating that the first “was initially tempted by 
the transcendental project” (CIS 125) while the later Derrida is free from it: “Instead of pairing down, the later 
Derrida proliferates.” (CIS 126, although the description is made from 122 to 126) It is the later Derrida that 
‘responds’ to Searle.  
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by creating his own language game, trying to avoid bearing another child by Socrates, 
being another footnote to Plato. (CIS 133) 
 
In this sense, LaVache’s stance could be seen as a refusal to be defined by someone else’s 
vocabulary, be it his father’s or that of an institution or tradition. As stated before, the 
interpretation can ultimately be based on whether the reader sees LaVache as, quickly put, a 
good character or a bad one in the moral sense, as an aid or a deterrent to his sister, the 
protagonist. Yet even if we read LaVache as acting in bad faith, it does not “undermine” Rorty’s 
theory since we can read LaVache the same way that Rorty reads Lolita’s Humbert Humbert: a 
character whose “private obsessions” make them “oblivious to the pain and humiliation [they] 
are causing” (CIS 141). I develop such a reading in the first and second chapter of this 
dissertation, where I also explain in detail how ‘obsessed’ and ‘oblivious’ characters relate to 
the concept of vocabularies and Rorty’s theory as a whole. What is pertinent to this specific 
reading is that Rorty defends and propounds vocabularies, be it public or private, that show an 
“effort to make our institutions and practices more just and less cruel” (CIS xiv). I believe this 
gives us clear Rortyan approaches to LaVache’s vocabulary, be it with LaVache maintaining a 
sort of autonomy of vocabularies or as a Navokobian example of someone indifferent to the pain 
of others. Rorty’s defense of vocabularies that aim for what is ‘more just and less cruel’ also 
refutes Hayes-Brady’s critique of vocabularies: “Rorty allowed for no hierarchy of vocabularies, 
and as such, instead of rendering communication clearer in its contingency, he complicates it 
further by allowing it to be further malleable” (83). It’s true that Rorty cannot offer a neutral 
(i.e. epistemological, metaphysical, eternal, absolute, etc.) reason to prefer one vocabulary over 
another but this does not mean he doesn’t have a preference. The hope of most of his 
publications is not so much to prove he was right, rather it’s to convince readers that if they 
adopt his way of understanding and using vocabularies a great deal of suffering might be 
avoided: “conversation replaces confrontation” (PMN 170).  The separation of the private and 
the public is not a hierarchy based on epistemological or metaphysical evidence, but the 
argument and preference for a specific use of and approach to vocabularies is made by Rorty. 
Moreover, Rorty’s call for future-oriented vocabularies that reduce human suffering and 
humiliation and move humanity towards a utopia can at least be considered a standard for 
adopting and constructing vocabularies (cf. CIS 189-98). The following quote from Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature connects the approach to propositions with a wider ethical context:  
Shall we take “S knows that p” (or “S knows noninferentially that p,” or “S believes 
incorrigibly that p,” or “S’s knowledge that p is certain”) as a remark about the status of 
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S’s reports among his peers, or shall we take it as a remark about the relation between 
subject and object, between nature and its mirror? The first alternative leads to a 
pragmatic view of truth and a therapeutic approach to ontology (in which philosophers 
can straighten out pointless quarrels between common sense and science, but not 
contribute any arguments of its own for the existence or inexistence of something.)42 
(175) 
 
I find Rorty’s prose to be clear and easy to follow considering the density of his topic and 
arguments. The problem with his argument and beliefs seems to be that he can’t give a 
metaphysical or epistemological justification of his criterion but, of course, that’s the whole 
point.43 I argue that Hayes-Brady and other critics44 who apply Rorty’s theory to Wallace’s texts 
get too hung up on Rorty’s dismissal of Truth when this is only the starting point of his 
philosophical project. This may be a result of constantly reading Rorty under the shadow of 
Wittgenstein, specifically the first Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, since it 
limits the reach of Rorty’s philosophical project. An example of this is present in the following 
statement by Hayes-Brady: “For Rorty, the most important thing is to keep the conversation 
going” (85). This statement isn’t wrong but it doesn’t tell us why and how the conversation 
should continue, which I consider to be the driving force of Rorty’s project. By not including 
his concepts of hope and utopia in an exposition of his work, Rorty’s philosophy appears to be 
a sort of postmodern nihilism. It’s also curious that for a philosopher who wrote so much on 
literature and who gave fiction an edifying social and individual role above philosophy,45 (does 
that count as hierarchical?) that his Wallacian literary readers focus on his anti-epistemological 
statements. (Again, these readers appear in Chapter one.) 
This partial presentation of Rorty’s philosophical project also appears in the first 
paragraph of page 84 of Unspeakable Failures, where part of the “inescapable problems” of the 
construction of language is “the nature of truth as a property of statements, not of facts.” A 
phrase that can be considered a starting point for analytic philosophy and that could be attributed 
                                               
42  It’s worth noting, again, that Rorty is not presenting this view as his original work but as the sum of both 
Sellars and Quine. 
43  “There is no neutral, noncircular way to defend the liberal’s claim that cruelty is the worst thing we do” (CIS 
197). 
44  Apart from Clare Hayes-Brady, the clearest examples are Greg Carlisle in Nature’s Nightmare; Paul Giles in 
‘All Swallowed Up: David Foster Wallace and American Literature’. I will engage both text in the next chapter.  
45  This is why the presence of novelists and poets seems to equal or outnumber the presence of philosophers in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Consider that the only philosopher to get a chapter dedicated to their work is 
Derrida (Chapter 6), while Nabokov and Orwell each get their own (Chapters 7 and 8, respectively).  
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to an early Bertrand Russell.46 The paragraph ends with a quote47 by Rorty on truths being 
human constructions, the import of which Hayes-Brady summarizes clearly: “He argues further 
that language is made, not discovered, and as such, truth is a creation, not an extrinsic reality” 
(84). This is, however, hardly an original tenet of Rorty’s philosophy. If we go to the quote’s 
source (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity) we’ll find that before the quoted statement Rorty 
lets us know he is being “thoroughly Wittgensteinian” in his “approach to language” (21). Rorty 
often presents the sum of various philosophical arguments to justify and present the starting 
point of his work, this is the structure of both Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and of 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. This is why the quote appears at the end of the book’s first 
chapter, ‘The Contingency of Language’ (CIS 3-22). The attribution of said statements as 
Rorty’s original work could be taken as proof of a symptom of literary critics, including myself, 
who are usually well-versed in Continental philosophy but often lost when it comes to its 
Analytic counterpart.  
 A similar connection is again made in Unspeakable Failures to show that, with 
vocabularies, Rorty advances “Wittgenstein’s language games” by proposing “a paradigm he 
calls ‘epistemological behaviorism,’ which explains ‘rationality and epistemic authority by 
reference to what society lets us say, instead of the latter by reference to the former’” (85 [PMN 
173]). Rorty presents epistemological behaviorism in the second section (173-82) of the fourth 
chapter in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, which “is concerned with epistemology and 
with recent attempts to find ‘successor subjects’ to epistemology” (10). In it, Rorty presents a 
genealogy or history of the belief that established the concept of the human mind mirroring 
reality (i.e. metaphysics, epistemology) and the quest for Truth, followed by the subsequent 
arguments that argue the impossibility of eternal certainty. In Chapter four, Rorty ‘confines’ 
himself to “discussing two radical ways of criticizing the Kantian foundations of analytic 
philosophy” through the philosophy Sellars and Quine. So epistemological behaviourism is the 
name Rorty makes to refer to both Sellars’ and Quine’s critique of Russell’s analytical project 
to find Kantian-like apodicts. (Rorty calls this the search for “privileged representations” [PMN 
170]).  
                                               
46  Compare to Russell’s“[A]ll sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions” (8) from A 
Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900). Leonard Linsky’s article ‘Terms and Propositions in 
Russell’s Principles of Mathematics’ (1988) is a good source for understanding how this sentence leads to 
a“belief in the supreme importance of logic as an instrument for philosophical progress” (621) that informs 
Russell’s philosophical project.  
47  “[S]ince truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence on vocabularies and 
since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths” (p84 in Hayes-Brady’s book and p21 in CIS). 
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 Rorty indeed uses the term ‘epistemological behaviourism’, and we can consider it a key 
part of his philosophical project, but more as proof of the influence of Sellars and Quine than as 
Rorty’s original creation: “Chapter four is the central chapter of the book--the one in which the 
ideas which led to its being written are presented. These ideas are those of Sellars and Quine” 
(PMN 10). To be clear, there’s no error in attributing the term to Rorty but it seems misleading 
or inaccurate to present it as a Rortyan ‘paradigm’ when it refers to the work of others. It’s clear 
that the philosophy of Sellars and Quine is a critical point between Wittgenstein and Rorty, and 
for his distance from the analytic project. Yet my objection is not spurred by a disagreement 
over the history of philosophy; rather, it’s about establishing a concise and accurate exposition 
of Rorty’s philosophy. As suggested above, it’s possible that readings like Hayes-Brady’s suffer 
from the self-imposed limits of only trying to prove Rorty’s influence on Wallace and on 
suggesting when Wallace responds to the philosopher. In this sense, the eponym connection 
between both writers is not only an irrefutable signpost, but also a pitfall that reduces Rortyan 
theory to the negation of Truth.48 
I’m in accordance with Hayes-Brady’s description of a kind of communication in 
Wallace’s literary project based on her approach via Wittgenstein and Rorty, one that aims “to 
create a narrative style that blurs the real/fictional divide by making the reader a co-producer of 
the text, in response to the text’s copious narrative blanks” (139). This conclusion can stand in 
the same field as the reading of The Pale King I develop in Chapter four, where I argue that the 
posthumous novel promotes and engages the reader in democratic participation. I challenge 
descriptions such as “Rortian mistrust of received truth” (139) because they paint Rorty as a sort 
of postmodern nihilist. My qualm with Hayes-Brady isn’t her reading of Wallace but what I 
consider to be an incomplete use of his Rorty’s philosophy, and I refute descriptions of his work 
suggesting that the abandonment of metaphysics and epistemology imply a loss of morality, 
meaning, and communication. For some reason, the majority of critical readers that apply 
Rorty’s theory to Wallace’s texts (as mentioned in footnote 38, Hayes-Brady, Carlisle, Giles) 
seem to read the end of metaphysics and epistemology as a reason to mourn. Yet I’ve always 
read Rorty’s work as one of constant good faith and hope. I therefore read his anti-
foundationalism as a liberation instead of a catastrophe.  
I’ll conclude with a summary of the chapters in this dissertation. Chapter one is on the 
short story “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature”, apart from the aforementioned eponym 
                                               




connection this story establishes between Wallace and Rorty, the relative obscurity of this story 
means I can closely interact with all the published close readings on it. I read the story through 
the concept of private vocabularies which contrasts with the anti-Truth focus of the other 
readings. The chapter also functions as a nuanced presentation of the concept of public 
vocabularies and makes use of Lucas Thompson’s Global Wallace to present the sources 
Wallace used to construct the story. Chapter two focuses on the discourse of two institutions in 
Infinite Jest: Enfield Tennis Academy and Ennet House. I again make use of the concept of 
private vocabularies to analyze the discourse of both institutions as they lead their members to 
an ultimate goal (professional tennis at Enfield and sobriety at Ennet). I try to make the case that 
Ennet’s AA discourse is efficient because it maintains a pragmatist discourse of contingency, 
while Enfield’s tries to make use of eternal and atemporal statements. The focus then shifts to 
the novel’s protagonists, Don Gately and Hal Incandenza. Since they’re closely tied to each 
institution, Don to Ennet and Hal to Enfield, I use their development, specially at the end of the 
novel, to exemplify and confirm my interpretation of said discourses.  
 Chapter three marks the shift from private to public vocabularies. I look at Wallace’s 
early and ignored book Signifying Rappers, making use of archival resources on the editing of 
the book available at the New York Public Library. I first use these resources to justify not 
interacting with the sections written by the co-author of the book, Mark Costello. More 
importantly, I use the archive to show Wallace’s awareness and intent of writing from one 
vocabulary to another; this is then linked to other critical work on rap music to exemplify the 
possibilities and capacities of communication between vocabularies. Chapter four is a kind of 
culmination of Rortyan theory in the dissertation and of my reading of Wallace. I present The 
Pale King as Wallace’s successful attempt at creating a civic and democratic literature that is 
beyond propaganda and indoctrination. The novel represents civic acts and democratic 
conversations, more than that, the text itself can be seen as a civic and democratic agent 
participating in the democratic conversation of the United States. In this sense, the novel 
describes the civic capacities of literature in a democratic nation by engaging with its citizens 
on how they view themselves as members of said nation and on how they talk about and describe 




Mirror Titles: Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of 




In this chapter I wish to identify the existence and use of vocabularies in Wallace’s work by 
reading his short story ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ through the philosophy of Richard 
Rorty. My overall critical approach to this story is to ask the concise Pragmatist question I ask 
all texts in this dissertation, and which Rorty poses in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity: “What 
purposes does this book serve?” (CIS 142) This chapter will show this critically ignored short 
story can serve in the construction of private vocabularies, a theme that will continue onto the 
next chapter on Infinite Jest. I also consider the story’s other literary influences and key 
academic work devoted to the story. 
As mentioned in the introduction, a shared title is the clearest connection between the 
work of David Foster Wallace and that of Richard Rorty. The title in question is found in 
Wallace’s 2004 short story collection Oblivion, which includes the text ‘Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature,’ and in Rorty’s 1979 publication Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. That 
Wallace took the title of Rorty’s book for his own story is more than a casual allusion, it is both 
a specific reference and an invitation to establish a dialogue between the two texts.  
This connection between philosophy and fiction is not unique in Wallace’s work. His 
first novel, The Broom of the System, references and converses with the work of both Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida. In the early essay “David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress”, on a novel where a character inhabits the world described in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Wallace shows an avid interest in ‘testing out’ philosophical theories in fiction. 
This chapter explores the possibility that ‘Mirror’ fictionalized (or ‘tests’) ideas presented in 
Rorty’s homonymous text.  
However, despite the title, the story is not overtly Rortyan and it is initially unclear how 
the narration engages with Rorty’s Pragmatism. I believe this has led to ‘Mirror’ being ignored 
or given imprecise readings. I engage with these readings in detail later on in the chapter. For 
now, I will present some brief examples. The recent Cambridge Companion to David Foster 
Wallace (2018) has a chapter by David Herring on the collection Oblivion (cf. 97-110), yet the 
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only mention of ‘Mirror’ is the following: “[…] while in [‘Mirror’] a mother and a son’s lengthy 
ride inside a bus with a ‘flesh-colored’ interior prompts a series of reflections on failed litigation 
and personal, vengeful, unhappiness” (99). I believe these underdeveloped interpretations often 
result from an absence of philosophical signposting in the narration itself; the story lacks the 
kind of explicit philosophical play common in texts like Broom of the System. In this sense, the 
connection between both thinkers is often made but rarely expanded upon, with the subtleties 
of Rorty’s philosophy ignored.  
 Critical readers of ‘Mirror’ often overlook the fact that the short story is a blend of three 
sources: apart from Rorty, Wallace makes use of the short story ‘Everything That Rises Must 
Converge’ (1965) by Flannery O’Connor, and of sections from the book The Red Hourglass: 
Lives of the Predators (1988) by Gordon Grice. Although my main interest is the story’s relation 
to Rorty’s theory, I will present the other two sources to construct a robust reading of the story. 
‘Mirror’ is an 8-page, one-paragraph monologue in which the protagonist and narrator 
talks about his life while accompanying his mother on the bus. The mother has had two botched 
facial cosmetic surgeries, and because of it “her face was a chronic mask of insane terror” (O 
182). They take the bus to visit the attorney carrying out the lawsuit against the mother’s latest 
cosmetic surgeon. The narrator is a man of “imposing size” (189) who wears “goggles” and 
“specially constructed gloves” (183), and collects and breeds black widows in his home garage. 
He was incarcerated for negligence because a child fell through the roof of his garage, crashed 
on the widows’ habitat, and died from their bites. 
 In my Rortyan reading, the narrator’s obsessions are the root of his mother’s sufferings 
yet he is unable to recognize this connection. This interpretation, which I’ll develop throughout 
the chapter, is uncommon in Wallace studies, since most of them, as I’ll show, focus more on 
what the protagonist describes, while the crux of my reading lies on what the character ignores 
and the manner in which he does it. The mother paid for her first botched operation with “a 
small product liability settlement” (O 182) from an insecticide company: “her original liability 
was that a worker at the assembly plant actually glued a can’s nozzle on facing backward” (188). 
Some of the academic readings of this story acknowledge the ‘liability settlement,’ but none 
press the issue as to why she was spraying insecticide in the first place. I find that the narrator 
provides a clear answer: “Her fear of the phylum arthropodae is long-standing which is why 
she never ventured in the garage […] Ironically also hence her constant spraying of R - - d© 
despite my repeatedly advising her that these species are long-resistant to resmethrin and trans-
d allethrin” (185) The mother is afraid of the spiders her son keeps and breeds so she constantly 
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uses insecticide in her home. She also tries to take the insecticide with her when she visits the 
attorney: “The phobia becomes so extreme she will carry a can in her bag of knitting until I 
always find it before leaving and say firmly, No” (186). This may sound like an exaggeration 
on her part, but two factors have to be taken into consideration, which the narrator will mention 
but not link. First, the mother is the narrator’s “custodian” since he is on parole and so must be 
accompanied by her at all times, and he also protects her “throughout the long ride” (183) to the 
attorney's office. Protection is necessary for the extreme reactions other bus passengers have to 
her chronic mask. Second, the son carries a briefcase “at all times” (184) which is filled with 
black widows. This means that the mother is never far from the creatures she fears. Their 
relationship is both of codependence and of legal necessity. I will return to this later on.  
 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is Rorty’s philosophical starting point, where he 
sets the theoretical ground from which he constructs his later work. In it, he argues for dropping 
the search for an epistemological system that reveals absolute Truth. He states his case by 
diligently presenting and engaging with the various arguments and concepts of both continental 
and analytical philosophy regarding Truth justification and Mind-Body dualities. Despite the 
book’s prodigious length, one gets the feeling that Rorty tries to be as succinct and clear as 
possible, and yet the only way to state his argument (or the way he was trained to do so, as he 
mentions) is to dismantle what he considers to be philosophical assumptions and ‘givens.’ He 
also creates a genealogy of the work that paved the way for his call to abandon epistemology 
(as mentioned in the Introduction) thus setting his book within a historical philosophical 
conversation.  
As mentioned, Rorty calls for the abolishment of the dualities that come with 
metaphysical concepts (for example Truth and non-Truth), the theoretical problems they inspire, 
and their implied finality. This does not mean that shared beliefs or judgements cannot be 
established (i.e. lower case truth), rather that philosophy should no longer be concerned with 
creating great epistemological structures that determine what is Truth or Beauty or Just. We 
should therefore abandon “The notion that philosophy should provide a permanent matrix of 
categories into which every possible empirical discovery and cultural development can be fitted 
without strain.” Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature argues against this “overambitious 
conception of philosophy” that “stem[s] from the same set of seventeenth-century images” (123-
4). But Rorty does not dismantle the concept of Truth to proclaim that existence is devoid of 
meaning: “Our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a matter 
of interactions with nonhuman reality […] We shall be looking for an airtight case rather than 
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an unshakable foundation” (157). Wallace’s short story exemplifies what happens when this 
‘conversation between persons’ does not occur. The protagonist’s ‘case’ is not airtight, neither 
the one that led to his parole nor the one full of Black Widows, yet we never see him in 
conversation with other people. In my reading, the protagonist is someone who considers their 
private vocabulary to be final, there is nothing beyond his grasp of comprehension. This absence 
of doubt is what stops him from understanding the suffering his obsession causes his mother. 
However, it’s important for my reading to clarify that the narrator is comfortable in his situation. 
I do not read any urge in him to change his situation, to escape his existence, or his way of 
thinking. In other words, that his vocabulary is without metaphysical Truth does not result in an 
existential crisis. This interpretation already sets me at odds with other readings of the story, 
and I will present them along with further descriptions of my reading.  
 
2. Critical Readings 
Marshall Boswell looks at ‘Mirror’ in his essay ‘“The Constant Monologue Inside Your Head”: 
Oblivion and the Nightmare of Consciousness.’ Boswell’s goal is to show that the stories in the 
book are united by more than joint publication. “To open the book at random is to encounter a 
visual analog for the state of consciousness Wallace depicts.” He calls the short story collection 
a “sombre portrait of souls in isolation” and links the content of the collection to its form: “the 
entire volume appears on the page as a vast, unbroken wall of text” as if to represent the 
character’s “hermetic isolation” (151). The connection between content and form is a strategy 
for the effect the narratives aim to create: “[e]ach story locates the reader in the protagonist’s 
word-drunk interior and traps her there for the story’s grueling duration” (152). ‘Mirror’ is no 
exception to the interior voice and to the shared style of the collection that abandons “narrative 
action in favor of dense description” (153). Nonetheless, I don’t think that ‘Mirror’ fully fits 
into Boswell's reading of Oblivion. I’ll begin with the observation that every protagonist is “at 
the mercy of their minds.”  Is this accurate for the narrator of ‘Mirror’? Maybe not, unless we 
stretch the definition of that statement to include any character whose thoughts and voice are 
part of the narrative. The result of being under this ‘mercy’ is described by Wallace later on, in 
his speech This is Water, in a line that was excluded from its published version: “They shoot the 
terrible master” (152). Yet the narrator of ‘Mirror’ is not suicidal; he may be the only character 
who makes jokes in Oblivion. I don’t find any textual evidence of him committing and 
considering self-harm or suicide, nor any sort of wish for his life to end. He indeed seems to be 
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beyond redemption, but can we say he yearns “for a release from the prison-house of 
interiority”? (165) I don’t have evidence of this when I read the story, I instead understand the 
protagonist, who shows no empathy towards his mother or the dead child, as someone unwilling 
or unable to recognize the limits of their private vocabulary and to reassemble their public 
vocabulary. That is to say that ‘Mirror’ is such a dense story that, when approached with Rorty’s 
Pragmatist questions, it reveals uses for both private and public vocabularies. I’ll detail the 
connection between both uses later in the chapter. For now, I’ll clarify the importance of my 
reading based on Rorty’s theory. If morality is no longer a metaphysical dictum, then it is 
through constant conversation that we’ll find a way to act that avoids or minimizes the suffering 
of others. Literature is critical to this conversation, and this is why Rorty praises “works of 
fiction which exhibit the blindness of a certain kind of person to the pain of another kind of 
person.” This describes the hinge of my reading, the detail that other readings ignore: not only 
is the protagonist indifferent to his mother’s suffering, it was his ‘blindness’ that caused his 
mother’s woes. With this reading, we can catalogue the story amongst texts that “show how our 
attempts at autonomy, our private obsessions with the achievement of a certain sort of 
perfection, may make us oblivious to the pain and humiliation we are causing” (CIS 141). I’ll 
continue with this reading later on in the chapter, for now, I detailed this point to show why 
Boswell’s conclusive reading of Oblivion clashes with my reading of ‘Mirror,’ and, indirectly, 
with the whole of my project. This can be seen in his description of Oblivion in the final pages 
of his essay: 
Oblivion even casts doubt on Wallace’s long held belief that language can bridge the 
gulf between us, and that fiction ‘can allow us imaginatively to identify with characters’ 
pain’ so that ‘we might then also more conceive of others identifying with our own,’ 
[…] ‘Good Old Neon,’ best articulates Oblivion’s more pessimistic vision of language 
as solution to our loneliness. (166)  
 
It’s not in the scope of my project to argue against Boswell’s well-constructed reading of 
Oblivion as a whole, yet his reading of how the stories fail to bridge individuals through 
language contradicts the Rortyan notion of vocabularies. ‘Mirror’ does present a pessimistic 
vision of a loneliness that includes a great gulf between characters. However, in the case of that 
story, I don’t find anything to suggest that gulf will never be bridged and instead read the story 
as an invitation to the reader to bridge said gaps ‘beyond the page.’ My reading of the story 
hinges on this contingency, since the civic capacity of Wallace’s literature functions with the 
bridging of vocabularies, be they public or private. Moreover, the ‘pessimistic vision’ invites a 
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kind of resignation regarding the suffering of others, whereas, in the Rortyan reading, the reader 
does not need to identify with the mother’s pain, or her son’s blindness to it, so much as 
recognize it and understand how it could be avoided. 
 Clare Hayes-Brady offers a similar interpretation of a troubled protagonist in the essay 
‘The Book, the Broom and the Ladder: Philosophical Groundings in the Work of David Foster 
Wallace’. Focusing on her direct comments on Rorty’s work and on ‘Mirror’, I’ll begin by 
disagreeing with her nihilistic description of Rorty as someone who “rejected outright the 
possibility of any sort of truth” (33). This interpretation limits Rorty’s philosophy to bleak 
relativism. It also affects the interpretation of the story, for example, we’re told the protagonist 
is uncomfortable “within the shifting boundaries of language” (32), yet this is not supported by 
any evidence.  The protagonist is consequently deemed unable to cope with constructed 
vocabularies: “Where the characters are unable to manipulate language skillfully, language 
betrays them” (32). Yet the essay does not clarify when or how language betrays the narrator. 
The text does not hide the constructed quality of the narrative voice, i.e. the protagonist’s 
vocabulary. In my reading, the narrator is in mastery of and at ease with his language because 
it allows him to ignore the suffering he caused to others (I’ll prove this in detail in the following 
section of this chapter). Like Boswell’s reading, Hayes-Brady’s reading may be better for 
describing the narrative voices of other stories in Oblivion. 
The observation that “the narrators’ lack of mastery of themselves and their vocabularies 
allows the subtle revelation of what they seek to hide” (32) is unclear to me. What is the narrator 
of ‘Mirror’ trying to hide? In my reading, the narrator protagonist masters his constructed 
vocabulary; through it he seems to supervise and control his peculiar environment. He is not 
actively trying to hide information that is then somehow accidentally revealed to the reader. 
What can be considered as concealed in the narration? Maybe the deadly spiders inside the 
suitcase. We could also include the botched cosmetic surgery: the ‘chronic mask of intense 
terror,’ conceals the mother’s actual emotions. Yet both are openly described and discussed by 
the narrator. The same goes for the death of the child; he openly gives us the facts of the case.  
What is revealed by the narration that is not said directly? The tense relationship between 
mother and son, that she lives in fear of the spiders he keeps in the house, their dependency on 
one another. His lack of empathy for the child who died from the bites of his spiders. Are these 
betrayals of language? I think it is more accurate to say that he is unable to empathize with the 
suffering of others. Rather than noticing how language betrays what the narrator wished to keep 
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hidden, in my Rortyian reading we, as readers, understand the use, limits, and morals of the 
narrator’s vocabulary. 
 This description of the narrator as trapped in both his situation and his language, who 
longs for an escape or freedom but is unable to find it is also present in Greg Carlisle’s reading 
of ‘Mirror’ in Nature’s Nightmare (2015). His book studies Oblivion as a whole, devoting a 
chapter to each short story from the book. The overall reading of the collection is chronological, 
for Carlisle understands it as the crucial stepping stone between Infinite Jest and The Pale King.  
The chapter on ‘Mirror’ provides a detailed account of the various “narrative threads” 
that the protagonist presents in a “seemingly random fashion” (91). However, I disagree with 
Carlisle’s reading that the mother’s insecticide poisoning and two botched surgeries were 
exaggerated, if not simulated, in order for her to make and win her lawsuits. Although Carlisle 
is right in noting the narrator’s comments on the exaggerations his mother made to boost her 
case, the reading nullifies other claims the narrator makes. First is the comparison of legal 
counselors to “parasites,” who on their TV ads urge “the viewer to wait patiently for the 
opportunity to attack” (O 186), which suggests the mother and son contacted this type of legal 
counsel after her poisoning and her surgeries. This carries on to the fact they take the bus to see 
a “Van Nuys negligence specialist” to handle the second lawsuit, which causes the 
complications that drive the narration. Doubting that the first surgery was botched, Carlisle asks: 
“And are we seriously to believe a second surgery was also botched?” I find it harder to believe 
that the mother maintains a fake face of fear every day during long bus rides and even at home, 
in company of her son, where he describes her as “[s]itting at home in dark glasses as ever” (O 
186).  
 Carlisle’s reading assumes that the narrator “aligns his perception of reality with [his 
mother’s], and that perception may be suspect” (95). In my reading, the narrator’s vocabulary 
denies this claim. His syntax is an amalgam of specialised discourse (the scientific and the legal) 
and pop-language (movies, ads, common phrases), overall, his vocabulary does not seem to be 
influenced by his mother; he only quotes her once: “Mother is blackly cynical in matters of the 
heart referring to the entire spectrum of mating rituals as a disaster waiting to happen” (189). 
The relationship between mother and son stands on dependance, fear, and animosity. The son’s 
report does betray a kind of resignation on the part of the mother, and suggests that, in her case, 
the reason why it is just the two of them living in the house is because the disaster has already 
happened. Maybe a death? The adverb seems somewhat redundant for modifying ‘cynical’. 
Maybe, since the protagonist is obsessed with black widows, he conveys the mother’s personal 
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history through the spiders. As far as I can see, however, there is nothing else in the story that 
supports this reading. At the very least, the mother’s phrase reads as ominous of her future 
plastic surgeries. 
 Carlisle ends his chapter (and he’ll end the book in a similar manner) by stating that if 
the narrator wants to escape “the oblivion of solipsistic isolation” he must follow Chris Fogle’s 
and Lane Dean Jr.’s example, from The Pale King, which involves “choosing what we pay 
attention to […] and by risking the disaster waiting to happen” (96). However, I am not 
convinced by the idea that the character wants to escape his ‘isolation.’ The narrator does not 
complain about his situation. He complains about his legal charges and punishment: “the 
misfortune of what happened […] did not justify hysterical or trumped-up charges of any kind” 
(O 186). He complains about his surroundings but not about his situation. The exception could 
be his observation that “Respecting mating I have been on dates but there was insufficient 
chemistry” (189), followed by the mother’s disaster comment quoted above. His clearest 
complaint regards the specimens lost as a result of the child’s deadly accident: “they are rare 
and both specimens escaped in his mishap and have not been reacquired” (187). Although 
Boswell’s and Hayes-Brady’s readings are more useful and professional than Carlisle’s, none 
give clear textual examples of the protagonist’s malcontent that goes beyond his inability to find 
a date and the loss of rare specimens due to the child’s accident (and death). With this in mind, 
it makes more sense to say that the protagonist doubles down on or even seeks refuge in his 
vocabulary or that, in Rorty’s words, he is unable to see the impact his “private idiosyncrasies” 
(PMN 141) have on others. 
 The last two readings I’ll present don’t clash with my reading like the previous three. 
Rather, they appear incomplete in comparison, even though their approach to the text has 
similarities to mine. Of the two, the clearest example of this is Paul Giles’ essay ‘All Swallowed 
Up: David Foster Wallace and American Literature’, since he presents Wallace as a writer 
immersed in the American tradition by tracing the influence of Transcendentalism and 
Pragmatism in his work. Giles’ reading resonates with the whole of my dissertation because it 
places Wallace’s work in constant dialogue with Pragmatism, with ‘Mirror’ as part of that 
dialogue, and also by marking him as a writer invested in the public conversation of his country: 
“[Wallace] was paradoxically committed as an author to the idea of his work as expressing the 
concerns of a public intellectual” (4). This commitment is paradoxical, for Giles, because he 
was not a great public figure yet his work had ‘public’ ambitions. This paradox can be extended 
to my claims that Wallace’s often complex or esoteric style and form is also democratic, in his 
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production of texts from the ‘muddy trench’, as stated in the Introduction. In the case of ‘Mirror’, 
however, the difficulty lies in that we read from within the protagonist’s vocabulary, with no 
help from a narrator or another character or even a clear plot. In a sense, we must read our way 
out of the protagonist’s vocabulary and notice the suffering he ignores. There is a clear difficulty 
in this, at the same time, it seems like an effective way to lead the reader to consider what 
suffering their vocabulary might ignore, since they successfully did it as readers, and redescribe 
their vocabulary to avoid said ignorance. It’s in this way that this dissertation presents Wallace’s 
‘concerns of a public intellectual’. 
Giles reads Wallace as a public American intellectual in the tradition of Emerson and 
Thoreau, one that spoke from a sort of pulpit: “My notion of Wallace as at some level a moralist 
and a pedagogue, a propensity that can be inferred from the concern with ethical issues that runs 
through his fiction and journalism, as well as the author’s own intense capacity for self-
interrogation about what it means to be an ‘American’ writer at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century” (6). Both the ‘concern with ethical issues’ and the ‘capacity for self-interrogation’ lead 
Wallace to interact with Rorty’s role for literature in the creation and use of public and private 
vocabularies. With this in mind, the reading of ‘Mirror’ becomes more than a fictional-response 
or -refutation of Rorty’s concepts and theory. Rather, it enacts the dangers of a vocabulary gone 
awry. Wallace is a moralist by repeating the Rortyian warning of not recognizing the suffering 
of others, to be an American writer in this sense means to present this warning to the public. Yet 
Giles does not apply these readings to ‘Mirror’s narrator, he instead focuses on the mother, 
whom he considers the “central character” of this story. This reading gives little importance to 
the fact that the mother is presented to us through the vocabulary of her son, which diminishes 
the importance of his perception of her. Giles is interested in the impact American culture has 
on both characters:  
[H]er legal case […] is no less beholden to a world of rhetorical manipulation and 
melodramatic affect than the compulsion that drove her to get her face fixed in the first 
place. Deprived of any correspondence theory of truth, Wallace’s characters find 
themselves cast adrift in a fallen world of false appearances and ‘special effects’ (186), 
with the comic references in this story to films such as Bride of Frankenstein (182) 
emphasizing how the author conceives of America’s corporate marketplace as a theatre 
of gothic masquerade. (14)  
 
This reading seems incomplete because the influence of the corporate marketplace does not 
seem a constant, inescapable presence in the story. It seems more present in other stories from 
Oblivion, such as ‘Mister Squishy.’ In ‘Mirror’, the corporate marketplace seems secondary to 
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the representation of a vocabulary immune to the suffering of others. False appearances indeed 
have a prominent role in the story, yet there is little falsity about the child’s death. In other 
words, there is also certainty in the world of ‘Mirror’, even if it’s that of taxonomy and venom. 
The mother’s ‘mask’ can indeed be seen as a representation, and the result, of ‘rhetorical 
manipulation’ and the ‘corporate marketplace’, since her decision to use the money from the 
first litigation can be seen as a desire that represents the ideology of the American ‘theatre of 
gothic masquerade.’ However, by focusing only on the botched surgeries their origin is ignored, 
and with it the fear the mother lives in, her codependent relationship with her son, and his 
framing of her life. Reading that it was ‘compulsion that drove her to get her face fixed’ forsakes 
larger narrative questions.  
 Thompson’s reading of ‘Mirror’ does not clash with mine because we have different 
approaches and interests. Nonetheless, I include his reading because it’s the most complete in 
describing and interpreting the narrator’s vocabulary and the mother-son relationship. It appears 
in his book Global Wallace where he diligently presents all of Wallace’s literary influences 
using clear archival and textual evidence. Since Rorty doesn’t count as a literary influence, 
Thompson’s reading doesn’t focus much on his effect on the story. This does not mean 
Thompson ignores Rorty’s influence; he quotes from Giles, Hayes-Brady, and Boswell’s texts 
to highlight the “explicit conversation” with Rorty. Yet it’s clear that Thompson is more 
interested in ‘Mirror’s other sources, O’Connor’s short story and Grice’s book. 
Thompson contrasts the scientific worldview of Grice’s text with the Catholic elements 
in O’Connor’s story to highlight the absence of religion and God in Wallace’s re-telling. In this 
sense, he approaches the anti-foundational world described in ‘Mirror’: “[…] a godless universe 
in which vanity drives the commerce of cosmetic surgery and an inquisitive child dies a painful, 
meaningless death, becomes clear” (189). By focusing on the ‘godless’ instead of on the 
‘truthless’, Thompson’s reading is better equipped to interact with Rorty’s philosophy since it 
avoids Hayes-Brady’s ‘relativist’ simplification. This stance, and his close-reading approach to 
literary influence, led him to best articulate the role of solipsism and voice in ‘Mirror’ that the 
previous articles also tried to word: 
[‘Mirror’] is populated with characters who are unable to communicate sincerely with 
others, let alone seek religious solace, because of their disabling levels of self-awareness. 
The narrator’s speech is full of irritating verbal tics, mobilizes a dizzying array of 
linguistic discourses, and uses frequent italicized insertions as a way of scare-quoting 
external perspectives. His narration is also maddeningly digressive, circling around and 




It’s possible that Thompson’s analysis benefits from not having to bring Rorty into the equation; 
his close reading best describes the complexity of the narrator’s voice without trying to justify 
concepts of non-Truth or lack of meaning.  He places the circumstances of the mother’s 
accident, “the can’s nozzle [glued] on facing backwards” (O 188), as “another synecdoche for 
the debilitating self-awareness that plagues Wallace’s characters” (190). Thompson does not 
comment much more on the “story’s second lacunae” (190), the mother’s accident with 
insecticide, which I also place ‘at the story’s core’, if not as more pertinent than the child’s 
death. This divergence in our readings is mostly the result of a difference in interests and goals. 
I’ll comment on the significance of the story’s three sources in the following section. I believe 
I’ve shown enough to prove that previous readings of ‘Mirror’ limit themselves by simplifying 
Rorty’s Pragmatism. For those critics who acknowledge Rorty’s relevance, this often results in 
reading the story’s bleakness as a representation of an assumed negativity or nihilism in Rorty’s 
philosophy. Part of the error might lie in thinking that the story’s bleakness is either a critique 
of Rorty or a representation of the dangers in his philosophy. Consider the following statement 
in Paul Giles’ article: “in Wallace’s story of the same name such an erasure of stable signifiers 
comes to carry a more sinister valence” (14). I, however, see the represented suffering as an 
enactment of Rorty’s Pragmatism; ‘Mirror’ responds to the Rortyan question that follows the 
initial one about a book’s purpose: “What sorts of things about what sorts of people do I need 
to notice?” (CIS 143) In the case of ‘Mirror’, it’s noticing how the pursuit of our aforementioned 
‘private obsessions’ can blind us to the pain of others. 
 
 3. Sources 
In the copyright page for Oblivion (2004), Wallace wrote: “One or two tiny parts of ‘Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature’ make uncited use of Gordon Grice’s The Red Hourglass: Lives of the 
Predators”. This is an understatement: the influence of Grice’s book on ‘Mirror’ goes beyond 
the “tiny parts” to provide a great deal of the characteristics, syntax, and vocabulary of the 
narrator. The Red Hourglass collects the author’s anecdotal experience with seven different 
predators, with a chapter devoted to each one. Wallace’s story is mostly informed by the opening 
chapter on the black widow, and it also makes use of the chapters on the mantid and on the 
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recluse spider. The two “tiny parts” are italicized by Wallace in the style of Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, as Carlisle notes.49 
 Reflecting on the death of the child who fell through the garage’s roof, the narrator states: 
“Granted widow bites are a bad way to go because of the potent neurotoxin involved prompting 
one physician all the way in 1935 to comment, I do not recall having seen more abject pain 
manifested in any other medical or surgical condition” (O 185). In italics, the character uses the 
following quote from Grice’s book: “Forney later commented, ‘I do not recall having seen more 
abject pain manifested in any other medical or surgical condition’” (52). The minor difference 
is that Forney participated in a series of experiments on the black widow’s venom in 1933, not 
1935. The second quote is used by the narrator to describe his mother: “Sitting at home in dark 
glasses as ever knitting while monitoring my activities her mouth parts working idly” (O 188). 
Apart from a hyphen, the quote is again identical to Grice’s text: “She watches him, and her 
mouth-parts work idly” (Grice 74). This isn’t a description of a black widow, but of a female 
mantid watching an approaching male. 
Those are the “tiny parts” Wallace mentions, yet the story is littered with phrases that 
seem constructed with the vocabulary of The Red Hourglass. Compare this phrase from the 
story: “[...] as I looked down to check the status I saw accidentally protruding from one of the 
ventilation holes at the case’s corner the slender tip of a black jointed foreleg [...]” (O 189), with 
the following by Grice: “A minute’s investigation reveals […] an almost invisible web, at the 
corner of which the clawed tips of a black widow’s sleek legs protrude from some crevice” (2). 
One gets the impression that Wallace reassembles sentences from Grice’s text to fit his short 
story’s setting.  
It’s clear the narrator mimics the voice of Grice’s clear, well-informed amateur: “No one 
has ever offered a sufficient explanation for the dangerous venom. It provides no clear 
evolutionary advantage: all of the widow’s prey items would find lesser toxins fatal, and there 
is no unambiguous benefit in killing and harming larger animals” (Grice 58). When rephrasing 
this information, the narrator forms the long sentences characteristic of Oblivion’s style: 
“Objectively no one even knows how the widow’s neurotoxin works to produce such abject pain 
and suffering in larger animals, science is baffled as to evolutionarily what advantage there is 
                                               
49 Consider the following quote as an example of Rorty’s italicized style: “Descartes was substituting ‘clear and 
distinct perception’ […] for ‘indubitability’ as a mark of eternal truths. This left indubitability free to serve as a 
criterion of the mental. For although the thought that I am in pain does not count as a clear and distinct 
perception, it can no more be successfully doubted than the thought I exist” (PMN 58). 
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for a venom well in excess of required for this unique but common specimen to subdue its prey” 
(O 187). The narrator’s amalgamate speech accentuates the Rortyan belief that language is a 
contingent tool, showing that the narrator’s “‘conscience’ and ‘taste’” are no more than “bundles 
of idiosyncratic beliefs and desires” (CIS 142), despite the possibility that the narrator’s 
knowledge and his way of presenting it seem to suggest universal certainty. If the narrator’s 
vocabulary is clearly constructed with other vocabularies then it’s hard to argue that his 
language stems from a fixed and absolute foundation. It’s worth noting that this is the quote 
presented in the aforementioned Global Wallace to show the use of Grice to represent the 
godless world the story is set in.  
Lucas Thompson also recognises the strong connection between The Red Hourglass and 
‘Mirror’ and he discusses it more than he does Rorty. Yet his main focus is on O’Connor’s 
influence; Thompson informs us that, in a letter to Michael Pietsch, Wallace described the story 
as “a complicated parody/homage to [Flannery] O’Connor’s ‘Everything That Rises Must 
Converge’” and that most of the story’s plot and setting come from O’Connor’s story: “Both 
stories are focalized through middle-aged sons who chaperone their mothers into town, with 
much of the narrative taking place in public buses.” He contrasts the scientific worldview of 
Grice’s text with the Catholic elements in O’Connor’s story to highlight their absence in 
Wallace’s re-telling: “the linguistically obscured fact of the child’s death has no meaning 
beyond its legal implications for the narrator, while his characterization of the mother is 
similarly deconsecrated, stripped of all theological meaning” (189). I don’t read this absence of 
god as an indictment of Rorty’s theory or secular culture; instead, it’s a way of pointing out that 
we cannot expect justice or morality to be declared and executed by a metaphysical source. 
Instead, it is up to individuals to discuss and decide what can and can’t be done.  
It’s important for my reading to show the delicate amalgamation of these three sources 
because it also highlights the Rortyan stance on language. In this sense, it is a clear 
representation of Rortyan vocabularies since it doesn’t pretend to be unique or neutral but rather 
circumstantial and constructed. It’s fair to claim that the readings I’ve presented distrust the 
protagonist’s vocabulary, in the sense that his way of speaking is ‘false’ or ‘fake’. When Boswell 
describes the inability of the story’s language to bridge gaps or when Hayes-Brady claims a 
betraying language, they seem to suggest the possibility of a correct or better way of speaking. 
I agree with Giles that the plot and the vocabulary of ‘Mirror’ offer a critique of American 
consumer culture, yet this doesn’t make his vocabulary less true than any other. It’s obvious that 
the protagonist’s voice is a vital part of his construction as a character; in my reading, it’s 
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important to notice how the language of the protagonist uses various sources to highlight that 
vocabularies are built or put together rather than given or found. When the protagonist describes 
his briefcase as a “sematic accessory” (O 184) and later describes himself in relation to his 
mother as a “sematic accessory” (O 189), I don’t read it as attempts at an imaginative metaphor. 
Rather, I read it as the words of someone who believes their vocabulary is commensurate to 
existence, that nothing in reality is beyond the set of words they know. What is the danger of 
this? In a Rortyan sense, if someone believes their vocabulary is set and all-encompassing, then 
they’ll have no need to consider their contingencies, that there is something they’re mis-naming 
or not noticing. In my reading of ‘Mirror’, Wallace tries to point this out to the reader. It is, 
however, done in a subtle manner since there is nothing like a third voice that can point this out 
to us. In other words, since we are offered no view that is beyond the narrator’s vocabulary, the 
blindspots of his false totality are not obvious since we as readers are also ‘stuck’ within the 
narrator’s description of the world.  
  
 4. Conclusion 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty critiques the notion of the human mind as a 
mirror of nature. In other words, the title names what the book critiques. My reading finds the 
same connection between Wallace’s short story and its title. ‘Mirror’ doesn’t try to critique the 
dangers of Rorty’s pragmatism, rather, it reveals the perils of considering one’s vocabulary as 
absolute, and, of not dropping the metaphor of the mind as a mirror of reality. It’s a reading that 
stays in line with Giles’ description of Wallace as a ‘a moralist and a pedagogue’ in some aspects 
of his work.  
The earlier interpretations of ‘Mirror’ seem unable to break away from a True-False 
duality; their reaction to Rorty’s critique is to conclude there is only No-Truth, which still works 
within the same language of absolutes. By placing the story in a No-Truth setting, the narrator’s 
descriptions are also emptied of meaning, casting doubt on the suffering portrayed (this error is 
most clear in Carlisle’s reading). The widow’s venom, the mother’s fear, the child’s death, 
should these be disregarded because we cannot depend on Absolute Truth? 
We abolish the absolute and dualist readings by asking the Pragmatist question: “What 
purposes does this book serve?” (CIS 142) ‘Mirror’ presents a character that is not ignorant but 
indifferent to the suffering he causes to others. In this sense, Wallace creates fiction that Rorty 
will describe and prescribe in a book that continues the argument of Philosophy and the Mirror 
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of Nature, this is Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. In it he analyzes “works of fiction which 
exhibit the blindness of a certain kind of person to the pain of another kind of person” (CIS 141). 
The narrator’s ‘blindness’ is such that he laments the loss of ‘rare specimens’ that escaped 
during the accident over the child’s death, nor does he notice the torment the spiders cause his 
mother.  
To better answer the Pragmatist question we can look at the classifications Rorty makes 
for books “deployed to ask the question ‘What sorts of things about what sorts of people do I 
need to notice?’” (143) This question, in tandem with ‘What purposes does this book serve,’ 
provides what I believe is the most robust foundation for reading Wallace’s short story and its 
indolent narrator. It also highlights Wallace’s capacity to write books that could lead us to 
consent and establish communal and individual values, for “such books show how our attempts 
at autonomy, our private obsessions with the achievement of a certain sort of perfection, may 
make us oblivious to the pain and humiliation we are causing” (141). I previously mentioned 
that ‘Mirror’ responds to matters for both public and private vocabularies, addressing the point 
where both concepts overlap. Rorty addresses this convergence in the chapter ‘Private Irony and 
Liberal Hope’ in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (73-95), where he defines what a ‘liberal 
ironist’ is through three concurrent conditions: someone who doubts the vocabularies they use, 
they know arguments constructed with their vocabulary “can neither dissolve or underwrite 
these doubts”, and they know that their vocabulary is not “closer to reality than others” nor is it 
“in touch with a power not herself” (73).  Here, I’ll only make use of the first one, since it’s the 
most apt for my argument, and because without it the other two conditions cannot be met. The 
Rortyan ‘ironist’ “has radical doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she 
has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she 
has encountered” (73). This means that the person knows their vocabulary is limited and 
contingent, it is not all-encompassing, nor is it near a true or eternal language. The protagonist 
of ‘Mirror’ does not meet this condition, in this sense, the short story can be seen as a sort of 
snapshot of a vocabulary devoid of any of Rortyan ‘radical doubts’ about its capacity. In other 
words, it’s the description of someone who believes their private vocabulary is a ‘mirror of 
nature.’ His taxonomic vocabulary reflects this: all is named and catalogued, a new species 
might be discovered, and there are unknown factors (e.g. an evolutionary reason as to why the 
widow’s venom is so potent) but there are no ‘radical doubts’ that challenge this vocabulary. 
The key issue here is not that taxonomy is useless, rather, that as a tool, the protagonist’s 
taxonomic vocabulary is useful for certain tasks and inadequate for other tasks, such as self-
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creation and empathy. The mother’s suffering deepens the story by showing the consequences 
this lack of doubt can have on others; this is where private and the public overlap. I’ll take the 
roundabout way to describe this overlap.  
If one has ‘radical doubts’ about their vocabulary and understands that the self-
description resulting from said vocabulary is not the ‘True’ one but simply one among many, 
then an experimental attitude of re-description is adopted to either expand one's vocabulary or 
adopt a new one: “We ironists hope, by this continual redescription, to make the best selves for 
ourselves that we can.” This means that ironists are interested in “enlarging our acquaintance” 
and the “easiest way of doing that is to read books” (CIS 80). This is why Rorty values literature 
and literary criticism so much: they’re a great tool for encountering re-descriptions, for grasping 
other vocabularies. They also help us know if a person is suffering in a way that cannot be 
described by our vocabulary. If we depart from the belief that “pain is nonlinguistic” (94) then 
we only know someone is suffering if it’s communicated to us. If someone expresses their 
suffering in a manner beyond our vocabulary then it’s very likely that we won’t recognize it. 
When one accepts the limits of their vocabulary, a possible consequence will be to redirect the 
efforts once used for discovering Truth into “making sure that she notices suffering when it 
occurs” since it’s possible for others to suffer in a way one cannot understand or recognize. The 
non-metaphysical approach to this recognition and for the motivation to prevent or stop said 
pain (i.e. without thinking one has a neutral, infallible framework for knowing if suffering is 
occurring or not) is through “imaginative identification” in place of “a specifically moral 
motivation” (93). In other words, a re-description allows for the creation of an empathy that 
allows us to understand the contingent causes for another person’s suffering, rather than 
responding with Kantian-like imperatives that don’t require much human conversation to 
resolve a moral dilemma, or how to respond to a cry for help. In my reading of the protagonist 
as a metaphysician, he is with those that “tell us that unless there is some cruel sort of common 
ur-vocabulary, we have no ‘reason’ not to be cruel to those whose final vocabularies are very 
unlike ours” (88). Since the protagonist never doubts his vocabulary, he cannot comprehend his 
mother’s aforementioned “long-standing” fear “of the phylum arthropodae.” He knows that this 
is why “she never ventured in the garage” (O 185) yet he does nothing to comfort her or assuage 
the situation. This absence of empathy results from a lack of ‘imaginative identification,’ an 
inability to see beyond his ‘private obsessions’ and understand his mother’s fear and suffering. 
In this sense, he doesn’t accompany his mother on the bus out of sympathy or love but out of 
legal obligations and co-dependence. Describing himself as her ‘sematic accessory’ maintains 
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an emotional distance from her. When looking at the relationship between suffering and 
vocabularies, Rorty’s states that “[r]edescription often humiliates” (CIS 90). The protagonist 
redescribes his mother’s fear and suffering in a way that allows him to distance himself from 
her and avoid any responsibility that results in a shift in his vocabulary, his self-image and 
actions. This is also his reaction to the child’s death. ‘Mirror’ steps into the field of public 
vocabularies when discussing the attention we give to the pain of others: “What matters for the 
liberal ironist is not finding such a reason but making sure that she notices suffering when it 
occurs” (CIS 93). Notice, however, that by referring to a ‘liberal ironist’ Rorty describes 
someone who understands both the differences and the overlaps between their public and private 
vocabularies. Despite its brevity, ‘Mirror’ shows us both the depth of Rorty’s philosophy and 
how its application to Wallace’s literature results in robust and detailed readings.  
What are the broader implications of Rorty’s anti-essentialism with regards to noticing 
the pain of others? Why and how should the protagonist care for his mother’s suffering if there 
is no metaphysical reason to do so? In Rorty’s view, there is no “essential humanity” that unites 
all human beings. Instead, Rorty posits that “feelings of solidarity are necessarily a matter of 
which similarities and dissimilarities strike us a salient, and that such salience is a function of a 
historically contingent final vocabulary” (CIS 192). His historical example for this that if you 
were a Jew “in the period when the trains were running to Auschwitz” you had a greater chance 
of being helped by your neighbours in Denmark and in Italy, and a lower chance in Belgium. 
Rorty argues that in the places were more likely to risk helping others there was greater notion 
of community, “for example, that this particular Jew was a fellow Milanese, or a fellow 
Jutlander, or a fellow member of the same union or profession” (CIS 190), a sentiment that was 
less common in places like Belgium. He also argues that the sentiment isn’t devalued by a lack 
of ahistorical or objective justifications, and go so far as to call this a “fundamental premise” of 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, asserting that “a belief can still regulate action, can still be 
thought worth dying for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing 
deeper than contingent historical circumstance” (189). In this sense, to return to Wallace’s story, 
the protagonist’s failure to notice the suffering he causes his mother is not the failure of noticing 
his mother’s ‘human essence’, rather, it’s his inability to place himself as an ‘us’ with another 
person. To put it in another way, consider that, for Rorty, someone unwilling to help a Jew 
running from the Nazis would think, for example, “She is a Jewess” instead of “She is, like me, 
a mother of small children” (CIS 191). In this sense, the protagonist of ‘Mirror’ is incapable of 
thinking, with regards to the child’s death, something like: “The child died in an accident related 
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to the deadly spiders I keep. I was once a child and I also know the pain the widow’s venom 
causes. Maybe this could have been avoided if I didn’t collect deadly spiders.” It’s an awkward 
phrase but I believe it makes my point, especially when the protagonist’s lament related to the 
accident is that rare “specimens escaped in his mishap and have not been reacquired” (O 187). 
There is also an absence of an empathic ‘we’ or ‘us’ towards his mother. Despite their constant 
dependency and interaction, he cannot formulate a thought such as “She is my mother and she 
lives in constant fear of the spiders I keep.” Like with the boy, the protagonist is more concerned 
and involved with his collection than with his mother. Wallace’s short story therefore 
exemplifies the kind of suffering that occurs in the absence of Rortyan solidarity. As explained, 
this is not the ability to recognize “a core self […] in all human beings” rather it’s the capacity 
to notice the suffering of others. Rorty argues that this can replace the need for “rationality and 
obligation - specifically, moral obligation”, which attempts to be neutral and permanent. He 
argues for this replacement by showing how this attention towards another being’s suffering is 
a better guide than said moral obligation, and it defines Rorty’s concept of solidarity: “the ability 
to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as 
unimportant when compared to similarities with respect to pain and humiliation—the ability to 
think of people wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us’” (O 192). With 
this in mind, the moral critique of the protagonist of ‘Mirror’ doesn’t have much to do with a 
failure of his obligations towards his mother. Rather, it’s his incapacity to establish an ‘us’ 
between his mother and himself, or any other human and himself.  
 It’s worth mentioning that a critique of Rorty is built around his example of 
communities’ attitudes towards jews during the time of their persecution by the Third Reich. In 
Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind; The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty 
(1995), Normas Geras argues for the concept of human nature against Rorty’s anti-essentialism, 
and in the first chapter of the book, ‘Richard Rorty and the Righteous Among the Nations’ (7-
46), he specifically addresses Rorty’s interpretation of aid given to persecuted people during 
WWII. He does this by referring to the explanations rescuers gave for helping other people. His 
argument is that these people do not speak like Rorty’s explanations, in other words, they 
explain themselves using universal terms like humanity and justice. An Austrian woman who 
helped Russian soldiers on the run explained that she “was obligated as a Christian” to help, 
and, in her words, did so “[o]nly because they were human beings” (8). There are various other 
examples of people speaking this way, so Geras builds the argument that “many of the rescuers 
who gave help to people close to them tell universalizing stories about what they did and who 
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they are, as well as or sometimes rather than citing friendship and the like, on what basis can it 
be claimed that their universalizing stories vouchsafe us nothing of what ‘really’ impelled 
them?” It seems to me that these accounts can still be given Pragmatist explanations, since the 
Christian woman’s vocabulary allowed for a very broad understanding of an ‘us’ that included 
every being that had a soul. The ‘universalizing stories’ are proof of a certain way of speaking 
that people had to explain their actions. In each case presented by Geras, it seems one could still 
say that the intention of a rescuer was to prevent another being from experiencing more suffering 
and humiliation. There is an example of a Polish boy admitting that there is “no difference” 
between them and a Jewish boy when it’s pointed out to him that “[h]e’s a boy just like you. 
Look at his hands, his face. There’s no difference” (34). Isn’t this rather an example of someone 
expanding the limits of their ‘us’? At the very least, the appeal is based on physical similarities 
rather than an intrinsic humanity. In this sense, any appeal to a supposed intrinsic human nature 
functions in the same manner as an appeal to an ‘us’ intention would, i.e. by communicating 
similarities, suffering, and/or humiliation. Barring, of course, a metaphysical revelation or 
delivery of justice, which I believe is what occurs at the end of O’Connor’s ‘Everything That 
Rises Must Converge’ where, after his mother goes into shock, the protagonist goes in search 
for aid: “‘Help, help!’ he shouted, but his voice was thin, scarcely a thread of sound. […] The 
tide of darkness seemed to sweep him back to her, postponing from moment to moment his entry 
into the world of guilt and sorrow” (10). It’s clear in this ending that the narrator defines the 
morality of the character’s act, something that never occurs in ‘Mirror’. This narrative distance 
or lack of moral involvement is not a sign of nihilism. Rather, it’s a rejection of moral 
puritanism. Overall, one is hard pressed to find moral purity in Wallace’s oeuvre. In the case of 
‘Mirror’, the importance of morality not coming from the narrative (from an ‘Olympic HQ’) is 
conversational, allowing the reader to weigh the actions described. To highlight the importance 
of this I would like to return to Zadie Smith’s essay on Wallace, where she seems to be 
describing this specific story:  
There are times when reading Wallace feels unbearable, and the weight of things stacked 
against the reader insurmountable: missing context, rhetorical complication, awful 
people, grotesque or absurd subject matter, language that is⎼at the same time!⎼childishly 
scatological and annoyingly obscure. And if one is used to the consolation of 
“character,” well then Wallace is truly a dead end. His stories simply don’t investigate 
character; they don’t intend to. Instead they’re turned outward, toward us. It’s our 




In the case of ‘Mirror’, the story is turned towards us readers by having to read through the 
‘stacked things’ that the protagonist gives us. By noticing in the narrative the suffering of others 
ignored by the protagonist, we both ‘exhibit the blindness’ (to use Rorty’s words) of the 
protagonist towards the pain of others and we also enact noticing the suffering of others. In this 
sense, the investigation of our character is our own attention to other beings. Moreover, it leads 
us to consider if, just like the protagonist, our own private obsessions lead us to hurt others. 
Wallace’s ‘Mirror’ has a similar objective to the comparison of the Jewish boy to the Polish 
boy: it aims to expand our notions of who we include in our ‘us’ descriptions. Wallace does not 
attempt to reflect reality and capture its essence, its truth. Instead, the texts mirrors back the 
reader’s attitudes towards their own reality, instigating reflection on their own vocabularies.  
In Le Rouge et le Noir, Stendhal included the formula: “Un roman: c’est un miroir qu’on 
promène le long du chemin”, first as an epigram (72) and later attributed to the narrator (342). 
The limits of the novel are present: one can reflect the azure sky and quagmires of the road. The 
narrator states that any accusation of immortality should be addressed to the world, not the 
mirror, yet the reflection itself and its precision is not questioned, nor what leads the mirror to 
point one way, then another. We can also remember Henry James’s monadic view of the novelist 
as a specific window of the “house of fiction.” This image highlights the inherent subjectivity 
in the art of fiction and already suggests a notion similar to the limits of vocabularies: “Tell me 
what the artist is, and I will tell you of what he has been conscious.” The shape of the glass 
determines what will be reflected along the way. Finally in this genealogy, James Joyce’s 
“cracked looking-glass of a servant” (7) in Ulysses considers surface of the mirror itself, 
bringing attention to the given notion of the mirror’s reflection as precise representation. In this 
chapter and through the rest of this dissertation, I present Wallace as a writer who discards a 
glassy essence and takes up vocabularies as his style and method of representation.  
 Despite Wallace’s various non-fiction and short story publications, he is read as a 
novelist. As mentioned in the Introduction, criticism places Infinite Jest at the center of his 
oeuvre. If in this reading I developed a dense interpretation from a brief narration, in the 
following chapter I will make use of the extended development of character and vocabulary 
allowed by the lengthy novel Infinite Jest. If the Pragmatist question I asked ‘Mirror’ was ‘What 





Hermeneutical and Epistemological discourse in Infinite Jest 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter takes a chronological step backwards in regards to the work of David Foster 
Wallace. ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ was written around 199850 and published six 
years later in Oblivion; here, I will focus on the earlier Infinite Jest, published in 1996. To 
interpret Wallace’s short story, I bridged the contents of Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (1979) to those of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, published ten years later. The 
former aimed to take part, and alter, the general professional philosophical dialogue, hoping to 
shift the method of inquiry and focus from epistemology to hermeneutics; the latter, although 
still a philosophical book, is less interested in creating philosophical space for its argument 
(since the previous book already established this) and utilizes literary and philosophical sources 
to exemplify and explain the concept of vocabularies. This concept is central to my dissertation, 
yet to take it as a valid concept one must first accept Rorty’s critique of epistemology and the 
validation of hermeneutics. Because of this requirement, this chapter will solidify the presence 
and preference of the hermeneutical approach over the epistemological one (i.e. anti-
essentialism over essentialism) in the novel Infinite Jest. 
 This novel is the central text in the Wallace canon, both in terms of popular readership 
and critical attention. For a complex book that surpasses the thousand-page mark, a dissertation 
chapter is inadequate for unfolding and interpreting its many elements, therefore I will 
concentrate on the discourses of the novel’s two main fictional institutions, the Ennet House 
Drug and Alcohol Recovery House [sic] and the Enfield Tennis Academy, as representing of 
the opposition between hermeneutics and epistemology. The majority of characters in the novel 
are connected to one of these institutions, and the two protagonists, Don Gately and Hal 
Incandenza, pervade the life and discourse of Ennet and Enfield, respectively. By discourse, I 
mean the commandments of Alcoholics Anonymous around Ennet, which are geared at keeping 
people away from addictions; and the tennis training programme at Enfield, which is developed 
to create professional players. My interpretation focuses on the two protagonists as examples of 
said ideologies occurring in practice and their reaction to events beyond the main purposes of 
                                               
50  The story was first published under the title “Yet Another Example of the Porousness of Certain Borders 
(VIII)” in the first volume of the quarterly publication McSweeney’s (Autumn 1998), edited by Dave Eggers. 
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their discourse. Briefly stated, in the vocabulary of AA, Ennet, and Don I find contingency, an 
acceptance of incommensurability, an openness towards other vocabularies, and a future-
oriented goal. In the vocabulary of tennis training, Enfield, and Hal, I find a vocabulary that 
tries to remain fixed, enclosed, and that believes that it has found epistemological parameters 
from which to navigate existence. At the end of this chapter I move away from the two 
protagonists to focus on the final passages of the novel and analyse how they represent the 
vocabularies of each institution. My reading of those passages is based on Rorty’s reading of 
George Orwell’s 1984 from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  
 This is not an allegorical reading where the institutions recreate the dichotomy between 
foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, it is an interpretation that elucidates the complexity 
of Wallace’s writing. In other words, Ennet and Enfield are not the fictional representations of 
each concept, nor is there a clash between both institutions and an attempt at effacement and 
replacement as there is in Rorty’s proposition between absolute and anti-absolute concepts. 
Unlike the concept of vocabularies and its relation to literature, the differences between 
hermeneutics and epistemology are less clear when taken out of a philosophical context. 
Because of this, something like an act of translation will occur when reading a novel through 
professional philosophy; some of the subtleties of Rorty’s theory are lost in this translation, yet 
enough remains to carry out my goals of elucidation.  
 As mentioned in the Introduction, Infinite Jest is Walllace’s most acclaimed literary 
achievement. It’s the text that galvanized critical attention for his oeuvre and made Wallace 
stand out over other writers of his generation.51 It’s also the reason why we consider Wallace a 
novelist, despite having only written three novels, one of them unfinished. This issue is 
addressed by Marshall Boswell in the preface to David Foster Wallace and “The Long Thing”, 
(2014), a collection of essays on his novels. “The obvious explanation” for Boswell is that 
Infinite Jest is “the bulwark atop which his reputation rests” (vi). In her essay in the Cambridge 
Companion to David Foster Wallace, (2018) Mary K. Holland calls Infinite Jest “the most 
accomplished single product of Wallace’s career, and one of the most influential works of fiction 
in the past 50 years” (127). I say this not to critique or defend this centrality but to present the 
critical field around the novel. Holland also describes how readers of Wallace (such as Marshall 
Boswell, who I discuss in the following paragraph) see Infinite Jest as the pivotal text where he 
                                               
51 Which is not to say that the novel received unanimous praise. A 1996 review by Dale Peck for the London 
Review of Books wrote that “Wallace out-Pynchons Pynchon, and his third book, Infinite Jest, may well be the 
first novel to out-Gravity’s Rainbow Gravity’s Rainbow.” He did not mean this as a compliment in any way. 
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“turned postmodernism’s primary dangers - irony, image, language, and self-reflexivity - into 
tools for generating empathy and sincerity” (127). In the 23 years since the novel’s publication, 
the amount of critical work published on it is too vast for a direct engagement like the one 
performed in the previous chapter. In reader’s guides alone, there are three different 
publications,52 not including online publications and essays from compilations such as the 
aforementioned David Foster Wallace and “The Long Thing”, where we find ‘Representing 
Entertainment in Infinite Jest’ by Philip Sayers, which not only presents the role of 
entertainment in the narration, but on the structure and form of the novel as well. We also find 
David Letzler’s ‘Encyclopedic Novels and the Cruft of Fiction: Infinite Jest’s Endnotes’, which 
I’ll make use of in my following chapter, where Letzler proves that the novel’s endnotes are not 
inconsequential and superfluous but rather contain vital information for the novel’s plot.  
 Marshall Boswell begins his 2003 publication Understanding David Foster Wallace by 
calling Wallace a “nervous member” of the “third wave of modernism” (1) in English literature. 
Boswell wrote a chapter each for two of Wallace’s previous books: The Broom of the System 
and Girl with Curious Hair. Yet, for Boswell’s chronological reading, it’s with Infinite Jest that 
Boswell can describe Wallace as fulfilling “the immense promise he had hinted at in his previous 
work” with a novel that “established him as perhaps the foremost writer of a remarkable 
generation of ambitious new novelists” (117). Boswell makes use of Lacan and Kierkegaard to 
read the themes of the novel, while also focusing on its complex structure, plot, and myriad of 
characters. In Boswell’s eclectic reading of Infinite Jest, his attention to the way AA functions 
is a precursor to my reading of AA as a contingent vocabulary. Bringing in Kierkegaard and 
Wallace Stevens, Boswell affirms that “Wallace’s ‘AA God,’ the primary God in Infinite Jest 
[…] is not any one thing but rather a fluid concept that is more a ‘necessary fiction,’ in Stevens’s 
sense, than an, if not the, transcendental signified.” (146) I also read the ‘AA God’ as a 
‘necessary fiction’ in the sense that it’s a necessary part of the vocabulary created to help people 
overcome addiction. The ‘AA God’ is therefore not seen as an eternal foundation but more a 
‘what works’ concept for AA. Boswell, however, mostly reads the ‘AA God’ in relation to 
Wallace’s response to postmodernism, finding in it part of Wallace’s departure from the 
literature of exhaustion (cf. 147), while I read it in relation to Rorty’s Pragmatism. Allard den 
Dulk, in his 2005 publication Existentialist Engagement in Wallace, Eggers and Foer: A 
                                               
52  David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest: A Reader’s Guide (2012) by Stephen J. Burn, A Reader’s Companion to 
Infinite Jest (2005) by William Dowling and Robert Bell, and Elegant Complexity: A Study of David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest (2007) by Greg Carlisle 
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Philosophical Analysis of Contemporary American Literature, which I mentioned in my 
Introduction, also offers a philosophical reading of AA. Similar to my reading, den Dulk’s 
analysis focuses on “the two main protagonists” (9), and, more importantly, he also reads in AA 
the importance of community and the recognition of suffering. Near the end of his book, den 
Dulk uses Camus to read the characters fighting addiction as rebels, finding in them “a rebellion 
that in many ways is a fight against the emptiness and loneliness of their absurd existence” 
(252). This rebellion, however, does not remain inward but instead becomes a sign of shared 
existence, and therefore community.  In AA, the “solipsistic illusion” is broken by noticing that 
all members are equal in their suffering, which in turn creates solidarity: “despair is shared by 
all that breeds hope” den Dulk turns this experience towards the creation of literature: “Through 
this experience of communal suffering, AA seems to do something that Wallace also regards as 
one of the main purposes of ‘serious fiction’, namely: ‘giv[ing]access to other selves’” (252). In 
the previous chapter, I mentioned the importance for Rorty of literature that helps us expand our 
vocabularies by noticing the suffering of others. Den Dulk creates a similar structure by 
highlighting the formation of a community in AA through the narration of one’s suffering, as 
well as the capacity of Wallace’s novel to create a similar rapport with the reader.  
A similar approach to the reading of AA can be found in Lucas Thompson’s Global 
Wallace (2016). Thompson traces Wallace’s many influences from world literature and he 
shows how Wallace incorporated or responded to these influences in his writing. As a result, 
Thompson argues that Wallace “perceived specific cultural content as a mere surface-level 
dissimilarity that should not distract from a text’s instantiation of universal truths and themes” 
(197). This mention of universality would seem to clash with my Pragmatist reading, however, 
Thompson continues that sentence by stating that “Wallace’s emphasis is on a literary work’s 
resonance for American audiences” (197). In this sense, rather than a search for neutral truths, 
Thompson’s reading shows Wallace incorporating from world literature whatever he found 
pertinent for his own writing. Or, translated into the style of my thesis, he expanded his 
vocabulary with useful redescriptions he found in other vocabularies. Thompson argues that 
Wallace developed this approach as a result of his interaction with AA: “this reading style is 
analogous to the Alcoholics Anonymous injunction to ‘listen for similarities’ ([IJ] 347) in other 
alcoholics’ testimonies, focusing on the common elements within all addiction cycles and seeing 
oneself as intimately connected to other addicts” (69). In a way, my reading inverts or extends 
Thompson’s reading, since I argue that those elements that Wallace took from AA (attention to 
the stories of others, willingness to incorporate redescriptions from other vocabularies to one’s 
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own, the creation of solidarity through narrations of suffering) are then offered to the reader of 
Infinite Jest in two ways. On one hand, they are offered by describing the effects of their 
presence in the sphere of AA, Ennet, and Don; and then this offering is reinforced as the reader 
notes their absence in the world of tennis training, Enfield, and Hal. My reading, through the 
Pragmatism of Rorty, will show how these narrative clusters can function as, and be understood 
through, the concept of vocabularies. The can also exemplify the differentiation that Rorty 
makes between hermeneutics and epistemology as modes of interpretation. 
 
2. Interpretation 
I will begin with the Rortyan differentiation between hermeneutics and epistemology, 
presenting a few key concepts for accepting the hermeneutic turn, followed by the discourses of 
both AA and ETA. These will contain contradictions, the clearest being AA’s use of absolute 
and universal tenets: I will resolve them in the second part of this section, making use of a 
collection of Rorty’s lectures published in 1993. In them, Rorty is not presenting anything 
beyond the claims made in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, it’s their style that sets them 
apart from the content of that book. They’re a re-telling of Rorty’s anti-epistemological proposal 
in a less ‘professional’ manner: “[t]hey offer a fairly simple, albeit sketchy, outline of my own 
version of pragmatism” (xiii). This sketchy outline offers another way to read Wallace and 
bridge both writers.  
 The first two parts of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (around 75% of the book) 
explain and refute the arguments and consequences caused by Western philosophy’s 
dependence on the image of the mind as the mirror of nature and on finding a neutral framework 
for knowledge. The third section deals with the clash of hermeneutics and philosophy, and with 
his proposal for a “Philosophy Without Mirrors”. It is a delicate presentation; Rorty describes 
his philosophy as anti-essentialist or anti-foundationalist, since the tradition of epistemology is 
so pervasive and dominant that its renouncement becomes the main quality of a philosophy that 
breaks away from its history and vocabulary. It is also important to observe that Rorty’s hope is 
not for hermeneutics to replace epistemology, he is not putting it forward as a better method for 
revealing essences, for unveiling Truth. Because of this, we could say that Rorty is less 
interested in the reader taking up a specific way of thinking and more invested in our 
abandonment of “[t]he notion that there is a permanent neutral framework whose ‘structure’ 
philosophy can display” which assumes that “all contributions to a given discourse are 
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commensurable” (315-6). Following the genealogy of Plato, Descartes, and Kant, the search for 
this eternal matrix has been the quest of Western philosophy, the one Rorty hopes we eliminate. 
If we don’t take hermeneutics as the new discipline for unveiling foundations, then it will 
ultimately be “seen as another way of coping” (356) with existential dread and the 
incommensurability of reality.  
What follows once we discard the notion “that our chief task is to mirror accurately”? 
For the purposes of my analysis, the consequences to follow are those established by the 
dissolution of the “classic picture of human beings,” (PMN 357), abandoning the notion that 
humans have a permanent and universal essence, something unique and unalterable. What 
remains, free from Dualism and Transcendentalism, is the “romantic notion of man as self-
creative” (358); Rorty develops the conclusion of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature on this 
notion, and it will constitute the majority of my hermeneutical interpretation of AA-discourse 
and of Don Gately. Rorty uses the term “edifying philosophy” to describe the hermeneutic act 
of self-creation, the “project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of 
speaking” (360). Here we notice the future-oriented characteristic of pragmatism: once the belief 
in and the search for a “permanent neutral matrix for all inquiry or history” (179) is abandoned, 
then we should be less concerned over what is True and beyond doubt, and more interested in 
finding what is useful to us, new ways of speaking, and “a new and more interesting way of 
expressing ourselves, and thus of coping with the world.” This leads Rorty to the concepts of 
normal and abnormal discourse; we are inevitably and necessarily culturized to a way of 
describing the world, educated into a set of norms and customs that pretend to have an 
unwavering foundation. This is normal discourse, a kind of necessary starting point, it is only 
“one way of being in the world” (365). In contrast, abnormal discourse constitutes edifying 
philosophy, being parasitic on and rebellious to normal discourse, since it involves new ways 
of speaking, of description, that cannot find consensus with the learned normal discourse. At 
this point Rorty brings in the existentialist view of the adoption of an abnormal discourse and 
the act of self-description as an exercise in freedom, while to remain in one’s normal discourse 
is a renouncement of freedom and of one’s human condition. Seen in a more Pragmatist 
approach, since reality is incommensurable, all discourse will at some point be lacking when 
dealing with some aspect of reality. One would be well served to pick up an abnormal discourse 
that is apt for dealing with the new problem and discarding the limited, normal one. This is 
similar to exchanging a broken or useless tool for an effective and useful one. 
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 I’ll soon explain how these philosophical approaches can be applied to fiction, but I’ll 
briefly set them aside to present the narrative locations of the Enfield Tennis Academy and the 
Ennet Half-Way House. The two places are linked in both form and content: the novel’s 
narrative voice breaks and jumps from one storyline to another, and often these shifts create a 
back and forth between ETA and Ennet, sometimes specifically focused on the protagonists that 
seem to almost embody what those institutions represent, Hal and Don. There are various links 
in the story between the institutions: the two sites are in walking distance of each other (ETA is 
on a cropped hilltop overlooking Ennet), some of the inhabitants of Ennet work at the Academy 
as part of their recovery, and near the end of the novel Hal visits Ennet, seeking help to overcome 
his own addiction. Since Don is hospitalized at the time of this visit, the two never meet in a 
scene dramatized in the novel, although it is twice suggested they do during the unwritten events 
that occur between the last and first sections of the novel.53 The narrative relationship between 
both protagonists is similar to the narrative relationship between the two sites in that there is no 
direct, plot-heavy interaction between the two, yet, as I hope to show later on, their connection 
to the novel’s many story-lines creates a tension Wallace deliberately does not resolve. The 
similarities in description and presentation between the two buildings strengthens this tension; 
both buildings host a multitude of characters we come to know in both general and specific 
terms, with sections that focus only on one character or on the many characters in one area (like 
the boy’s lockers and showers at ETA or the living room at Ennet), we learn their customs, 
idioms, and rules, and the endnotes build up the characterization of both places (e.g. the way 
kids pick up tennis balls on court, the house’s punishment-system). Their connection via plot is 
indirect, yet there is no lack of parallels; both institutions work to help their inhabitants reach 
one goal, professional tennis or freedom from addiction. My Rortyan analysis focuses on the 
vocabulary and beliefs implemented to attain these goals and how they also affect other aspects 
of the characters’ lives, with a note on how the anti-foundational vocabulary has a more positive 
effect on characters’ lives than the foundational one.  
 I’ll begin with the ideology of ETA, to which we are introduced by Gerhardt Schtitt, the 
German Head Coach and Athletic Director at the academy: “at near what must be seventy, 
mellowed to the sort of elder-statesman point where he’s become mostly a dispenser of 
abstractions rather than discipline, a philosopher instead of a king. His presence is here mostly 
verbal” (IJ 79). These verbal abstractions are the closest we get to a philosophical definition of 
                                               
53 pp 17; 934. 
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ETA’s understanding of tennis. In a presentation characteristic of Wallace’s style, Schtitt’s oral 
command of English as a second language prevents a precise definition of his tennis-beliefs, 
although the narrative voice gives us a hand: “Schtitt approached competitive tennis more like 
a pure mathematician than a technician” (81). This approach is mostly concerned with the 
possibilities of what can occur within the limits of the tennis court “infoliating, contained, this 
diagnate infinity of infinities of choice and execution, mathematically uncontrolled but humanly 
contained, bounded by the talent and imagination of self as opponent” (82). We can see Schtitt 
as the voice of ETA’s ideology not only for his role as head instructor, but because the founder 
of ETA and physicist James O. Incandenza hired Schtitt for their shared views on tennis. 
Schtitt’s mathematical beliefs quickly leave the court to form a type of communal ethics; he is 
presented as an authoritarian figure, almost comically fascist, wielding a weather pointer and 
sporting leather boots, his ethics are a stoic enterprise in which individuals give themselves to a 
group and to a set of rules, “[t]he well-disciplined boy begins assembling the more abstract, 
gratification-delaying skills necessary for being a ‘team player’ in a larger arena” however, this 
‘arena’ is inadequate for this transition, since in the novel’s North American landscape the “State 
is not a team or a code but a sort of sloppy intersection of desires and fears” (83). The muddle 
that results from Schtittian ethics and the ‘sloppy intersection’ can be read a few pages later, 
through the interactions that take place in the male locker room after an arduous training session. 
The Academy’s ranking system and the struggle to climb those rankings and become a 
professional player seem to contradict, or at least complicate, Schtitt’s beliefs; the students are 
“‘here because they want the Show when they get out,’ Ingersoll sniffs and says. The Show 
meaning the A.T.P. Tour, travel and cash prizes and endorsements and appearance fees, match-
highlights in video mags, action photos in glossy print-mags.” Hal grounds this desire by letting 
us know how difficult it is to reach the professional circuit, even for members of a tennis 
academy: “But they know and we know that one very top junior in twenty even gets all the way 
to the Show. Much less survives there long. The rest slog around on the satellite tours or regional 
tours or get soft as club pros. Or become lawyers or academics like everyone else” (111). Why 
would players give themselves up to a group when, unlike maybe a team sport, the group will 
not reach the goal together? When the group is divided by rankings and inner competition? For 
Hal, it is that shared experience that binds the group: “We’re all in each other’s food chain. All 
of us. It’s an individual sport. Welcome to the meaning of individual. We’re each deeply alone 
here. It’s what we all have in common, this aloneness” (112). There are various moments in the 
novel when this camaraderie is evident, be it around a tennis tournament or in the academy’s 
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food hall, however, it seems to fail Hal as he goes through the effects of marijuana withdrawal 
at the end of the novel. I will detail Hal’s final scenes in the novel later on in this analysis, 
suffice it to say for now that, as he suffers from withdrawal, he finds neither support nor solace 
in tennis or ETA’s community. 
 It seems clear that members of ETA have a specific understanding of tennis and the 
endpoint of their preparation. In these confines, it is successful in creating high-level tennis 
players. However, complications arise when non-tennis issues are faced via Schtittian ethics and 
the rankings-mentality. Despite their high academic levels, the inhabitants of ETA seem unable 
to break away from the metaphor of tennis, of options contained within a set field. As I will 
show, this approach fails the characters as the novel advances; Schtitt’s and Incandenza’s 
abstraction of the tennis court and its rankings has a similar effect to the image of the mind as a 
mirror of nature: reality must conform to this image.  
 An example of this is the story of the junior tennis player Eric Clipperton, who attended 
national tournaments sporting a handgun and would aim it at his head during games, holding his 
tennis racquet in the other hand, threatening to kill himself if he lost the match. Understandably, 
his competitors would forfeit the match and, in this way, Clipperton amassed “meaningless 
victor[ies]” (407-10). Clipperton would later on actually shoot himself in an ETA classroom, 
with the founder James O. Incandenza and his son Mario Incandenza as witnesses. The story is 
told as a sort of cautionary or morality tale by the Academy members, on the dangers, and 
emptiness, of pursuing victory and the top of the rankings by any means necessary. The narrator 
offers an interpretation tied to ETA pedagogy: “But the whole Clipperton saga highlights the 
way there are certain very talented players who just cannot keep the lip stiff and fires stoked if 
they ever finally do achieve a top ranking or win some important event” (436). The issue always 
relates to the context of competitive tennis and the Academy’s programme. It is maybe no 
surprise that “Schtitt holds a special key” to the room where the suicide took place and is offered 
as a gruesome meditation room where students can try and think of an alternative to “hard daily 
slogging toward a distant goal you can then maybe, if you get there, live with” (434).  
When the story of Clipperton reappears in the novel, it is again discussed with regard to 
the preparation of junior players for the success of reaching the professional tennis circuit.54 As 
                                               
54  This conversation is held in Parisian French and Quebecois, between O.N.A.N-O.U.S. secret agent Steeply, 
who is posing as a female journalist doing a soft-profile article on Orin Incandenza, and Quebecois ETA 
prorector Thierry Poutrincourt, who may be an agent for the terrorist cell A.F.R., with the chimings of another 
ETA prorector, Aubrey F. deLint, who tries to control and constrain the conversation as a way of protecting the 
alumni from unnecessary media attention. Schtitt’s broken English might make us doubt the clarity with which he 
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the previous Schtitt quote suggests, a new complication arises when the tennis player reaches 
the goal of the professional circuit: “You must keep winning to keep the existence of love and 
endorsements and the shiny magazines wanting your profile.” A pressure is created in which 
winning is expected, a pressure which, until then, the player has not experienced, “[h]ence the 
suicides. The burn-out. The drugs, the self-indulging, the spoilage” (677). The professional 
player faces two types of “doom” if they “cannot find some way to transcend the experience of 
having that goal be your entire existence.” The first is that you “realize the shocking realization 
that attaining the goal does not complete or redeem you,” which carries an allusion to 
Clipperton’s case, killing himself even though he found a way to guarantee victory. The second 
is akin to drowning in celebrity-culture, in fame, attention, and parties, it ends their career 
“because you cannot both celebrate and suffer, and play is always suffering” (680-1). These are 
views held by both Schtitt and the “academic Founder,” and although the importance of steering 
through a “goal-based culture of pursuit” and transcending tennis is present in the Academy’s 
discourse, the institution still focuses on making players that attain and maintain a level of 
professional success, and not so much the life that lies beyond it. In this way, the Show-oriented 
system of ETA can be read as an epistemological system, in that it’s approach to tennis and a 
tennis-career provide a justification of beliefs and a consequential way-of-being. It’s worth 
remembering that, for Rorty, the consequences of taking up Hermeneutics and dropping 
Epistemology go beyond professional philosophy. This is why his work ultimately turns towards 
hopeful attempts at reducing human suffering. I read ETA’s training system as the 
epistemological system of the academy’s inhabitants because of its rigidity and all-
encompassing pretension. It succeeds at saving them from a Clipperton-like destiny, but it also 
fails at addressing a life beyond the Show by applying Schtittian ethics of infinite variety within 
constraints (i.e. the possibility of commensurability) to existence.  
 I return to Hal and Schtitt for the clearest examples of this. Halfway through the novel 
we read about an ETA outdoor training session that takes place on the 9th of November, in 
preparation for matches over Thanksgiving. It is cold in Massachusetts, snow fell the day before; 
the Academy covers the courts with ‘The Lung’ when it gets too cold to play outdoor tennis, 
however, Schtitt refuses to take it out yet. Student LaMont Chu complains about the weather 
                                               
is able to express his ideas; the agendas of the three characters complicate gauging the honesty and intention in 
that conversation.  
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being too cold to play in,55 Schtitt instructs him to take refuge in the tennis court: “This second 
world inside the lines […] Not ‘adjust to conditions.’ Make this second world inside the world: 
here there are no conditions” (IJ 459). This world, the court, offers the students shelter from the 
other, larger world, and they must make an effort to gain access (or “citizenship”) to this world, 
which is ultimately on a mental plane, the end to Schtitt’s stoicism: “Use a head […] Where is 
where you apply for citizenship in second world Mr. consciousness of ankle Incandenza, our 
revenant?” In the general scope of the novel, Hal is the ideal player to ask, maybe fatally so; he 
replies: “Head, sir” (461). The first chapter of Infinite Jest is chronologically the last scene of 
the plot, in which, trapped in his head, telling the reader “I am in here” (3), Hal seems unable to 
renounce his mind-citizenship; he follows the Schtitt-ETA ideology to its final consequence, 
overachieving in the second-world court but beyond the realm of play. The indoctrination of a 
commensurable existence leads to the search for higher planes of existence and solipsism from 
which one is capable of measuring said existence, but these metaphysical planes do not exist 
and one is left with a doctrine that rejects life.  
 One could argue that the rules and regulations at Ennet House are stricter than those at 
ETA and that the cult-like environment of AA is guided by an epistemological system that 
provides an answer for any query, stopping further inquiry. A rhyme carved by knife on a plastic 
seat exemplifies this: “Do not ask WHY/ If you dont want to DIE/ Do like your TOLD/ If you 
want to get OLD” (IJ 375; [Sic., as endnote n.143 tells us]). Here we can point out a first link to 
ETA and Schtitt’s ethics, in that AA’s axioms are “almost classically authoritarian, maybe even 
proto-Fascist” (374). However, there is a leniency to AA that edges it closer to hermeneutics 
than to a concept of neutral truths.  
 I’ll begin by reiterating that the argument for abandoning epistemology for hermeneutics 
was constructed in the context of a discussion between relatively secure professional 
philosophers in the West. Neither Ennet House nor Boston’s AA groups inhabit an academic 
setting; just as the main goal of ETA is to create junior tennis players, AA’s objective is to keep 
people away from their addictions, and its rules are more like communally-agreed contingent 
guidelines. You are welcome to choose your own method and variations, the argument against 
doing so is that following your decisions lead you to the ‘bottom’ of your addiction: “There are, 
                                               
55  It’s worth noting that some pages beforehand we’re privy to 11 year-old Chu’s shameful and fearful 
confession that “he wants the hype” (388) of success in professional tennis. The desire for fame, like that for 
playing comfortably, is frowned upon in ETA. Chu can be seen as an example of unfinished indoctrination by 
showing signs of future failure in the Academy’s system. 
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by ratified tradition, no ‘musts’ in Boston AA. No doctrine or dogma or rules. They can’t kick 
you out. You don’t have to do what they say. Do exactly as you please — if you still trust what 
seems to please you” (356). The ideology of AA is contingent without straying too far into the 
abstract. One of the causes for its contingency and other hermeneutical qualities is that AA is 
not actually geared to renounce your addiction but rather to keep it at bay. As the Ennet House 
residents’ stories show, only a certain amount of will-power is required to renounce your 
addiction for a few days, the problem is staying off the substance for a month, a year, a lifetime.56 
Contingency and routine become the key characteristics of a method that must adapt to the near 
infinite variety of the recovering addict’s experience. 
 We can see this in the belief system that AA offers to the recovering addict, composed 
of a series of platitudes and the worship of an ambiguous god. There is no logical explanation 
as to why these beliefs are necessary to AA’s goals, yet they are essential to keeping addiction 
away: “the old guys say it doesn’t yet matter what you believe or don’t believe, Just Do It they 
say” (350). The option of going through the motions without acquiring belief or accepting a set 
of arguments moves AA away from the epistemological ambition of presenting a neutral matrix 
that overrides all other human disciplines. In this sense, AA is not even interested in its members 
understanding the system they are adopting: “Gately still feels he has no access to the Big 
spiritual Picture.” Nor what interpretation they give to said system: “It’s supposed to be one of 
AA’s major selling points that you can choose your own God” (349). What matters is that you 
do the daily required praying. In this sense, AA does not offer any kind of explanations, certainly 
not metaphysical, not even about its own methods: “Gately couldn’t for the life of him figure 
out how just sitting on hemorrhoid-hostile folding chairs every night looking at nose-pores and 
listening to clichés could work. Nobody’s been able to figure AA out, is another binding 
commonality” (349). This unexplainable system of thought is a far cry from the search for total 
commensurability, and it should lead us to interpret the apparent metaphysical content of its 
claims and the discipline with which they must be followed as a collection of contingencies, not 
as a claim of Truth but as the necessary and best-known re-description for surviving an 
addiction: “It’s all optional; do it or die” (357). 
 This can also explain why the AA tenants are unable to resist critical examination, and 
with it why it “is statistically easier for low-IQ people to kick an addiction than it is for high-IQ 
people” (IJ 203). AA is a terrible epistemological system, it fails as a method for carrying out 
                                               
56  “He had tried to stop smoking marijuana maybe 70 or 80 times before” (18). 
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inquiry and establishing what is True, what belief accords with Reality. This is best exemplified 
in the discussions between Don Gately and Geoffrey Day, a “red-wine-and-Quaalude man” 
(272) and an ex-college professor. Endnote 90 (1000-3) is a conversation between the two, Day 
attempts an intellectual critique of AA’s axioms to which Don can only reply with slogans and 
clichés or by admitting he’s having a hard time following Day’s arguments. Day rhetorically 
outmanoeuvres Don throughout the conversation, yet Don knows that once addiction’s call 
returns “Gately’ll get to tell Day the thing is that the clichéd directives are a lot more deep and 
hard to actually do. To try and live by instead of just say” (273). Seven days later we find Day 
talking to Kate Gompert in Ennet House’s living room, telling her about the time he came close 
to jumping out of his dorm window. He explains how he avoided suicide thanks to the company 
of a stranger:  
Some boy I hardly knew in the room below mine heard me staggering around 
whimpering at the top of my lungs. He came up and sat up with me until it went away. 
It took most of the night. We didn’t converse; he didn’t try to comfort me. He spoke very 
little, just sat up with me. We didn’t become friends. By graduation I’d forgotten his 
name and major. But on that night he seemed to be the piece of string by which I hung 
suspended over hell itself. (651) 
 
The character who asks for a detailed justification of a method has once already experienced the 
possibilities of a solace that does not answer to a metaphysical system. I interpret his 
remembrance as an acceptance of the AA approach to combating addiction, relinquishing, in a 
way, the epistemological need for certainty. It’s also worth noting that Day’s progressions come 
via conversation and/or a witness. At AA meetings you stand in front of a crowd and speak your 
mind. Many characters tell a gruesome memory of suffering and abuse they had hoped to escape 
through addictive substances. The act of remembering and retelling, of sharing one’s story is 
present in all members of Ennet House and A.A., I find a parallel between said act and Rorty’s 
understanding of self-reliance and his reading of Proust as an ironist novelist.57 Despite A.A.’s 
mention of a higher power, there is no need or demand to give each story a metaphysical 
redescription. In other words, the A.A. stories are not framed under by that higher power, not 
by discovering it or coming into touch with it: their suffering or recovery is not tied to a grand 
narrative. They’re Proustian for narrating “a network of small, interanimating contingencies” 
                                               
57  It’s worth remembering that by ironist Rorty means someone with ‘moral courage’ who argues dialectically, 
and who understands that their “vocabulary is closer to reality than others” (ICS 73). 
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that “are not interested in incommensurability”.58 In the case of Geoffrey Day, he no longer 
looks for irrefutable theoretical justifications of A.A. and instead tells of a moment of salvation 
through chance and empathy. It’s important that his memory isn’t given directly by a narrative 
voice, instead we read him telling the story to Kate in Ennet, which I read as him dropping the 
objective intellectual act and ‘surrendering’ (to use the vocabulary of A.A.) to his addictive past. 
In it he finds an act and a sign of hope that seems so similar to the process and meetings of A.A., 
it also makes his character less cynical and more humane. This shift in Day’s character is in line 
with Rorty’s belief that “[p]rivate autonomy can be gained by redescribing one’s past in a way 
that had not occurred to the past” (CIS 100-1). We won’t find the complexity and originality of 
Proust in Day, and so it might seem excessive to say that there is an innovation in telling his 
story which ‘had not occurred in the past.’ However, it’s enough for the redescription to not 
have occurred in Day’s past, since there is ‘no interest in incommensurability’ or in establishing 
a connection to History as a totality. In other words, the redescription does not have to be unique 
in the history of humanity, it’s enough for it to be a new redescription in a person’s life. This is 
what A.A. offers to its members. This connection between redescription of one’s past and 
autonomy, and the act of communicating the redescription to others, is present in the story of 
the novel’s protagonists. 
The importance of sharing an oral testimony is central to my comparison of Hal and 
Don, but I must first explain their situations near the end of the novel. Despite the structural 
distance I’ve already mentioned between the two protagonists, we can find both textually 
present on page 902, where Hal’s section ends and Gately’s begins. Their narrations remain 
separated but we can notice important similarities: both characters are horizontal, Don lays on 
a hospital bed, Hal is laying on his “back on the carpet of Viewing Room 5”, both characters 
are engrossed in their minds, rediscovering lost memories and trying to understand their present 
situation; both are battling to stay away from their drug of choice, marijuana for Hal and 
Demerol for Don. The differences that occur within these parallels mark the differences that set 
ETA as epistemological and AA as hermeneutical. Before listing these differences, I’ll 
contextualize their situations. Don is in a hospital bed after he was shot in the shoulder, he 
refuses to take potent pain-killers because he would consider a break from his sobriety, even 
                                               
58 Dave Eggers mentions Proust in the foreword he wrote for the 10th anniversary edition of Infinite Jest, 
commenting that “There is the same sort of obsessiveness, the same incredible precision and focus, and the same 
sense that the writer wanted (and arguably succeeds at) nailing the consciousness of an age)” (xiii). He does not 
elaborate beyond this. I do not know of other readings pairing wallace with Proust.  
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though other AA members have told him it wouldn’t be the case. Ennet House and AA members 
visit Gately and confide in him even though he can’t talk back; he’s having fever dreams while 
also recounting his life and revisiting lost memories. He’s also visited by what could be the 
ghost of James O. Incandenza. Hal is suffering marijuana withdrawal; he’s stopped smoking 
because he must pass a doping test before a big tournament. However, this seems to be an excuse 
for a choice he’s taken, since his mother is ETA’s dean and would not kick him out of the 
academy. He played a tennis match against someone ranked below him and almost lost; he 
doesn’t feel like playing tennis for the time being. Hal wants to be alone; he watches his 
deceased father’s films and revisits memories of his father.  
At that point in the story, one of the key differences between both protagonists is their 
experience of present time. Before laying down on the carpet floor, Hal has a panic attack which, 
somewhat like Don’s pain-killer-free pain, sharpens his senses. Hal knows how to manage this 
fear on the tennis court but not outside of it: “Lyle’s counsel had been to turn the perception and 
attention on the fear itself, but he’d shown us how to do this only on-court, in play” (IJ 896). 
Unrestrained by the court’s limits, this perception spreads out into the world: “What didn’t seem 
fresh and unfamiliar seemed suddenly old as stone.” And so the repetitions of the past and the 
future are accounted for in Hal’s present time: “The familiarity of Academy routine took on a 
crushing cumulative aspect […] I reexperienced the years’ total number of steps, movements, 
the breaths and pulses involved” (896-7). Hal also imagines the amount of food he’ll consume 
and the excrement he’ll exude. The training of ETA fails, even betrays, Hal: he’s unable make 
use of his skills beyond the court, his accumulative view of the past is reminiscent of the ranking 
system that determines your present skill on the summary of your previous games. His view of 
the future as an enumerated set of actions speaks of a worldview based on the predetermined 
and the commensurable.  
 Gately endures his present and his pain differently. Although he suffers from the 
gunshot wound in his shoulder, the pain is less than what he endured during the first two weeks 
of not taking Demerol: “but the hurt was nothing like the Bird’s hurt was.” He faces the pain of 
the wound with the same technique he used when he went cold turkey: “Living in the Present 
between pulses […] living completely In The Moment”. Gately considers the possibility that 
this is how the veterans of AA think he should live, present in-between each heartbeat. It is 
certainly the way he faces the pain in his shoulder, and by doing so his reaction is the opposite 
to Hal’s; the junior tennis player considers the measurable quantities in his past and future, Don 
turns away from this type of thinking and chooses to remain in-between heartbeats: “Here was 
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a second right here: he endured it. What was undealable-with was the thought of all the instants 
all lined up and stretching ahead, glittering” (IJ 860). Don is basically describing Hal’s panic 
attack while avoiding it, and, like Hal, Don is also going through a kind of withdrawal. Both 
AA veterans and the hospital’s medical staff strongly approved and recommend pain-killers to 
Don, yet he refuses them because he craves the drug for more than the relief it offers:  
No single second was past standing. Memories of good old Demerol rose up, clamoring 
to be Entertained. The thing in Boston AA is they try to teach you to accept occasional 
cravings, the sudden thoughts of the Substance […] It’s a lifelong Disease: you can’t 
keep the thoughts from popping in there. (890) 
 
It’s fair to claim that Gately is suffering both from extreme pain and from withdrawal, that he’s 
in a more dire situation than Hal, and that he deals better with his situation. Another difference 
between the two protagonists is their willingness to communicate with others. As Hal lies 
horizontal, various characters almost cartoonish pop their heads through the door and try to talk 
to him, getting no reply: “Some more heads came and awaited response and left” (IJ 906). 
Pemulis gets some conversation out of Hal, but not much: he is turned away. We last see Hal 
on the floor of his room, remembering his childhood and his father, finally conjuring an image 
of his mother copulating with ETA’s top ranked player John Wayne.  
Gately becomes (unwillingly) the receptor of the AA confessionals when paralyzed in 
bed: “It seems like Don G.’s gotten way more popular as somebody to talk to since he’s become 
effectively paralyzed and mute” (IJ 828). Various characters visit Don and open up to him, not 
only Ennet House residents but also characters like the ghost of Hal’s dad, James, who battled 
with an alcohol addiction. Because of his ailment, Gately can barely talk back at the visitors, 
yet he does pay attention and try to get his point across, even attempting to write his questions. 
He communicates with the wraith of James because they talk from one mind to another. The 
purpose of this comparison is to show that, when placed under pressure or constraints, the 
ideology of AA functions better than that of ETA, mostly because while the former trains one 
in a sort of outward movement that attempts to establish conversations, the latter invites you to 
establish limits and reside within your own mind. I will give other examples of this dichotomy 
at the end of this chapter that do not include Hal or Gately.  
This judgement is not only based on Rorty’s anti-essentialism and his critique of the 
mind as the mirror of nature; I believe it is also validated by the novel itself. While hospitalized, 
Gately remembers his mom’s alcoholic boyfriend; he also remembers the how the ex-boyfriend 
would constantly beat and abuse his mother. The three of them lived together in a trailer, and 
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during this time Don started drinking. As memories of this time return to him, Gately wonders 
if he should “fend off uninvited memories of his own grim conversations” with the ex-boyfriend. 
Since James, the wraith, is privy to Don’s thoughts, he replies to him: “No! Any conversation or 
interchange is better than none at all, to trust him on this, that the worst kind of gut-wrenching 
intergenerational interchange is better than withdrawal or hiddenness on either side” (IJ 839). 
Throughout the novel it is suggested that James Incandenza’s last film, Infinite Jest, was an 
attempt to communicate with Hal. A few paragraphs before the previous quote, the Wraith tells 
Don that the  
[…] spent the whole sober last ninety days of his animate life working tirelessly to 
contrive a medium via which he and the muted son could simply converse. To concoct 
something the gifted boy couldn’t simply master and move on from to a new plateau 
[…] Games hadn’t done it, professionals hadn’t done it, impersonation of professionals 
hadn’t done it. His last resort: entertainment. Make something so bloody compelling it 
would reverse thrust on a young self’s fall into the womb of solipsism, anhedonia, death 
in life. (839) 
 
This passage could describe Hal’s mental confinement in the opening chapter of the novel. The 
“impersonation of professionals” seems to be a reference to a scene at the start of the novel 
where James wears a shoddy mask to interact with Hal.  That James failed at various different 
attempts to converse with his son (and possibly save him from the mind-trap of the opening 
chapter) could convince us that one should not desire to become a ‘citizen’ in the second world 
of our minds, since it can become our only ‘citizenship.’ It might be no coincidence that Hal, 
during the aforementioned locker-room discussion on the Academy’s pedagogy, explains: “In a 
nutshell, what we’re talking about here is loneliness” (113). A phrase that is reminiscent of 
Prince Hamlet’s remark: “I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself king of infinite 
space”.59 A line that sounds like an all too accurate description of the direction Hal is heading 
towards.  
In my reading, Hal was trained to find, act, and become within set parameters; his 
reaction cannot simply be ascribed to withdrawal symptoms since, as Gately’s case shows, the 
effects vary. Like the motions of tennis, internalized through repetition, Hal’s reaction during 
his withdrawal and panic attack is to establish parameters within which he can establish control 
and protection. This action aligns with Rorty’s explanation of the desire behind the creation of 
an epistemology:  
                                               
59  Marshall Boswell looks at the connections between Hamlet and Infinite Jest in his book Understanding David 
Foster Wallace (cf.165-7, 169). 
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[t]he desire for a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint—a desire to find 
“foundations” to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, 
objects which impose themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid. (PMN 315)  
 
While Gately fights off these impositions, Hal tries to set limits attempting to stabilize his life. 
This can be further evidenced by returning to Rorty’s reading of Proust. Rorty describes Proust’s 
project as wanting “to free himself from the descriptions of himself offered by the people he 
had met” (CIS 102). In the case of Gately, this includes his own negative view of his past and 
himself, as well as the interpretation forced on him by his addiction, with the drug Demerol as 
an object wanting to ‘impose’ itself on him. “[W]ithout claiming to know a truth which was 
hidden from the authority figures of his earlier years,” he is able to resist addiction, to listen to 
others, and to face the hidden pains of his past. Although Gately does not write a 7-volume 
novel, I do think he is able to master “contingency by recognizing it” by facing the 
circumstances of each moment, one by one, without trying to establish a Foundation or find a 
connection to an omnipotent authority. Be it his mother, addicts or felons from his past, fellow 
A.A. members, and even possible wraiths, Don Gately “turned other people from his judges into 
his fellow sufferers, and thus succeeded in creating the taste by which he judged himself,” (CIS 
103), with ‘taste’ here being his adoption of A.A.  
I’ve focused on Hal given his importance to the story and his parallel relation to Don 
Gately, yet a similar interpretation can be extended to other members of ETA. For example, 
there is a scene at the start of the novel where an infant Hal goes to his mother who is gardening 
on their previous home’s front lawn and tells her that he ate a kind of mould he holds in his 
hand, the mother panics and shouts for help while “[h]olding the speckled patch aloft in a pincer 
of fingers, running around and around the garden’s rectangle while O. gaped at his first real 
sight of adult hysteria” (IJ 11). It is a short scene in which Avril is unable to step over the limits 
of the space she works in, even to call for help, to communicate with someone else. A similar 
event occurs with Michael Pemulis, Hal’s friend who at one point comforts a 14-year-old student 
suffering a panic attack by inviting him to “trust math,” because math will “[n]ever fail you […] 
You can fall back and regroup around math” (1071). The same Michael Pemulis who gets mad 
when players of his beloved game Eschaton cannot differentiate between the map and the 
territory and stop following rules. 
At this point, one might criticize my interpretation by stating that to claim Gately is 
better suited to face withdrawal than Hal sounds as obvious as saying that Hal is better suited to 
play tennis than Gately. However, to think that the protagonists are only experiencing 
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withdrawal is a simplification: both are also faced with the elements and situations that pushed 
them towards addiction, they are therefore also required to choose how to face what bubbled up 
from withdrawal. If we trust the wraith of James O. Incandenza, then Hal was on the path 
towards a mind-trap for some time now, and ETA did not do much to assuage it.  
 
3. Conclusion 
For this conclusion, I will set the supine protagonists aside to make a Rortyan reading of the last 
passages of Infinite Jest, where both discourses are represented in various passages free from 
Hal and Don. The end of Infinite Jest is not a standard narrative conclusion to the described 
action. It is therefore more useful to use Stephen Burn’s description of Wallace as a “narrative 
architect” whose “fiction's layered designed is often underpinned by a logic of juxtaposition that 
drives it forward” (150). This better describes the last pages of the novel, where the juxtaposition 
of several passages advances or enhances the plot and even a sense of an ending without 
historical finality. My Rortyan interpretation tries to read as much as possible from these layers 
to give this chapter a broader conclusion. To continue with Burn’s description, although the 
final passages may not seem directly connected to the vocabularies of AA and ETA, it’s 
important to note that “Wallace's fiction is built less around cause-and-effect plotting, than it is 
around the construction of rich metaphoric nodes where multiple meanings accumulate” (150). 
These final passages are “nodes” that I will interpret to show the validity and depth of my 
reading, as well as the novel’s complex structure. 
 In the second to last passage in the novel, Hal Incandenza’s older brother Orin is tortured 
by the terrorist cell AFR by being placed in a glass cage where cockroaches are released. (cf. 
971-2). It is an inversion of his method for killing cockroaches at the start of the novel: trapping 
them under a glass. This torture suggests that Orin was under close surveillance for some time, 
while it also provides another example of the novel’s elegant structure since, for example, the 
inversion recalls the first narrations of Orin at the start of the novel (cf. 44-5), while also offering 
another image of containment in the novel (consider the aforementioned Hal trapped in his head 
and Don at the hospital). What matters most to my reading is that, as the torture begins, Orin 
screams “Do it to her! Do it to her!” (972) It is unclear whether he refers to the female spy who 
captured him or to his mother, with whom he has a complicated relationship, to say the least. 
The scene and exclamation are reminiscent of one of the final scenes in Orwell’s 1984, where 
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Winston Smith is tortured at the hands of O’Brien.60 Instead of cockroaches, O’Brien uses rats, 
and Winston shouts: “Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia! Not me! Julia! I don’t care what you do to 
her!” (297) This connection is elemental to my reading because Rorty devotes one of the last 
sections of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity to the torture scene in 1984 and its significance 
in the novel as a whole.  
 Rorty shows that various readers and defenders of Orwell consider the torture scene a 
mistake, almost bad taste. (cf. CIS 171, 175, 180-2). Rorty, not surprisingly, thinks those 
readings are still concerned with Historical Truths and Neutral Essences, and the reason for 
some critics’  distaste is that the torture scene does not align with their reading of the novel as 
Truth against tyranny, they read Orwell “as a realist philosopher, a defender of common sense 
against its cultured, ironist despisers” (172). For Rorty, Orwell was neither “transparent nor 
simple” (174), and through the torturer O’Brien and the world of 1984 he showed a possible 
future of “endless torture,” (182), in other words, in a contingent future that goes in “the wrong 
direction” where “the same developments that made human equality technically possible might 
make endless slavery possible” (175). In other words, Orwell was not defending an absolute 
concept but exemplifying a contingent future, which is similar to the use of a dystopian future 
in Infinite Jest.  
 Rorty focuses on the torture scene because its methods and objectives can be given an 
anti-foundational reading. O’Brien’s torture methods attempt (and succeed) in destroying 
Winston’s vocabulary and so his sense of self. It’s worth remembering the quote I used at the 
end of the previous chapter: “Redescription often humiliates” (CIS 90). The tipping point in 
Winston’s case was saying he would rather Julia, the woman he loved, be tortured than himself: 
“Temporary irrationality is something around which one can weave a story around. But the 
belief that he once wanted them to do it to Julia is not one he can weave a story around” (178). 
In this sense, the torture is not aimed at damaging Winston’s ‘human essence’ or ‘innate nature’ 
but rather at destroying what O’Brien and the Party know Winston constructed around himself 
for his newfound freedom. “O’Brien wants to cause Winston as much pain as possible, and for 
this purpose what matters is that Winston be forced to realize that he has become incoherent, 
realize that he is no longer able to use a language or be a self” (179).  In Orin’s case, the 
description of his torture is too brief to know how it ends and how it changes him, yet it’s clearly 
                                               
60  I’m indebted to James Baxter (University of Reading) for pointing out the link between both novels during the 
2018 David Foster Wallace Research Group Symposium. I have not yet found an academic publication that 
makes the same connection.  
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a torture method designed specifically for Orin which could therefore lead to irreversible 
damage. The basis of both torture methods is not ‘what causes the most suffering to humans’ 
but ‘what causes the most suffering to this individual,’ they are based on the victim’s 
experiences. We get more information on Winston’s torture than on Orin’s, we know how 
Winston is captured, what happens before and after, whereas with Orin we only read the 
breaking point. We can assume he is tortured for information but we never really see it, the link 
we’re given between the novels is the result of a vocabulary-oriented torture motivated by 
sadism: “The Inner Party is not torturing Winston because it is afraid of a revolution […] It is 
torturing Winston for the sake of causing Winston pain, and thereby increasing the pleasure of 
its members, particularly O’Brien” (179). The efficacy and horror of Rorty’s reading shows that 
torture in 1984 is not a kind of battle between Truth and Oligarchy but the kind of thing an 
intellectual in a dystopia would do for fun. One could also make the case that Orin’s torture is 
unnecessary in the sense that the AFR already know where the master copy of “Infinite Jest” is, 
and therefore have no information or confession to extract from Orin. The NFL player is not 
shouting a confession; Orin is a Don Juan-like character who seduces without regard for 
humiliation it may cause and this may be his hellish punishment. The female spy watching his 
torture let herself be ‘seduced’ by Orin in an undercover ploy to get close to the Incandenzas, 
and a reader could assume she is enjoying Orin’s pain after experiencing his seducer’s persona. 
Orin trained for professional tennis at ETA, but at college he found his vocation as a punter, 
and, at the time of his capture, he plays for the NFL’s Arizona Cardinals. In my reading, Orin 
is, then, another representative of ETA ideology. However, now that I’ve established this link, 
my interest is not to explore the connection between 1984 and Infinite Jest but, as a way to 
cement my reading, to show Wallace’s novel contains the opposite possibility to O’Brien’s 
torture method.  
 Although Orin’s torture is horrific, it pales in comparison to the suffering and 
humiliation recounted in Infinite Jest’s various AA stories. These are narratives in the first- or 
third-person scattered throughout the novel that tell us about the life of AA members. They are 
mostly harrowing experiences that lead them to an addiction or about ‘touching bottom’ and as 
a consequence joining AA. They are stories of violence, that often include abuse, rape, and 
death, and they are amongst the darkest passages on the novel. Some stories have a comical tone 
but the humour is often at the expense of a person’s pain. Because of the amount of suffering 
described, the stories might be likened to Smith’s torture: so much suffering leads them to have 
nothing to hold onto. However, I will make the case for the opposite reading; given their context, 
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the AA stories show that the recovering addicts have something to hold on to, since most of the 
stories are to be read as spoken to an audience at an AA meeting, or as part of a conversation, 
such as Geoffrey Day’s, detailed above.  
 Near the end of the novel (958-960) there is a brief story told by Mikey, a recovering 
addict, at an AA meeting. He presents himself as “an alcoholic and an addict and a sick fuck” 
(958) who wanted to take his son bowling on his free day. His son lives with Mikey’s mother 
and sister, who tells him he needs the judge’s approval to see the kid, making Mikey very mad. 
He insults his sister and later, remembering the AA precept, tries to apologize for it. He wonders 
with his audience why he carries such uncontrollable anger within him and ends with “I just 
wanted to get some of that shit out” (960). Mikey’s story has no bearing with the novel’s main 
plots or protagonists, or with the other final passages of the novel. It is the first and only time 
we read about that character, so we could see the passage as inconsequential or minor. I read it 
as another node with accumulated meaning that, amongst passages where the protagonist’s 
narratives reaching tense events, we are meant to remember the stories of the many recovering 
addicts that are trying to survive day by day, and that those stories are a sign of hope.  
 I’ll now focus on an AA story that deals with hope instead of humiliation. Near the 
middle of the novel, a recovering addict “whose last initial is E.” tells a simple and brief story 
at an AA meeting, with Gately in attendance, about “his first solid bowel movement in adult 
life”. At the toilet, he believed he dropped his wallet into the toilet but discovers he’s 
successfully taken a solid shit or, as he calls it in a strong Irish accent, “a rail tard” (IJ 351). 
This is a sign of hope; his addiction damaged his body to the degree he became un-accustomed 
to taking solid shits. Now, thanks to his recovery, his body is performing normal functions again. 
Apart from his personal health, what matters in the context of AA is that he voices this and that 
it’s heard by other recovering addicts: “the lightless eyes of certain palsied back-row newcomers 
widen with a very private Identification and possible hope, hardly daring to imagine” (352). The 
sharing of these stories and the identification caused in the audience seems to be the main 
purpose for centring the description of the meetings around them. With their appeal and 
effectiveness coming from the subjectivity of the stories of survival, and the communicative 
connection they cause, rather than an appeal to metaphysical reasons. 
 To highlight the importance of this story, I must briefly return to Rorty’s interpretation 
of O’Brien’s torture methods. Thanks to the torture scene, Rorty reads in 1984 that there is 
“nothing to people except what has been socialized into them—their ability to use language, and 
thereby exchange beliefs and desires with other people” (CIS 177). With this belief as a starting 
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point, O’Brien’s technique is to “tear down” this socialized ‘inside’: “[Humans] can be given a 
specific type of pain: They can be humiliated by the forcible tearing down of the particular 
structures of language and belief in which they were socialized” (177). The victim’s suffering 
lasts after the torture since they lose the means to understand themselves as individuals and 
navigate the world. In this reading, the resistance to Big Brother’s famous 2+2=5 equation is 
not so much about objective vs. subjective, “the need to insist that two plus two equals four not 
as Orwell’s view about how to keep the O’Briens at bay but, rather, as a description of how to 
keep ourselves going when things get tight” (185). 2+2=4 becomes a foothold on a vocabulary 
that facilitates survival, with it a person can establish a narrative for themselves and their 
experiences. O’Brien specifically looks to destroy said footholds with his torture and leave 
nothing for Winston to reconstitute himself afterwards: “Winston had to watch himself go to 
pieces and simultaneously know that he could never pick those pieces up again” (178). 
Afterwards, he has no choice but to become whatever Big Brother wants him to be. My reading 
of AA’s vocabulary in the novel, set in a different dystopian future, makes it the opposite (or at 
least have the opposite effect) of O’Brien’s torture methods, for if his goal is to tear apart those 
existential footholds, then AA gives its members footholds. Such is the value and role of the 
clichés and routines; they are the recovering addict’s 2+2=4. Their capacity for hope can be 
forgotten among the many AA stories of suffering and humiliation, yet we must remember the 
context they are spoken in and shared. In the end, they are on a path to becoming like the shit 
story and establishing a more solid ground. It is an act of ‘putting together’ instead of ‘tearing 
apart.’ Mikey’s story at the end of the novel, despite its drama, is a reminder of this hope and it 
stands as a counter-node to Orin’s torture.   
 With this reading in mind, a continued interpretation can be given to the two passages 
between Mikey’s story and Orin’s suffering. The first involves an attorney who once was out to 
get revenge on Gately since one of his break-ins drove the attorney’s wife mad. He speaks with 
Pat Montesian, the director of Ennet House, outside of Gatley’s hospital room and we learn he 
is an AA member now, looking to make peace with Gately. The following scene involves two 
Catholic brothers making a bet or “experimental challenge” about human compassion, where 
the younger brother, Barry, stands on the sidewalk near a subway stop asking people to touch 
him, i.e. asking people to extend “basic human warmth and contact” (IJ 969), and so proving 
his older brother’s misanthropic beliefs wrong. He starts making money as a beggar but still no 
one touches him until Orin and Hal’s younger brother, Mario, appears and extends a hand. In 
his aforementioned book, den Dulk reads the scene as symbolic of “Mario’s role in the novel: 
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he demonstrates intuitively that the connection with others is indispensable for a meaningful 
existence” (243). A statement that coexists with AA’s audience and the Pragmatist recognition 
of the suffering of others. Barry Loach would afterwards get a permanent position at ETA. 
Mikey’s AA story and the attorney’s visit make two AA passages that are followed by two ETA 
passages, Mario touching Barry and Orin’s torture. The pairing of these worlds at the end of the 
novel seem to be nodes in themselves, with a focus on how characters react to the pain of others. 
It’s fair to claim there is a lot more empathy and compassion in the AA sections. Mario’s scene 
may sound like the exception to my reading of ETA but we must instead see that Mario is the 
exception at ETA, he is very much part of the academy’s life yet his disability keeps him away 
from ETA indoctrination and becoming a high-level athlete like his brothers.  
The overall aim of this chapter wasn’t just to prove Rorty’s influence on Infinite Jest but 
to create a reading of the novel similar to the ones Rorty makes of Proust and Orwell in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. When Rorty judges that “(d)etailed descriptions of 
particular varieties of pain and humiliation […] were the modern intellectual’s principal 
contribution to moral progress” (192). it seems clear to me that Infinite Jest is a book that can 
contribute to moral progress. In my reading, it is the people who can make use of AA’s 
vocabulary who better respond to the descriptions of pain. I’ve tried to describe that vocabulary 
as a contingent tool, so that, despite its use of words like God, its members could agree to Rorty’s 
claim that “We try not to want something which stands beyond history and institutions” (189). 
From the way AA is represented in the novel, a recovering addict’s call to a higher power works 
more like a coping mechanism to get through the day than a metaphysical assertion. In other 
words, the goal of their metaphysical terms is not to prove or even to argue for an eternal, neutral 
structure but to ward off addiction for another day. As I detailed previously in the chapter, there 
are many doubts about the content of AA’s methodology but not about its results. As we read 
Gately successfully following AA’s programme but also continuously expressing his doubts at 
AA meetings, in conversations, or to himself, we might be reminded of Rorty’s description of 
the person who understands the anti-foundational contingency of their private vocabulary: “The 
ironist - the person who has doubts about his own final vocabulary, his own moral identity, and 
perhaps his own sanity - desperately needs to talk to other people” (186). With these 
descriptions, we can read the characters of Infinite Jest through Rorty’s Pragmatism, focused on 
the ability to recognize the suffering of others and the desire to communicate, paired against the 
apathy and cruelty of other characters, as well as their inability to speak (often literally) to others. 
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In the following chapter these characteristics will be highlighted in what I consider to be 
Wallace’s most ignored book, Signifying Rappers, a nonfiction text on the seminal musical 
genre of hip-hop. In it we find the young Wallace grappling with a vocabularies both akin and 
foreign from his own. It’s main relevance for my dissertation is the evidence of Wallace’s 
interest and investment in the public conversation of his country, showing a pluralist and 
nonessential view of the cultures, classes, and history of the U.S. The Pragmatist questions, 
‘What purpose does this book serve?’ and ‘Why do you talk that way?’, will continue to guide 
my critical readings, and I’ll also include a question Wallace makes in Signifying Rappers that 




Signifying Rappers and Public Vocabularies 
 “Step up yo vocab” 
Bun B, Big Pimpin’ 
1. Introduction 
In April 1989 David Foster Wallace went to Boston. He was set to start a PhD in Philosophy at 
Harvard University in the Fall and he found an apartment to rent with his friend Mark Costello. 
By then, The Broom of the System had already been published and, as Mark Costello recalls, 
Wallace “had come through gory legal edits on his great story collection Girl with Curious 
Hair” (SR xi). The collection would be published in the Fall of that year, but during that time 
Wallace had no literary project to work on. He put off his commissioned review on 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress and attempted to start a project that “gyrated between fiction and 
nonfiction” (Max 124). This would turn into “a long essay on the making and the watching of 
pornographic movies” (Costello SR xi). Yet it was a period when “Wallace no longer felt he was 
writing well” (Max 123) and nothing would immediately come out of that project.61 “This was 
writing as compulsion, not as pleasure” (Costello SR xii) his roommate observed. Although he 
could not make it cohere, his interests and energies took on a new direction when, in June, 
Wallace defended the then emerging hip-hop music genre during an author panel in New York. 
Ecco Press editor Lee Smith was “intrigued by Dave’s defense of the form” (Costello SR xii) 
and suggested that Wallace write an essay on rap’s qualities. Wallace’s energies went into this 
project and the result was Signifying Rappers, a text he co-authored with Mark Costello, 
published by Ecco Press in October of 1990. This chapter aims to understand how Wallace 
engaged with rap music, the approach and strategy he took, and argues that his defense of rap 
music is as rich and insightful as the texts commonly cited to present the early Wallace, such as 
“Westward” and “E Unibus Pluram.” My reading of Signifying Rappers posits that Wallace’s 
analysis of rap is driven by the interaction between vocabularies, for vocabularies represent 
communities, and Signifying Rappers aims to bridge the white American community to the 
African American community. 
The role of Rorty’s Pragmatism in this chapter is to conceptualize Wallace’s placement 
and interaction with hip-hop music and its culture. Wallace’s approach to rap is not 
epistemological: he doesn’t pretend to judge the genre using a neutral theoretical framework. 
                                               
61  Wallace would later write an essay on the pornography industry in “Big Red Son” (1998) and it could be 
argued that this interest in pornography was the first step in the project of The Pale King (Max 257). 
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I’ll demonstrate that Wallace doesn’t subsume hip-hop into his worldview or give a totalizing 
interpretation of rap, he instead constructs a redescription of hip-hop for the white middle-class 
vocabulary he knows. Wallace wrote in a time when rap music was considered a felony and 
considered a social threat, as will be shown later in this chapter. His aim wasn’t to influence, for 
example, the rapper’s understanding of rap, but to change the ruling class’ attitudes towards rap 
music and, consequently, African American culture. In this gesture we can better understand the 
democratic gesture of Wallace’s writing. To highlight this approach, I also make use of theory 
unrelated to either Wallace or Rorty, that deals directly with hip-hop and African American 
culture, to prove that Signifying Rappers can participate in critical conversations on rap music. 
This chapter also includes the lengthiest close reading of my thesis. I do this, firstly, because 
my overall argument is strengthened by an understanding of how Wallace approaches and 
develops his redescription of rap. Second, as I’ll detail shortly, I have access to primary sources 
that no other scholar has used, and which reveal Wallace’s involvement in the project. 
Regardless of its small readership and brief recognition, I’ll show that Wallace was invested in 
Signifying Rappers not only for the cultural but also the political conversation of his country.  
 Despite being co-authored, I will only look at Wallace’s sections in the book. This 
approach is not troubled by the need to sort out who wrote what because Signifying Rappers is 
not a homogeneous text, in fact “Signifying Rappers presents a relatively straightforward 
intellectual partnership” (Morrisey and Thompson 80). Wallace authored some chapters, 
Costello authored others, and to make the separation clearer, the chapters authored by the former 
have a “D.” in their heading, those authored by the latter have an “M.” instead. I will elaborate 
on this structure later on. For now, it suffices to understand that an analysis that disregards 
Costello’s writing isn’t lacking in a significant way. Therefore, unless I am explicitly discussing 
the details of the co-authorship, when I mention Signifying Rappers in this chapter, I am 
referring to Wallace’s sections in the book.  
The book’s publisher, Ecco Press, was founded in 1971 and acquired by HarperCollins 
in 1999. When Ecco Press was bought, its records were acquired by the New York Public 
Library and stored in their Manuscripts and Archives Division. I obtained photocopies of the 
two folders that make up the Signifying Rappers records in the Ecco Press Archives. One 
contains letters, memos, and drafts regarding the book’s editing process, the other is one of the 
book’s final galley copies before its first printing. To my knowledge, this source material has 
not been published or analysed in any form. Throughout the chapter, I will present quotes from 
these folders that will either clarify or solidify the text’s characteristics.  
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 In Signifying Rappers Wallace looks at a new musical genre that is both a commodity 
and an act of rebellion, both entertainment and the development of a cultural tradition, both a 
mode with its language use for initiates and an address to a nation. This chapter uses Wallace’s 
interest in these dichotomies, as well as his interest in understanding how art can reach a wide 
audience and participate in society without creating something whose only purpose is mass 
appeal. My reading of Signifying Rappers will show a writer who engaged with a vocabulary 
and a community that were not directly his own, yet he was connected to it as a fan of the music 
it produced, and also historically, geographically, and politically, as a fellow citizen and as a 
speaker of English. It might seem contradictory, if not counter-democratic, that Wallace 
analyses black culture but does not address a black audience, for the intended audience of his 
text is middle class white America. In the context of hip-hop, this white audience represent, on 
the one hand, the antagonists of the rapper. And, on the other, white America represents the 
largest market for potential consumers of rap music. Nonetheless, it’s the black audience that is 
addressed by the rap’s lyrics, not the white market. Hip-hop’s conversation occurs between the 
rapper and their black community; Wallace addresses his own white middle-class community, 
despite writing about rap music, since his goal is to change the white vocabulary’s descriptions 
(and, therefore, its attitudes) of hip-hop and, as a result, their relation to the black community.  
In this chapter, I’ll explain how we can understand the redescription of rap music for the 
white vocabulary as a Rortyan overlap of the private and the public vocabularies, and of the 
black and the white vocabularies, as well as the public discourse and conversation of the United 
States as a democracy. Signifying Rappers is not only a work of aesthetic inquiry, there are 
strong democratic intentions in it that recognize the subjective conditions of American society; 
Wallace makes a clear effort to validate rap as an art form, yet his endgame is to bring the white 
reader’s attention to the conditions of poverty and violence in black communities.  
 It is fair to claim that this co-authored publication is the most ignored work from the 
Wallace canon, not only in terms of academia, but also his popular readership, publishers, and 
even Wallace himself.62 The only essay to emerge from the field of Wallace studies that focuses 
on Signifying Rappers, Tara Morrissey and Lucas Thompson’s “‘The Rare White at the 
Window’: A Reappraisal of Mark Costello and David Foster Wallace’s Signifying Rappers,” 
begins by demonstrating and lamenting that the book “has received a surprisingly small amount 
                                               
62 However, there has been a belated surge of interest in the topic of race in Wallace studies. Consider Jorge 
Araya’s ‘Why the Whiteness?: Race in The Pale King’ (2015), Samuel Cohen’s ‘The Whiteness of David Foster 
Wallace’ (2015), and Ed Jackson & Joel Roberts ‘White Guys: Questioning Infinite Jest’s New Sincerity’ (2017). 
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of academic and cultural attention” (77). What qualities of Signifying Rappers might have led 
to its relegation as a minor piece in the Wallace oeuvre? To start with, it didn’t help that 
“Wallace rarely, if ever, mentioned Signifying Rappers in other contexts” (Morrissey and 
Thompson 81). The work is mentioned and commented upon in the famous McCaffrey 
interview (C 47) but this is closer to being a unique commentary rather than a recurring topic in 
the scope of his interviews. This may be because the content of Signifying Rappers is an 
exception in his writings, since Wallace “never again returned in his writing either to music 
criticism in general or to hip-hop in particular” (81), and notably as well he “never again wrote 
directly on racial issues” (Morrisey and Thompson 89). Yet it seems hard to believe that subject 
matter alone dissuaded a readership when one considers the multifarious nonfiction Wallace 
produced throughout his career. Morrisey and Thompson also point to the complications of 
differentiation in a co-authored volume as cause for critics to avoid a text. 
D.T. Max’s biography on Wallace does not mention much of Signifying Rappers, but 
the working relationship between both authors is described: “[Wallace] began to leave the 
portions he’d drafted for Costello to comment on when he got home. Soon the roommates were 
alternating writing sections of the essay, Wallace by day, Costello by night. (“Chess by mail” is 
how Costello describes the collaboration.) Wallace’s gesture to include his roommate was at 
once generous—he knew Costello still held literary aspirations—and defensive, even desperate” 
(123). One could interpret the influence on each other’s chapters as more editorial than creative, 
and that Wallace worked with Costello for reasons beyond the development of a commentary 
on rap music. To reiterate, a consideration of Wallace’s chapters in Signifying Rappers as not 
dependent upon Costello’s chapters is neither a misreading nor dismissive. The archival sources 
suggest that Wallace’s efforts were what kept the text’s style steady throughout the editing 
process, this includes Mark Costello’s sections as well. The following is an extract from a letter 
dated 21st May 1990:  
Bonnie informs me Mark hasn’t been able to do his galleys. Let’s go with my set. I’ve 
fixed all typos; I didn’t mess with his sections much. I’ll clear it with him. Let’s move 
forward. He’s having a hard time at the DA’s job and I don’t think will be able to do 
his set in time. (58)63 
 
This is not to suggest that Wallace did some ghost-writing for Costello, just that it was Wallace 
that steered the stylistic ship of Signifying Rappers. This simplifies the who-wrote-what problem 
                                               
63   The archive was sent to me as a pdf document. The numbers given in this section refer to the page number in 
the pdf.  
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of co-authored works, and allows Morrissey and Thompson to pay little attention to Costello’s 
sections: “it is not difficult to relegate Costello’s role to the ‘Sancho Panza’ or ‘Alice-Tolkas-
esque’  DJ position” (Morrisey and Thompson 80).64 
 Is Signifying Rappers to be discarded as pre-Infinite Jest juvenilia? As mentioned, both 
The Broom of the System and Girl with Curious Hair were published before it, and both texts 
have received a considerable amount of critical attention. It is possible that there is a greater 
interest in Wallace the fiction writer, yet even his undergraduate philosophy dissertation, Fate, 
Time, and Language: An Essay on Free Will (2011), “a forbiddingly dense academic paper with 
limited general-audience appeal” (Morrissey and Thompson 78), was reprinted before 
Signifying Rappers, and in a time when rap music is ubiquitous. There must have been, 
ironically, some copyright issues since, as mentioned, HarperCollins bought Ecco Press yet their 
competition, Penguin, published the new edition of Signifying Rappers. Morrissey and 
Thompson don’t mention a cause for this but they do state in a footnote that their version of 
Both Flesh and Not, published in 2012 by Penguin, does not include Signifying Rappers in the 
catalogue of works by Wallace.  
 Signifying Rappers merits further examination because, as Morrissey and Thompson 
argue, “the book offers a revealing glimpse into [Wallace’s] development as both a fiction writer 
and an essayist” (78). Unlike topics such as grammar, tennis, or philosophy, rap music had no 
place in the Wallace household, and the world described by rappers is alien to Wallace’s white, 
middle-class Midwestern and university life. In Signifying Rappers we have the opportunity to 
read how Wallace’s mind unravels, analyses, and finally understands a new musical genre that 
became another branch of commercial pop music yet maintained aspects of its countercultural, 
underground, and rebellious origins, and was deemed ignominious by the ruling majority; an 
interpretation that may be considered analogous to his approach to literature and writing. These 
are some of the “virtues that save it from being a mere period piece, of only historical interest” 
(82). Signifying Rappers presents a pre-Harvard, pre-breakdown, pre-Infinite Jest Wallace 
wrestling with an ethical, intellectual, and specifically American challenge, “For outsiders, rap’s 
easy to move to, hard to dissect” (SR 24). This book, I contend, is a necessary piece in the 
creation of a genealogical perspective on Wallace’s writings. Not just because “a close 
interrogation of Signifying Rappers enriches our understanding of Wallace’s work, revealing an 
                                               
64  It’s worth noting that a similar observation appears in one of the first reviews written on Signifying Rappers. 
Writing for the Review of Contemporary Fiction (Spring 1991), Steven Moore describes the book as 
“informative, provocative, funny, and--especially in the sections by Wallace--brilliantly written” (340). 
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oblique vision of Wallace striving to articulate a personal artistic agenda in response to the 
postmodern literary tradition” (Morrissey and Thompson 78). My ‘interrogation’ of this text 
will also hopefully expand on our understanding of Wallace and bring the ‘oblique vision’ that 
reveals the democratic qualities of his oeuvre. 
To reiterate, Richard Rorty posits that there are no absolutes or universalities to be found 
or created. A main consequence of this stance is renouncing the belief in and the search for an 
absolute language, i.e., a language that can describe and communicate the totality of existence. 
Instead, we must work to reshape the tools that are vocabularies. Rorty makes a distinction 
between public and private vocabularies, neither are set, both are contingent and experimental. 
Vocabularies are limited by the impossibility of totality, i.e. becoming a neutral, ahistorical 
structure that grasps and judges all of reality. Rorty differentiates public vocabularies from 
private ones by noting that the former are ways of speaking that are effective for creating 
solidarity between people and for reducing the suffering of others, while the latter are useful for 
self-creation and self-realization.65 It’s important to once again note that there is no vocabulary 
that can do both, there is no vocabulary that is both public and private. These distinctions, 
however, are not based on essentialism or idealism; as the previous chapters have shown, 
vocabularies overlap and affect one another. This chapter studies the vocabulary of the rapper 
as presented in Signifying Rappers, as well as the community the rapper comes from and 
addresses. To understand how the contingent vocabularies of communities function and interact, 
we must return to the initial proposal of giving up the search for universalities and absolutes. 
This not only means that the aims or results won’t be presented in universal terms, it also means 
that the words and concepts associated with such a mindset are ineffective: “[T]he distinctions 
between absolutism and relativism, between rationality and irrationality, and between morality 
and expediency are obsolete and clumsy tools—remnants of a vocabulary we should try to 
replace” (CIS 44). Rorty calls for this change because the ‘tools’ of unalterable foundations on 
which humans can build upon to reach a utopian height no longer work, they must be substituted: 
“[T]he institutions and culture of liberal society would be better served by a vocabulary of moral 
and political reflection which avoids the distinctions I have listed than by a vocabulary which 
preserves them” (CIS 44). One of the interesting qualities of Rorty’s proposition is that he 
doesn't call for a total overhaul of the institutions and cultures, or for a great revolution, since 
                                               
65  Rorty argues that certain vocabularies that offered new ways of speaking were capable of reducing suffering. 
That is why “we cannot mention Marxism, Christianity, utilitarianism without respect. For there was a time when 
each served human liberty” (CIS 89). 
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the very vocabulary of his proposal categorizes those calls as replacing one foundation with 
another instead of effecting their erasure.66 
 Richard Rorty divides the books that “help us become less cruel” into two types: “(1) 
books which help us see the effects of social practices and institutions on others and (2) those 
which help us see the effects of our private idiosyncrasies on others” (CIS 141). Signifying 
Rappers touches on both ‘types’: the marginalization of the black community both historically 
in the U.S. and specifically by the Reagan administration; the white community’s unwillingness 
to interact with rap except as stereotype. By following the attitudes of the white mainstream and 
the words of the rapper, Wallace reveals “the blindness of a certain kind of person to the pain 
of another kind of person” (141). As mentioned, Signifying Rappers hopes to achieve this by 
asking its own variation of the quintessential Rortyan question, "Are you suffering?”, one 
framed by the context of hip-hop: "What would you do, or sing about?” (SR 143)  
 Signifying Rappers finds ‘moral and political reflection’ by focusing on language. We 
can understand Wallace’s analysis of rap in American culture as the representation of the 
interaction between two vocabularies, that of the black community and of the white community. 
The centrality of this interaction is justified by what I consider to be the first academic mention 
of the book. In “Rap Music’s Doubled-Voiced Discourse: A Crossroads for Interracial 
Communication” (1991), Gregory Stephens describes the text as a “study of how non-blacks 
respond to rap’s pro-black/anti-white rhetoric” (82). The other mentions of Signifying Rappers 
in the article are of how hip-hop samples guitar riffs from rock music, a genre from the white 
community, which come from the riffs of blues guitar, a genre created by the black community 
(cf. 82). Stephens follows by quoting the conclusion from one of Wallace’s sections: “a self-
consciously ‘closed’ music’s obsessive use of samples that must by nature be open” (SR 98). 
Although the use of Signifying Rappers is brief, Stephens clearly uses it to describe what he 
calls the “[o]ngoing interchange at the rap crossroads” (83). To continue the image, Signifying 
                                               
66   Which is not to say that his political stance was lax or indefinite. In Achieving Our Country, Rorty clearly 
presents himself as a non-Marxist, Reformist Leftist. His critique of Right-wing politics in the United States is as 
relevant and accurate as ever: “The Right thinks that our country already has a moral identity, and hopes to keep 
that identity intact. It fears economic and political change, and therefore easily becomes the pawn of the rich and 
powerful--the people whose selfish interests are served by forestalling such change” (AOC 31). I don’t think it’s 
hard to translate this stance to Rorty’s more philosophical vocabulary; the fixed moral identity is a belief in an 
absolute concept, the fear of change is a rejection of contingency, and the selfish interests are an indifference 
towards the suffering of others. Rorty’s rejection of Marxism seems mostly grounded on absolute concepts that 
claim to know “what was bound to happen” (AOC 23), moreover, “Marxism encouraged us to look for such a 
purity” of “people who made no mistakes” (AOC 45). Because of this, Rorty would have preferred if Marx was 




Rappers describes said crossroads from the viewpoint of the white vocabulary, not so much to 
highlight the role of the white vocabulary but to demonstrate the capacity of rap for creating an 
innovative voice for an impoverished community, as well as establishing the groundwork for 
dialogue between vocabularies. My close reading in this chapter will demonstrate how Wallace 
achieves this by recognizing from the start of the text that he’ll never fully grasp rap music 
except at a distance. At the same time, Wallace approaches the rap itself, the rapper’s words 
with utmost critical seriousness, despite the playful and oral tone of the text. This approach will 
lead him to see the rapper’s message as one the white community should approach with empathy 
and attention. This is not to say that Wallace keeps a comfortable distance from within his 
vocabulary, there is a clear effort to expand his own vocabulary by understanding the history 
and tradition of hip-hop, trying to contact record labels, rappers, and academics, even attending 
a rap concert. The efficacy of Wallace’s efforts of reaching out and defending rap music might 
be proven by the description of Signifying Rappers in “Musicology as Political Act” a text that 
argues for rap as “a voice for the empowerment and resistance for African-Americans mired in 
poverty.” (Bohlman 412) This should not be understood as a kind of transcription of the rapper’s 
words, instead, it is a kind of translation that tries to enlarge the vocabulary of the white 
community and so make it more receptive to those words. As the previous quote suggests, the 
aim of this effort is not to instigate an aesthetic shift in the dominant culture. As this chapter 
will show, Wallace’s text aims at the possibility of reducing the suffering of a community that 
is oppressed in the same democracy he participates in. We can read Signifying Rappers as a 
clear effort to construct a text that has civic, political, and cultural implications in the United 
States. That Wallace carried out this project in the early stages of his career should instigate 
serious critical revaluation of the text, as well as its resonance throughout the oeuvre. Through 
the use of archival material and rap criticism, this chapter will show that Signifying Rappers is 
undeserving of the obscurity it was subjected to for over a decade. But, maybe more importantly 
than that for my dissertation, I’ll show the deep civic and democratic intentions of this text and 
its archival sources through Rorty’s American Pragmatism.  
 
2. ‘E Unibus Pluram’ 
‘E Unibus Pluram’ is the closest Wallace came to a literary manifesto; it is fair to say it does not 
call for the replacement of one foundation with another, nor does it defend its stances through 
absolute concepts. By considering the creation of a literature that can avoid its own banalization 
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and commodification, Wallace posits the option to “risk the yawn,” i.e. to write with a purpose 
beyond entertainment; this is a contingent proposal based on the reasoning that “[r]eal rebels 
[…] risk disapproval” and the only risk to run in the entertainment laden early ‘90’s is to 
“eschew self-consciousness and hip fatigue” (81). To “risk the yawn” is not presented as an 
inherent quality of literature, it is a possible avenue of continuity for a U.S. fiction that seems 
to have exhausted itself. One would be hard-pressed to present rap as a genre that ‘risks the 
yawn’ for rap music seems to thrive in the environment that suffocates American fiction, yet 
parallels can be established between both texts. Morrisey and Thompson found that “Wallace’s 
concerns with hip-hop’s overriding cynicism and lack of a positive program” can be read as “a 
refracted version of his later critique of ‘postmodern lit.’” By placing ‘E Unibus Pluram’ in this 
way, Wallace’s thoughts on rap are but a developmental stepping stone; “an attentive reading 
of Signifying Rappers allows us to observe the ways in which Wallace was rehearsing, in an 
indirect and veiled manner, the artistic agenda he would shortly set forth” (87). This reading 
downplays the complex social positionality of Signifying Rappers that is present in a lesser form 
in ‘E Unibus Pluram.’ This chapter will show that Wallace was neither directly concerned with 
rap’s ‘overriding cynicism’ nor its ‘lack of a positive program.’ 
The full title of the essay is ‘E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction’ and when 
Wallace writes about those two topics he can do so from within his own vocabulary, he is writing 
from the inside, so to speak; he can be glued to the tube and spend hours zapping through 
channels. This is not the case with rap music, towards which he is the unaddressed fan, the white 
male outsider. When I compare ‘E Unibus Pluram’ to Signifying Rappers, I am interested in 
connecting the overlapping observations between both texts. These overlaps reveal the shared 
conditions of both communities, revealing angsts and possibilities that appear as characteristic 
of the democracy Wallace lived in.  
A difficulty that comes from pairing ‘E Unibus Pluram’ with Signifying Rappers is that 
the statements of the former might efface the subtleties of the latter. Rap music “mirrors” its 
core performative audience, America’s black community. I will detail later in the chapter how 
the ‘mirroring’ relation partakes in the study of rap, for now, I present a concept from ‘E Unibus 
Pluram’ called Image-Fiction: it’s the name Wallace gives to prose literature that aims to 
describe a society defined by T.V.-watching. But Image-Fiction is less a reaction to a cultural 
malaise than a symptom, and this is why Wallace notes that the “fictional response to television 
is less a novel than a piece of witty, erudite, extremely high-quality prose television.” (80) It 
would appear logical and simple to apply the same judgements to hip-hop, yet Wallace 
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denounces this approach in Signifying Rappers. It is erroneous and dismissive to state that 
rappers only enact with what T.V. culture feeds them, it is an oversimplification used to discredit 
hip-hop: “Thus the rapper isn’t artistically legit, doesn’t ‘create;’ he merely regurgitates the 
popular artefacts his world has taken, or had imposed on it, as that part of the Self it can see” 
(SR 98). Signifying Rappers is more than “a refracted version” of ‘E Unibus Pluram,’ more than 
a practice draft for his later commentaries on U.S. culture, it is a text with a social and ethical 
complexity that is unique in the Wallace canon.  
Morrissey and Thompson found that “[t]he problem with Signifying Rappers, from 
contemporary whiteness-studies perspective, lies not in its positionality or methodology per se 
but rather in the inconsistency of its aims” (95). This chapter disagrees with this statement, 
maybe because it does not approach the text from a “contemporary whiteness-studies 
perspective” but from Rorty’s Pragmatist theory of vocabularies. Wallace’s aim, I contend, is 
to aid his white community in understanding hip-hop music as an art form and its role in 
American culture. He hopes to create empathy for the black community through the expansion 
of the white community’s vocabulary by having them comprehend the rapper’s story. 
Leaving behind Morrisey and that article but staying with Thompson, I’ll present the 
prominent reading he gives Signifying Rappers in the aforementioned book Global Wallace. It’s 
no coincidence that Signifying Rappers is the last text by Wallace he reads before presenting his 
conclusion. It’s worth remembering that, as presented in the previous chapter, Thompson 
argues that Wallace “perceived specific cultural content as a mere surface-level dissimilarity” 
(197) when reading world literature. Thompson then argues that Wallace worked similarly to 
rap’s samplers when he incorporated qualities from international literature into his writing: “Part 
of what attracted Wallace to late-80s hip-hop was its emphasis on intertextuality” (232). 
Thompson therefore places Signifying Rappers at a prominent place of the Wallace canon, 
turning it into “one final metaphor with which to understand Wallace’s commitment to 
intertextuality”, the metaphor being “Wallace as the literary equivalent [of] a hip-hop sampler” 
(234). In my reading, however, Wallace is more the equivalent of hip-hop’s rapper, since, as I’ll 
show, it’s the rapper who both addresses and represents the black community, and in the case 
of Wallace he addresses his own white middle-class community, hoping to expand their 




3.  Close reading 
Signifying Rappers is written in a style that looks to evoke the voice of an ‘80s’ fan of rap music; 
its form tries to appear more improvised than planned, coupling extensive sections with brief 
ones. Before looking at each of Wallace’s sections, I will present archival evidence showing 
that from the first draft he had a clear notion of what kind of book he wanted to write, and that 
his heavy involvement in the editorial process kept Signifying Rappers in a consistent stylistic 
direction. The following is a section of the letter Wallace wrote to Lee Smith, an associate editor 
at Ecco Press, to present the first draft of Signifying Rappers:  
Enclosed is a long, hopefully pretty exhaustive piece on the rap/hip-hop scene in the 
U.S. late-80’s as such might be perceived by white people -- my roommate and I have 
been working on it for 2 months. (2) 
 
It is interesting to note that, apart from the obvious “rap/hip-hop” theme, he picks the book’s 
temporal and social setting as the main elements that define it; “late-80’s” and “perceived by 
white people”. This contingency will guide the editing process up to its publication. Compare 
Wallace’s own description of Signifying Rappers with the following one by Ecco Press in a later 
stage of the publishing process. The first is from a Spring 1990 publication list: “An essay 
investigating rap’s music’s relationship with politics, violence, racism, its place in the 
continuum of African-American culture, and its integrity as artistic expression” (31). The 
second is an excerpt from the book’s original back-cover: “The authors, white, educated, 
middle-class, occupy a peculiar position, at once marginal and crucial to rap’s Us and Them 
equations” (120). The former focuses on the characteristics of rap music and its validity as art; 
the latter, basically quoting from the book, focuses on the writer’s (racial) relation to their topic, 
similar to Wallace’s description. Although both describe the content of the book, for my reading 
the difference between the two re-enacts the editorial shift from an attempt at an objective 
description of rap to Wallace’s subjective description.  
The book’s style and syntax are also tied to this temporal positionality, as any reader that 
has listened to rap after the ’90’s will notice. It’s obvious that Wallace had no way to predict 
what direction hip-hop would take, much less its slang; there is a tied-to-the-whale risk in his 
effort to take in and absorb the hip-hop culture of his time by employing its slang and syntax 
while never pretending to be part of the movement itself. The importance this choice had for 
Wallace, and the confusion it caused his editors, can be seen in a two-page letter from 1989 he 
sent to Ecco Press in which he lists that apparent style errors, idiosyncrasies, and incongruities 
are ‘INTENTIONAL.’ The list contains 15 points in total, the best example may be: “6-Any 
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neologisms or deviations from standard English usage are INTENTIONAL and will be stetted” 
(113). These style choices were present from the project’s start and they indicate how Wallace 
approached, interacted with, and wrote about rap. Another one of the book’s characteristics that 
was planned from the start was its division into three titled sections: “section titles -- 
ENTITLEMENT, IMPEDIMENT, ACQUISITION --” (11). It seems that from the start of the 
project, Wallace saw white, middle-class men writing about rap as an issue to be presented and 
resolved. I read this as more than social tact; Wallace is delineating the two vocabularies he’ll 
attempt to bridge in the text.  
The archive testifies to Wallace’s active and dedicated role in the book’s copy-editing 
process. In one of his responses to an edited draft sent by Ecco Press, he began by stating his 
praise of whoever did the work: “I do some copyediting myself and am sincerely awash in 
admiration” (37). Wallace’s involvement can be seen in his observation of how a crossed-out 
word should be crossed-out: “p. 97 line 3 word 11 needs a heavy, acutely angled line through 
the word’s heart [the word is ‘theme’; p. 112 line 4 word 2 in my edition.] (this is hard-to-set 
way poststructuralists like to represent words under ‘erasure.’) I attached a page of explanation 
to p.97” (37). Sadly, the page-long explanation is not in the archive folders I received. 
Nonetheless, the fact that he wrote an explanation to justify an editorial choice speaks to both 
the depth behind Wallace’s writing and to the relation he kept with the staff at Ecco Press, a sort 
of conversational editing process. This often included stets in the proofs Wallace received, 
similar to and despite his list of ‘INTENTIONALs.’ Wallace made an effort to keep his text 
away from standardization as if it would ruin the inner-logic and purpose of his text: “Several 
l/n’s were stetted, like ‘essay-wise’ on p.23, ‘drive-by’ on p.31, trickle-down (as noun) on p.122; 
despite Webster 9, no hyphen here results in a lot of reading difficulty” (37). That Wallace 
wishes to avoid ‘a lot of reading difficulty’ is pertinent to my research; in these examples we 
notice Wallace placing Signifying Rappers in a prose style that is neither that of standardized 
English and the essay-form nor a convoluted one that will complicate its reading.  
Wallace’s sections in the book, all labelled with a D., do not seem to explain rap to the 
reader so much as to bring her along on his effort to understand rap. In the first section, labelled 
(1B), Wallace presents the co-authors as “not yuppies” and “two white Boston males” (21-2) 
and then presents their situation “at this hour” (22). Wallace begins his essay by establishing the 
context and time of his writing, as well as an “ethnic distance” (22) to the genre. His overall 
style is unworthy of an encyclopaedic definition, neither objective nor distanced; he presents 
himself as an outsider to the genre and he will maintain this distance throughout the text. 
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Wallace then explains how and why the co-authors will be able to write about rap and he also 
asks for permission to do so: “grant us at least secondary authority” (28). As if, once presented 
as outsiders, they wouldn’t be able to write anything worth reading, lacking any insight but also 
aware that writing on rap as a white man already implies a cultural conflict.  
 It is mostly because of the awareness of this cultural conflict that Wallace’s approach 
and relation to rap can be understood through the Rortyan concept of vocabularies. Signifying 
Rappers informs the reader that within the United States there is a black culture, to which rap 
belongs, that was forced to the fringes of American society by the white culture in power, to 
which Wallace belongs. These two cultures have different vocabularies, and rap music, where 
the lyrics are central, is developed within the vocabulary of the black community. Its mass 
appeal comes from rap’s adherence to said black vocabulary, “rap [appeals to the white market] 
by keeping the music closed, prepositionally black” (36). Wallace’s main concern, then, is how 
to approach a vocabulary, a way of speaking, that is not his. 
For Wallace, “rap presents itself as synecdochic” (40) of the black community, and 
therefore of its vocabulary. “Synecdoche’s potency in art depends on a community as backdrop 
and context, audience, and referent: a definable world for the powerful, dual-functioning Part 
both to belong to and to transcend” (41). Wallace can discern the relation between rap and its 
white audience as parallel to the relations between black and white cultures in America, noticing 
an evident lack of communication and understanding. The Rortyan goal of solidarity is non-
existent between the two American vocabularies. For example, Wallace accuses “Us, the bland 
masses […] the media-We”67 (41), i.e. the white community, of reducing the black community 
to stereotype (“a false synecdoche” [40]) and of ignoring the violence that occurs within it “like 
We haven’t noticed it’s been going on this way 10+ years” (41). The response of understanding 
through stereotype and selective shock as the response is equal to the reaction that the white 
community had towards rap music:  
The rest gather themselves under headlines about the connection between rap and gangs, 
rap and rape, rap and crack, rap and ‘lost generations’ We’d never ‘found’ to begin with. 
An Entitlement thesis of this whole sampler is simply that critics and writers so far have 
done a shitty job of countenancing the decade’s most important and influential pop 
movement as anything more than a slide under the socio-penology’s inverted ‘scope. 
(42) 
 
                                               




A lack of attention and empathy towards rap as a true genre, as synecdoche of a vocabulary, 
leads to framing it within the same views and/or prejudices of the culture that pushed the black 
community as a whole to the margins of society and kept it there. Wallace at one point held this 
prejudiced view. He went to a rap concert expecting the lazy image to fit reality, and found that 
only other white people held the same notions and expectations: “Evidently the cops had read 
the same stuff about rap that we had. They and we were suffering a kind of delicious enforced 
paranoia” (44). The cops and the white college kids are within the same vocabulary, and so they 
share the same limitation: working with the stereotype and not the synecdoche. Wallace’s shift 
towards synecdoche begins by realizing that rap music is not addressed to him, that it is not 
immediately comprehensible to him, if at all. This is not the case for the black audience that 
operates within the same vocabulary as the rappers: “For the only mediating image between 
them and the rap Scene was the one the Scene itself projected. They were born inside it, bought 
in by right, needed no lens or text to see past the ‘distance’ and ‘perspective’ administrators and 
police and sample staff needed to bring to bear” (45). There is no effort from the white listeners 
of rap to understand the genre as an expression of a vocabulary that is not their own, as a 
representation of a life they do not grasp because they haven’t experienced it. The lazy reaction 
is to see rap from the white perspective, to bring it into the white vocabulary, where it loses 
meaning. “And you can feel this false ‘perspective,’ these lambent, tourist-bring-your-own-
water attitudes in the established rock critics who determine all pop’s seriousness, worth, 
implication - post-hip white staffers […] Often a fatherly condescension about the ‘formal 
novelty’ of a genre ‘with plenty of energy but not one original sound’” (45). Wallace’s strategy 
for getting the permission he asked from the reader is to prove the awareness of his condition as 
an outside listener and critic; he shows what he wishes to avoid by listing the shortcomings of 
other white critics of rap: in a racially charged context, to barge into the rap scene in a near 
colonialist-attitude; the use of a privileged position to interpret and explain to another 
community their own creations; to explain rap to rappers.  
 The archive proves that the concept of synecdoche was present in the text from its first 
draft. However, the archive also suggests that the section on synecdoche may have grown and 
gained importance as the text was re-drafted. The following is an excerpt from the commentary 
by the first editor, Lee Smith, on the first draft of Signifying Rappers: 
David, p.17, your long foot note: this seems too important to be a footnote. Why isn’t it 
a part of your argument above, especially when much of it relies on the notion of the 
rapper speaking to and for his audience? rapper [sic] as Everyblackman, as Legba, as 
troubador [sic] ...In fact, the more I think about it the more I’m convinced of the central 
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importance of synecdoche to the rest of the entire essay [...] My only point here is that 
your footnote on synecdoche should not be a footnote. Is it something you’re afraid you 
haven’t worked out enough? Or are you afraid it seems too academic? (8) 
 
A reader of Wallace knows that he had no problem including a very “long foot note” in his 
work, yet I doubt that the first-draft footnote was the 4 pages (SR 38-41) that comprise the final 
version’s introduction and explanation of synecdoche. Since this footnote no longer exists and 
there is a section on synecdoche in the main text, Smith presumably convinced Wallace, and 
this suggestion also led Wallace to expand the role of synecdoche in the text. That being said, I 
don’t think Wallace was oblivious to the “central importance of synecdoche” for his argument 
even if he placed it in a footnote. The article “Encyclopaedic Novels and The Cruft of Fiction” 
(2012) by David Letzler shows that Wallace was fine with placing vital information outside of 
a text’s main body. It seems, however, that the definition and use of synecdoche became too 
large, even for Wallace, for a footnote.  
 Wallace ends the chapter with a series of questions: he first asks if the rappers are “just 
reflecting their audience, holding up the mirror their world can see itself as world in?” (47) This 
question brings together the possibilities Wallace has been reaching throughout the chapter: the 
rapper is not interested in addressing the white audience (which doesn’t mean they are not 
wanted as customers, but that will come later); the rapper is not promoting or proposing violence 
but describing his surroundings; the rapper’s music is best understood by the members of his 
community. The sum of these observations causes a certain fear in the white audience; although 
they form part of the dominant majority, the rap genre cannot be fully grasped by them, it doesn’t 
even address them. “We suspect here’s the root and hidden white mainstream fear: what if 
cutting-edge rap really is a closed music? Not even pretending it’s promulgating anything 
controversial or even unfamiliar to its young mass audience? What if rap scares us because it’s 
really just preaching to the converted?” (47) But what causes the ‘scare’? That the white 
community ignores the violence that plagues the black community or that the ‘converted’ have 
no interest in relating to the white community? Either way, Wallace’s observations give 
evidence of the lack of communication and empathy between both vocabularies. 
 In this first chapter, Wallace presents an image that he will use throughout to exemplify 
the disconnection between both vocabularies, between the rapper and the white spectator: 
“Interested whites, in fortunate or unavoidable moments, can only stare through a window 
whose bulletproof glass reveals what makes us glad the glass is there” (43). This image is more 
than an adaptation of the outside-looking-in phrase, it is the synecdoche of his critical situation 
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towards rap music.68 Variations of this image will be presented throughout the text to exemplify 
various relations between communities. I believe that the depth of this image can also represent 
the Rortyan notion of vocabularies, and it’s worth noting that Wallace’s closing sentence offers 
a final variation on it (cf. 145). Wallace will not let the reader, or himself, forget his condition 
as an outsider to the community rap speaks to. Wallace begins by dating his writing “Circa of 
composition here is July ‘89” (48). The temporal placement of his text fits the Rortyan 
interpretation: he is not constructing a definition of Rap but attempting to understand the cultural 
event around him, thus highlighting the contingent setting of his analysis and of the nascent rap 
movement. 
 In the next section, D. (1C), Wallace explains why two white males should be allowed 
to study rap music. It is a brief chapter where Wallace explains why the co-authors are interested 
in rap music, why it is worth writing about and examining beyond the usual white audience 
response of shock and fear. In the book’s interpretation, by 1989 all pop music is a rehash of a 
sellable product, every known artist has basically ‘sold-out’, “rap is pretty much what there is 
to like” if one is searching for meaning in music beyond a “jingle.” Wallace is not interested in 
rap as exotic venture; he considers it the only musical scene worth paying attention to in his 
time. It is a genre that reveals a telling aspect of the milieu: “Serious rap is important, both as 
art-for-own-sake and as a kind of metaphor-with-larynx for a subbed-culture unique in its 
distillation of the energy and horror of the urban American present.” The mimetic quality of rap 
that Wallace mentioned in the first section seems unique since no other mainstream genre 
mirrors its surroundings. This quality, once recognized, should move the listener from the 
stereotypical comprehension of rap to ‘synecdochal’ appreciation, for it is in this mirroring that 
Wallace begins to reveal the possibility of a message that can move across vocabularies. This is 
why he finds rap to be “important in different ways explainable by parallax--both to and for a 
young white American mainstream dammed up by the very bed it’s made itself to flow in” (49). 
Like synecdoche and the glass image, the concept of parallax is another part of Wallace’s 
approach to rap. It opens up the possibility that, although not directly mirrored, the white 
audience can find something in rap besides the immediate Other-shock it offers.  
 Chapter D. (1C) ends with Wallace placing the essay within a “rap-esque rationale”: it 
will be written and published because it gives them pleasure to do so and it is a sellable product. 
But these virtues are not privy to the rap scene, for Wallace they are part of the mainstream 
                                               
68  The title of Morrisey and Thompson’s essay comes from this image, although they do not address it directly in 
their text.  
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culture, “The headlong pursuit of present-tense pleasure, after all, has risen to chief among 
American rights; no?” (50) Signifying Rappers opens with a discussion of ‘Entitlement’ because 
it plans to engage in a conversation that divides participants by their race. The co-authors are 
racially placed in the oppressive group, therefore their interaction with the cultural production 
of the oppressed group can be interpreted as another mode of domination. This format suggests 
that the co-authors were not only interested in constructing their argument, they were interested 
in how to best present their argument for use in the national debate of rap in the ’80’s. Beyond 
the form and content of the book, the archive gives evidence of the co-author’s desire and 
anticipation for the book’s role in the public sphere.  
In a letter from Wallace to Cathy Jewell, the third editor of Signifying Rappers, he 
discusses how the book can better take part in the public debate on rap. Yet he begins by stating: 
“My co-author is worried about my bio-line for him; he’s working as a narcotics prosecutor and 
doesn’t want his office exposed to any controversy about race” (85) Beyond a copyright debacle, 
it seems the co-authors worried about a possible backlash at their head-on engagement with hip-
hop culture, the discussion of ‘Entitlement’ therefore seems necessary. 
 The next section, entitled “Impediment”, opens with a chapter by Wallace, (2A), where 
he returns to the position held in the first section: “Whatever musical or sociopolitical 
importances there are in rap/hip-hop are pretty obviously there to be drawn out by and for black 
people.” (53) The message of rap music is not for a white audience, so Wallace approaches both 
the rap’s lyrics and its community, the vocabulary of rap, “thru the window of pop/media 
stereotype.” (56) Wallace looks at the dissonance between both vocabularies in order to reach a 
possible definition of his subject. This is a definition by parallax, giving the white audience a 
way to appreciate the same rap the black audience listens to, but in a way different to that of the 
black community. Wallace then gives a good example of the clash between vocabularies when 
he shows that rap doesn’t fit into the O.E.D.’s definition of music: “[rap’s] values and foci are 
different, its precedents un-Anglo” (57). Wallace defends it as music: he follows with a 
paragraph of praise, a near-poetic listing of the various qualities of rap, qualities unnoticed or 
ignored or misunderstood by a white audience. This listing becomes the closing statement of 
the chapter as Wallace leaves behind the question of how to approach rap and presents defence 
of rap music: “It’s the contrapuntal tension between the music’s celebration of freedom-in-
Space (dance) and the rap’s tightly rhymed and metered rhetoric of imprisonment-in-Time, of a 
poverty of ‘set’ and self that allows only status and power as value and only neighborhood as 
audience… it’s this tension that gives rap’s ‘talk-on records’ their special and poignantly post-
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Reagan edge” (58). Wallace broadens the definition into a ‘shared’ presidency, one that negates 
common experience, for he already mentioned that the Reagan administration’s War on Drugs 
program affected, or rather targeted, the black community in a way that the white community 
cannot relate to. Rap is the next step in the genealogy that has pushed musical innovation in 
America throughout the 20th century (blues, jazz, rock), and it is also a genre created within 
political, social, and economic constraints, and so it only addresses the people living within 
those same constraints. By now the reader should be asking along with Wallace: how can 
someone outside the rap community enjoy and appreciate rap as more than superficial pop-
jingle, a fear-ride consumption? Wallace’s answer in the next chapter takes a foothold on the 
idea of the ‘post-Reagan edge.’ 
Although he must again begin by pointing out the difficulties of grasping rap, in the 
following chapter (2C), he answers that question with the lengthiest version of the glass image. 
This time, the glass belongs to the windows of a suburban train passing by an impoverished 
area; the white commuters inside, the black ghetto outside. The commuters get “all quiet and 
intense” as the train goes through the hood, and the “easy analysis” and analogy is that white 
listeners of rap, like the commuters, enjoy the short voyeuristic thrill of watching the violence 
of American society, like a TV image, which also has a glass in between (or, used to), because 
to be a distant viewer “assuages, makes us think that what’s inside that torn-down world refers 
to us in no way, abides there decayed because Meant To, the pain of the snarling faces the raps 
exit no more relevant or real than the cathode guts of Our own biggest window” (76). The simple 
image, the stereotype of rap in the white vocabulary, is of similar value to that of TV 
entertainment: it gives the audience a thrill before letting them return to business as usual.  
 Wallace invites the commuter to step out of the train, “even for just a moment.” Those 
that accept the invitation find “the gutted landscape of rap itself” (76), the place where rap 
originated is not “static” but “a ruined totem to total presence […] exploding outward” (77). He 
then lists the varieties of rap, “this Scene’s hydralike”; rap moves horizontally through active 
sub-genres and vertically from underground status to pop success. How, then, to pin down this 
genre? How can one be sure that the sample taken as synecdoche has not turned outdated, 
lacking any accurate representation of the scene? 
 This quandary was present in the book’s editing. Signifying Rappers had three different 
editors during its publication, the first two left Ecco Press before the text was ready. It seems 
that all three editors were concerned with the text’s temporal position. This concern is best 
exemplified in Lee Smith’s reaction to the first draft Wallace sent:  
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One of the more frightening things about it, from a publisher’s standpoint anyway, is 
that, as you’re quick to point out, rap changes very quickly. Cf., PE’s [Public Enemy] 
recent reconciliation. So, rather than trying to update the manuscript every two weeks, 
it will be best if you try to avoid the urge to be timely and aim instead to be a bit more 
comprehensive, anticipate certain objections. Please don’t misunderstand! I am NOT 
talking about a ‘History of Rap’ here. (7) 
 
The extreme he wishes to avoid, the Encyclopaedia-Entry style for a ‘History of Rap,’ would 
basically annul the text’s syntax and form, yet it seems hard to curb the ‘publishers’ fear’ he 
mentions, for how could any of the author’s ‘anticipate certain objections,’ especially to a 
movement they are watching from the side-lines? If we return to Wallace’s first description of 
the text, the project rests on not being comprehensive, on being unable to anticipate.  
The book went through galleys under the supervision of a different editor, and the desire 
to give the text an undated and comprehensive approach was still present. During the Spring 
and Summer of 1990 Wallace received a galley-proof with notes suggesting changes; the Ecco 
Press archive contains these notes as well as Wallace’s pencilled responses. The first note reads: 
“P.15-l.15 OK to change to “June ’87”? Book is generally edited to read like it’s from a 1990s 
point of view….” To which Wallace replied: “Yes.” The second note reads: “Ok to cut “current,” 
to avoid dating manuscript (in line with editorial changes throughout)?” To which Wallace 
replied: “Yes.” The third note reads: “p. 129 - ll 2-3 Do you want to cut reference that would 
date book (even though we’re just pages away from the “Summer ’89” signoff)?” To which 
Wallace replied: “Let’s stet ok” (72, 75-6). 
Even after a change in editor, we can notice that the effort to present the book as being 
written from rap’s bleeding edge remained, even though it would also contain dated chronicles 
and a “Summer ’89’” signoff. In the end, the book is dated instead of falsely atemporal. It’s 
possible that this editorial desire led to Mark Costello’s brief chapter (2D), in which he wonders 
if rap’s escalation of violence will lead to a snuff rap record (SR 81). Wallace seems to have 
valued the text’s temporality, as he did when he first presented it to the initial editor, and part 
of the success of Wallace’s sections rely on the acceptance and celebration of this temporality: 
“If you’re reading this in print it’s already dated.” Part of rap’s appeal for Wallace was its 
nascent quality, its developing and unsettled reaction to the end of the ’80’s culture that Wallace 
was also trying to understand and respond to. 
 Wallace compares the rap scene to that of the “late-’60s protest rock” and finds that the 
“Establishment” rock protested against is “benign” in comparison to the one rap battles against. 
The mention of protest in the ‘60s should remind us of ‘E Unibus Pluram,’ where Wallace states 
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that authentic civic protest (i.e. feminism, anti-war, civil rights movements) was subsumed by 
the market via ironic advertising. Although Signifying Rappers was published 3 years before ‘E 
Unibus Pluram,’ it shows that Wallace already had a historical notion of a post-’60s America, 
and the rap scene and the rapper appear as results and reactions of that new social landscape. 
Viewing hip-hop music as a struggle against the establishment that extinguished the social 
protests of the late ‘60s (and had decades to settle in, one assumes) is an empathic approach 
towards the vocabulary of rap, and so the black community.  
 The similarities to ‘E Unibus Pluram’ carry on into the next chapter, (2E). Consider his 
summary of rap’s world vision: “a kind of dystopian present from which no imaginative future 
can even emerge. Long-honoured musical ‘messages’ […] have been here relegated to the status 
of an oh-come-on cliché, instant ridicule---cf. The implications of those damned involuntary 
quotations marks around ‘messages’” (SR 82). This vision is reminiscent of the ironic attitude 
described in ‘E Unibus Pluram’ that ‘banalizes,’ and therefore annuls, honest conversations or 
statements regarding pertinent topics. I consider the ‘banalizing’-stance described in ‘E Unibus 
Pluram’ to be part of the middle-class white vocabulary, in other words, a consumer class that 
can choose between protest and shopping. The stance does overlap with some of the rapper’s 
vocabulary, but the rapper developed the outlook from the marginal environment of violence 
and poverty, so he places the discussions of social change and progress within the dystopian 
vision: “A roll of jaded streetwise eyes at one’s naiveté effectively disses even the politest 
requests to hear about rap music’s ‘vision of the future’ or ‘program for change’---in the Scene 
such ideas are mutely regarded as either superannuated civil rights windmill tilting or the glad-
handing bullshit of the white politicians who, after all, built what rap lives in” (82-3). In a broad 
sense, both reactions have the same result: a civic or social discussion is cancelled, and so the 
possible change they might bring about does not come. In Wallace’s view, the difference is that 
the banalizing reaction is caused, bluntly explained, by an over-exposure to advertising,69 
whereas the rapper’s dismissal is induced by his environment, of living where hope is rare. No 
wonder that throughout the essay Wallace refers to the rapper’s world as hell.  
 The bulk of this chapter is spent explaining how the rapper’s lyrics work, the formal 
constraints and freedoms it has, its comparison to the use of euphemisms in rock n’ roll, and 
                                               
69   It’s worth recalling Rorty’s reading of Nabokov’s Humbert presented in the Introduction. Humbert’s “private 
obsessions” blind him to the “pain and humiliation” (CIS 141) he causes. I believe that the vocabulary of banality 
fuelled by advertising is in a similar position to Humbert’s vocabulary, in that the obsessions and desires sold by 
advertising, as well as its ironic disengagement of solidarity towards others, blinds, in this context, the American 
middle class of the suffering of others. 
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even rap’s ‘pre-Greek’ qualities. The characteristics of rap lead always to the self-referring 
personae who ‘spits’ the lyrics. Wallace finds that “The roots of this identity are traceable in 
just about any direction you like, from Jungian archetypology to The Golden Bough to Aesop;” 
yet the personae of the rapper seems to have its strongest root in the ancestry of the black 
community itself: “the wily trickster’s an especially beloved character in the folk tales of those 
West African nations [he] finds an almost direct late-’80s descendant” in various rap songs. This 
modern trickster70 finds that in rap’s format of drum-machine rhythms and looping samples the 
ideal space to “perform its best-rooted and probably strongest function: storytelling” (86). 
Wallace’s main interpretation of the rapper is as a storyteller; one whose tradition and audience 
is outside of the white vocabulary and community. Hip-hop’s storyteller has many masks, they 
change according to message and audience, giving the rapper the ability to “say pretty much 
whatever he likes to whomever he wishes, and do it with impunity” (87). This mutability 
problematizes the definition of rap and the rapper, of assigning a single mask to the storyteller: 
“the quintessential rap group is unquintessential, chameleonesque […] more likely it’s just a 
good old venerable synecdoche of the rap’s Genre itself, one that’s now moving so fast it can’t 
quite fix on its own identity … much less hold still for anything like cool critical classification 
or assessment, from outside” (90). I think this mercurial quality appealed to Wallace and that a 
broader understanding of his country and culture at the end of the 20th century could be gained 
by tracing the rapper and his words.  
The next chapter by Wallace, (3A), opens the last section of the essay, titled Impediment. 
In it, Wallace lists the characteristics of the “musical/antimusical form” of the exploding rap 
scene, a list he considers an “outside sampler’s inevitable simplification” (93). It has an a)-to-f) 
form that fits Wallace’s tentative and paced approach for arriving at some understanding of the 
rap genre and scene. 
 Wallace looks at the accusations against rap as an unoriginal, if not plagiarised and lazy, 
style of music. A claim that may sound valid when the sampling is carried out by a successful 
rapper who has access to all the studio production and recording resources he could want. “Many 
critics […] direct at rappers the same distant pith that helped critics crush ‘sample-heavy’ 
literature - post-Beat and modern - back in the ‘70s” (SG 98). One gets the impression that Rorty 
is describing the white community’s reaction to rap music when he wrote: “The popularity of 
the new ways of speaking will be viewed as a matter of ‘fashion’ or ‘the need to rebel’ or 
                                               
70  Which is one of the allusions of the title, the other being the book The Signifying Monkey by Henry Louis 
Gates, of which I’ll talk about later in the chapter.  
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‘decadence.’ The question of why people speak this way will be treated as beneath the level of 
conversation - a matter to be turned over to psychologists or, if necessary, the police” (CIS 48). 
The white community’s reaction seems to be proof of the totality of rap as an actual vocabulary, 
as something beyond their accorded modes of speaking.  
Wallace defends the originality of rap in the next chapter (3D): “What are indisputably 
original, besides the (re-)arrangement of recorded sounds a rap band’s digital hands help shape 
and create, are of course the cut’s lyrics, the rap’s rap.” What matters is what the rapper is 
rhyming about, what he is saying. Wallace cuts the discussion on the originality of sampling, 
cut-ups, and fixed beats by relegating them to the service of the rapper’s lyrics. That “sound 
carpet” is designed “to focus listeners’ creative attention on the complex and human lyrics 
themselves.” This is rap’s originality and revolution in the late ‘80s: “The pop tradition by which 
rhythm and lyric became melody’s supporting cast is here inverted” (109). This presentation of 
rap’s formal originality works with Western and academic standards and appreciation of 
innovation and invention. In this sense, it's the kind of critical observation that validates and 
legitimizes rap in the vocabulary of the white community. 
 The chapter ends with an approach to rap: “So a thesis: the theme, energy, wit, and 
formal ingenuity of the rap are where any meanly dressed, unMarginal spectator outside the 
window will and must look for aesthetic access to a music self-defined as not for him. That is, 
the outside listener must not only take the rap ‘on authority’: he must read that rap as story” 
(111). Wallace’s great critical turn in this text may be to not hold the rapper as a violent or 
disenfranchised Other but as a storyteller. Neither patronizing nor belittling, it is this view of 
the rapper that allows the possibility, in Rorty's sense, for a creation of empathy.  
It is worth noting that Wallace’s definition of rap would not work well as an excerpt. In 
other words, terms like ‘unMarginal,’ ‘the window,’ and ‘outside listener’ have a rich meaning 
created across Signifying Rappers. Those terms all relate to Wallace’s understanding of himself 
as outside the rap vocabulary. Wallace does not find a way ‘into’ rap, a key to revealing it, or 
of transcending his condition as excluded; his observations explain to the fellow outsider how 
to comprehend and appreciate rap beyond the stereotypical grasp. Wallace is therefore 
addressing those within his vocabulary; he is clearly not trying to explain rap to the black 
community. This does not mean that Wallace shunned any communication with the black 
community; as will be shown later on, during the editing process of the book there was an effort 
to create a dialogue with various rappers and black intellectuals.  
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It is somewhat comic to see the legal and conceptual issues of sampling and remixing 
that Signifying Rappers describes re-enacted in the editing process of the text. The editors at 
Ecco Press wanted copyright consent for all the lyrics included in the book, yet Wallace did not 
share their urgency: he believed that samplers couldn’t and wouldn’t complain about sampling. 
In a letter from the beginning of the editorial process, Wallace wrote to Lee Smith: “We will 
check with Eric B. and Rakim’s agency to make sure they don’t object to something they can’t 
possibly object to” (15). The song in question is “Paid in Full” which gets specific attention over 
other quoted songs because Wallace planned to include a full musical transcription of it, plus 
lyrics, at the end of the book; his comment about rappers not being able to ‘object’ probably 
stems from the fact that the song contains three different sampled sources. 
The result of Wallace’s ‘will check’ is found in a letter he wrote to the second editor of 
Signifying Rappers, Lee Ann Chearneyi: “I’m hoping you got my letter about permissions. A 
subsequent phone conversation with a Mr. Dutka in the Rights Dept. of Island Records has 
solidified my conviction that no one has anything to worry about” (44). He apparently did call 
to ask, and he even adds a hyperbole to drive the point home: “We have spoken by phone to 
several people in the rap industry (and I spoke today to someone in the legal department of 
Island Records about the transcription of Eric B. and Rakim’s “Paid in Full”), and are justifiably 
confident that there is no problem with using even the longer quotations [...] the rights/legal 
people we’ve spoken to have basically wondered why we’ve wasted our phone bill and their 
time bothering with this” (44). It’s worth noting that in the archive Wallace only discusses the 
song “Paid in Full” and Island Records’ permission, even though the book cites many other 
songs that are owned by different record companies. That Wallace seemed untroubled by this 
issue is best exemplified at the end of the letter when he tries to let the legal blame fall on the 
co-authors:  
For your own piece of mind, I’ll again make clear that any payments due to any 
performers, record companies, or music publishers upon publication of the book are 
payments Mark Costello and David Foster Wallace need to make, do not represent in 
any way obligations of Ecco Press. Further, any legal issues are between Mark and me 
and artists and do not involve Ecco. I believe this is called “indemnifying” ourselves. 
(46) 
 
This stance does not imply a total disregard for legal limits. On page 106 of Signifying Rappers, 
Wallace refers to the non-existent “Ocean Records Company,” a play on the actual Island 
Records, as a money laundering front. It is another example of the Wallacean trope of presenting 
fiction as fact, one which the proof-readers at Ecco Press were not familiar with and therefore 
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thought Wallace was calling out a drug dealer’s scam in print. One of the copy-editing notes 
reads “Whoever these Ocean Records people are it may be preferable to not [in pencil, Wallace 
indicates a reversal should be made, resulting in ‘not to’ and draws a happy face] refer to them 
in print as the front company of a Jamaican drug kingpin.” To this note, editor Cathy Jewell 
added: “This is questionable legally!” To which Wallace responded: “FALSE NAME - IT’S 
OK” (77) This shows that Wallace’s attitudes towards quoting rap lyrics without legalized, 
printed permission is not a pedantic position but, rather, proof of his understanding of rap 
culture’s exchange ethics. In the end, the transcription of “Paid in Full” did appear as an 
Appendix to the 1990 Ecco Press edition of Signifying Rappers and the archive indicates that 
Wallace paid for the transcript. The book’s copyright page states that the song is “Used by 
Permission.” The transcript does not appear in Penguin’s 2013 reedition, maybe because 
copyright problems reappeared. This transcript, however, is the cause of Signifying Rapper’s 
second mention in an academic publication, albeit in a foot note: in “‘Don’t Have to DJ no 
More’: Sampling and the ‘Autonomous’ Creator” (1992), David Sanjek calls the transcript a 
“striking illustration of how rich and complex mixing can be”. A statement that justifies 
Wallace’s obstinance in including the transcript in the book. It’s part of Wallace’s redescription 
of rap music for a white middle-class audience since, and I believe I’m justified in stating this 
in vague terms, complexity is often taken as proof of sophistication. 
 The next chapter, (3E), continues the analysis of rap’s lyrics, and puts aside the self-
conscious justifications of an outsider to focus on the poetical validation of rap: “not only is a 
serious rap serious poetry […] it’s quite possibly the most important stuff happening in America 
today” (SR 114). Wallace’s aim goes beyond getting his reader to break from the stereotypical 
view of rap, he wants to make them aware of the ‘rebellion-against’ element of rap. He tries to 
do this via analogy; rock n’ roll, which is comfortably assimilated into the white vocabulary, 
once rebelled against certain authority figures and social norms, rap does the same, but in it “the 
objects of rebellion alter, spread, grow in urgency.” In Wallace’s analogy, rock n’ roll’s ‘objects 
of rebellion’ appear as mere teen angst next to the violence and social oppression that rap 
denounces. It is worth quoting these objects in full since it names the suffering the rapper 
experiences, the suffering which he raps about to his community, and which he reflects from 
and to his audience:  
[T]he urban ’80s’ police, violent death, homelessness, the lure of ecstatic drugs that 
dehumanize, weaponry, fatherlessness, the animal emptiness of sex w/o love, the almost 
Trilaterally sinister white establishment (‘THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSIBLE 
THE GOVERNMENT’S…’), Everyone Else: life as a series of interruptions from an 
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angry slumber about what the electric voices say you must have and what the human 
voices say you may not, about the betrayal of the past, of the promises exacted by 
Carmichael, X, and the now formal martyrdom of King. (116)  
 
All this Wallace gathers from listening to the rapper’s story. Yet the rap-act, the Scene and 
genre, is not just a continued outcry of social rebellion. The rapper’s persona forms a dichotomy 
with the protest content of the song: “every against engages in miscegenation with a for” (129). 
Wallace calls this an additional artistic challenge that rock stars or magazine poets do not face, 
“Viz., as before, the hip-hop artist must present himself and his rap to a tough audience as at 
once for and of that audience.” The rapper is seen as another member of his community, but also 
as the one who deserves to be on that stage. For those within the same vocabulary “the rapper 
must literally be the homeboy next door… except now a neighbor who’s up on stage, rich and 
famous, via his entitlement to speak to, of, and for his community” (130). To illustrate this 
double-mask of the rapper, Wallace uses an archetypal definition: “The historical figures in 
whom these two crucial rapper identities best unite are, yes, the Blue Trickster of West African 
myth, but also the actual storytelling minstrel/troubadour of the European Dark Ages, the 
traveling rogue who performed for king and cooper both, singing (especially in Provençal) ever 
of himself” (131). The rapper is a new historical and mythical figure that can represent (be a 
synecdoche for) his community (what Wallace calls the “Everyvoice,” or “Everybrother” to 
highlight its place in the black vocabulary) as well as the victorious individual that overcomes 
and succeeds in America (mostly in the financial sense). Wallace recognizes the democratic 
possibilities of the “Everyvoice” and looks to engage with it, instead of presenting it with an 
anthropological or historical distance. This rich characteristic of rap is lost on the white 
community when they only interpret rap through their own vocabulary. It is again a ‘window’ 
issue, the original and important side of rap is ignored: “Instead it seems like the mainstream 
pop-critical bulk looks at, not through, the window’s flawed bubbled glass, listens to a music 
not-for-them just attentively enough to make out the blender-whining aural surface of a 
threatening Alien World” (132). This advice seems to catch its own reflection on that aural 
surface, that sound mirror.  
 Within an emerging American setting where “younger U.S. whites have begun to regard 
open, wet-mouthed acquisitiveness as fashionable, to see consumption as value and not just 
value’s crude measure, to speak openly about American Dream as financial fantasy” (SR 134), 
the rap scene seems to uncover, or rather not hide “the national environment in which such 
shallow, dubiously tasteful obsessions can rise with sufficient public force to yield an Art’s 
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theme and subject, context, even ‘value’” (134). This is the result of the rapper’s mimesis and 
synecdoche. The aim of his cursing isn’t cursing to merely challenge the puritan tics that survive 
in a white community that, again, the rapper does not address, rappers are talking to and from a 
place where “people say ‘motherfucker’ and ‘cocksucker’ in lieu of ‘kiddo’ and ‘big fella’”. The 
rapper’s synecdoche can bring into pop culture an underrepresented and oppressed part of the 
United States, this is why Wallace states that “for us, its most affecting quality is that it’s the 
first pop genre to countenance a peculiarly modern American despair” (136). By ‘us’ he means 
Costello and himself, but it could also be the ‘Us’ of the white community. But how can said 
community listen to rap the way Costello and Wallace do? The question again arises: if there is 
a barrier between vocabularies, how can the black community, and specifically rap, create a 
representation of a ‘despair’ that speaks to the white vocabulary? Similar to how both 
communities exist under the same government, they both subsist and suffer under the same 
economic structure. The chapter ends with this link: “Serious rap’s the first music to begin 
creative work on the new, (post-) postmodern face the threat of economic inequality to American 
ideals is wearing” (137). Wallace dedicates his next and last chapter, (3H), to describing the 
countenance or force of said ‘despair’ and ‘inequality’, and he does so without the tentative, 
asking-for-permission attitude that marks the previous chapters. Wallace’s defence of rap is also 
an indictment of the late ’80s’ American culture. For it, Wallace reuses an image: “rap is, in the 
best and worst ways, just a mirror” (144). As mentioned, the black community is reflected, but 
they are reflecting a malaise that is pertinent to the whole of American culture, which is “largely 
a matter of TV virtues” (139) which teach that “Greed is good. Power is good. Power is freedom 
[...] Because cars, hardware, jewellery, trendy clothes, are the uniforms of those who exist on 
the electronic landscape to be regarded at all” (140-1). Wallace, in another move reminiscent of 
‘E Unibus Pluram,’ drives the point home by quoting from actual ads: “And you too must ‘Have 
It All,’ must ‘Succeed, Not Just Survive’” (141) .Yet this fear of existential invisibility is 
presented in a distilled form by a community at the margins, in places where consumer culture 
is linked to actual life or death situations. The black community lacks a considerable middle 
class to form the social situation described in ‘E Unibus Pluram’. From his vantage point, 
Wallace observes that the rap vocabulary is a unique presentation of what became the American 
belief and way of life at the end of the Cold War, and at the same time, it is that belief’s 
compressed and honest presentation: “The rapper’s world is one that seems to embrace 
completely the Reagan carrots of Entitlement and Power, a deregulated prenez-faire where 
freedom is isomorphic with class, and face is a stat-function of one’s capital and consumption” 
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(141). What is the point of rap’s rebellious side if it is so well adapted to Reaganomics? The 
black community did not choose said belief, rather it was force-fed through poverty; part of hip-
hop culture’s depth can be found in the embrace of its contradictions.  
 In the America of ‘E Unibus Pluram’, the rapper’s synecdoche is not a sign of his 
comfort in society but rather its relegation to the margin; it is in conflict with the centre that, for 
reasons of survival, it tries to reach: “In rap we have the Voice of a community of whom it’s 
just plain unreasonable to expect trust in white Systems, but for whom the rewards of the 
System’s stress on image, power, status, and greed are broadcast too frequently and too 
forcefully to be unreal. What would you do, or sing about?” (SR 143) Greater than rap’s formal 
constraints of rhythm and rhyme are the social constraints of power and survival; Wallace 
strategically addresses his (white) reader after describing rap’s context. Such a direct question 
looks to create empathy, it describes a situation and then places the reader in it.   
 Wallace ends ‘E Unibus Pluram’ with a sort of literary prescription for the social malaise 
he diagnoses. In contrast, Wallace ends his last chapter of Signifying Rappers with another 
version of the window trope (cf. 145). There are no solutions or suggestions to conclude because 
the text is limited by his empathic approach to the topic. Any type of prescription for the black 
community might relegate his work to the dynamics of power and race (White telling Black 
what to do). Instead, Wallace’s stylistic and critical approach is exemplary and prescriptive in 
itself. Briefly said, Wallace’s literary efforts are aimed at understanding the rapper’s message: 
“he’s saying he exists” (138). 
 
4. The Nihilism of gangster rap  
Nick de Genova carries out a similar process to Wallace but from a different vocabulary, from 
within the Black community. In the article “Gangster Rap and Nihilism in Black America: Some 
Questions of Life and Death” (1995), Genova reaches similar conclusions about rap’s place in 
American culture as Wallace does in Signifying Rappers, so a conversation via comparison can 
be made as if each text spoke from each side of Wallace’s ‘window.’ The pairing with Genova 
also shows that Wallace’s method of approaching the rapper’s words opens the possibility of 
comprehension and solidarity between vocabularies.71 
                                               
71  While Wallace wrote about rap in general, Genova focuses on the genre of gangsta rap. I don’t find a critical 
dissonance in pairing their interpretations since Genova’s genre-specificity makes up for the historical difference 
between both texts (Signifying Rappers was published in 1990, Genova’s essay in 1995). Genova writes at a time 
when rap music was gaining worldwide success (shortly before the publication of his article, the song “Gangsta’s 
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Genova explains that gangster rap can be considered the most violent expression of hip-
hop music and is a sort of distillation of the rapper’s act. He finds that its main characteristic is 
a particular nihilism present within the black community, specifically by people that live in 
ghettos. This is an observation also made by Cornel West.72 The difference between their stances 
is that West believes this nihilism is the cause of the evils in black communities, what keeps 
them in conditions of poverty and violence. Genova instead believes that this nihilism, if looked 
at closely, presents the black community with a possibility of social and political action. I will 
develop Genova’s understanding of this nihilism and then pair it with Wallace’s analysis of rap 
music.  
Wallace’s opening statements from Signifying Rappers exemplify his understanding of 
the relations between the white and black communities in the U.S.: “America’s great Alien 
Within, the carcinomoid Other, inside Us, one whose desperate contemporary condition and 
response to it--i.e., their daily lives--we Concerned Citizens decry and deplore and target in 
‘Wars On.’” (36-7) Wallace understands race relations as an antagonistic, and often violent, 
atmosphere in which the dominant white ‘Us’ declares and maintains ‘Wars’ on a black ‘Them’ 
perceived as a sort of cancer. It is within this community under siege that gangster rap and its 
specific type of nihilism, the focus of Genova’s article, develops and exists. Wallace’s 
awareness of these social and racial relations provides a shared foothold to compare the 
approach both writers have to a similar subject.  
For Genova, the nihilism of gangster rap “stakes the possibilities for freedom--and for 
life itself--upon a remorseless rejection and subversion of moral conventions and upon an 
impulse for destruction, which frequently could be resolved only in self-destruction.” (89) Here 
we find also the contradictions of rap highlighted by Wallace, the same that are used by the 
white critic to judge rap as a minor genre. Like Wallace, Genova finds in gangster rap “a creative 
form of African American cultural production and cultural politics” (89). When hip-hop is 
branded as a creation without artistic value, there is an implied dismissal of the culture and life 
it is representing.  
Yet, when starting his analysis, Genova is quick to state hip-hop’s political limitations: 
“In its various forms, hip-hop has sustained a prominent and lively arena of ideological 
                                               
Paradise” was released and became a number one hit in over 15 countries), his focus on gangsta rap means he 
addresses the less commercial elements of violence and oppression, which Wallace finds throughout rap when the 
genre rose to pop prominence.  
72 See the first chapter of Race Matters: “Nihilism in Black America” (1994). 
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articulation. Still, it is obvious that gangster rap as such in no way defends any rigorous political 
system” (89). This statement buffers both the critic and the reader against over-interpretation, 
Genova also sets up his response to West, who does demand something like a rigorous political 
project from hip-hop. Wallace perceives both this ‘articulation’ that rap has for instigating 
conversations as well as the lack of a systematized program proposed by rap. This view brings 
Wallace closer to Genova than to Cornel West. West disapproves of rap’s nihilism, he does not 
see it as a symptom or a reaction of the black communities socio-political situation, instead he 
sees it as its main cause, as a sort of wayward mode in black culture; he would prefer it if 
gangster rap was no longer produced for it sustains a social malaise: “black musicians play such 
an important role in African American life […] to present beautiful music which both sustains 
and motivates black people and provides visions of what black people should aspire to” (Quoted 
in Genova 90). To this, Genova is quick to note: “The problems of knowing what might be 
‘beautiful music’ and understanding ‘what black people should aspire to’ remain implicit, at 
best” (90). In a Rortyan sense, West seems to produce the type of Foundational discourses that 
Rorty criticizes. In his view, the problems facing his community are solved through an ideal that 
music would express and black people would ‘aspire to.’ If hip-hop does not fit into this aspiring 
ideal, then it should be discarded. Genova disagrees with this posture and, this will be clear, so 
would Wallace.  
Genova’s approach seems more contingent: “There is little merit in criticizing a complex 
heterogeneous cultural field for its political inconsistencies in light of some ideal political 
agenda to which it has absolutely no conscious relationship [...] the challenge [...] is to explore 
the radical political apertures which emerge from the creative work itself” (90). One must 
approach rap like Wallace does, looking at the rapper’s act and considering the message of his 
words. By interpreting rap with rap’s own rules and tropes, one opens the signifying act that 
cannot reveal itself through the lens of other traditions or vocabularies. In this sense both 
Wallace and Genova invite us to take in rap’s vocabulary, a figurative ‘leave whiteness at the 
door.’ Both of their critical projects notice that the majority of descriptions and criticisms of 
hip-hop are hegemonic extensions of the establishment that rap rallies against. In other words, 
the ideology and institutions that created the precarious conditions were rap grew are the same 
that criticize rap as un-musical, unoriginal, plagiarizing: “the discourses of and about gangster 
rap are inextricable from the much wider ideological terrain where racist hegemony in the 
United States is continuously reelaborated [sic] and sometimes contested” (90). Hip-hop 
‘contests’ the racist hegemony of the U.S. not only with lyrics of protest, but also by bringing 
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to the pop forefront the realities poor communities in the United States, and even, through its 
musical style and form, pushing back against the musical standards of power. In Rortyan terms, 
the innovation of rap creates a redescription of what music is in the hegemonic (white) 
vocabulary of the United States. It’s in this expansion of vocabulary where Genova finds that 
gangsta rap has the capacity to create a discursive space for ‘radical political apertures.’ 
 With this contingent approach understood, Genova’s presents his project as a search “to 
explore some of the meaningful human complexities as well as emphasize the radical politics 
lambent in the so-called nihilism of gangster rap” (90). Signifying Rappers highlights these 
‘meaningful human complexities’ to a white audience that dismisses the genre (while 
consuming it, as Genova discusses later on). It is useful to highlight the differences between 
Genova’s text and Signifying Rappers, for though their works intersect, both write from within 
different parameters. Whereas Signifying Rappers is written by a white author presenting the 
black vocabulary to a white audience, Genova writes from the black community in the academic 
format, in dialogue with a black philosopher, although it is written in a neutral or external 
format, the discussion itself is referenced to or stays within the black community. Nonetheless, 
by listening to the rapper’s narrative they both understand that “there is no way to disentangle 
life from the constitutive violence of a social order founded upon racial subordination and 
effected in outright terror. Where terror is a way of life, “life” itself entails a complicity with 
that terror [...] a series of compromises which reduce life in some sense to a protracted way of 
death” (Genova 91). The belief that rappers choose and create their environment should be 
replaced by an understanding that opens the complexities of hip-hop and acknowledges that 
rappers react to and with their contingent environment, then the listener and audience could 
understand their “need to give that violence significance” (91). Once more, Wallace’s question 
for his white readership is relevant: “What would you do, or sing about?” This subjective 
positionality is applied by Genova to the rapper’s understanding of his environment through 
nihilism “Like the violence which confines us to our death while it defines our way of life, this 
dialectic is ruthless… and relentless. It drives us forward recklessly into the furious nihilism 
that would sooner destroy everything than reconcile us to the cunning violence which engulfs 
us” (92). The rapper’s act is a motion of nonconformity, not trying to carve a space for the self 
within the confines of oppression but willing to break them, burn them and oneself with it. It is 
this reaction that West cannot either understand or accept. “Although [Cornel West] plainly 
identifies U.S. capitalism and white supremacy as the ultimate causes of this nihilism in Black 
America, West reduces the majority of African Americans to a subhuman condition in which 
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their own ‘disease of the soul’ is a greater threat to their well-being and survival than any 
objective structures of exploitation or oppression” (92). In this view, the fault lies on the 
individual alone, and so the violent life that the gangster rapper represents is a choice, the choice 
of destruction over that of inspiration, of lifting the spirit of a community. “The violence of 
everyday life, for West, looms as a ‘result.’ Although he refers in passing to ‘a market culture’ 
[...] these things are understood to have merely eroded a way of life and its institutions, 
generating a kind of collective infirmity” (93). Genova presents West as believing that the black 
community is, in a manner of speaking, inside a hole it dug itself in, which is deaf to the rapper’s 
words that “denounce all the ways that we are already beaten--and proclaim that our way of life 
is a way of death” (94). Genova cannot use West’s view to comprehend the complexities of rap 
and present them to his readers; he discards the philosopher because “West begins to sound like 
the classic example of a colonized elite” (95) West’s opinion is on par with the white 
community’s critiques of rap.  
Genova’s counterbalance to Cornel West is the writer Richard Wright, whose 
observations on the black community describe and validate hip-hop culture. Through Wright’s 
work, Genova interprets “nihilism as a tremendous resource for African American cultural 
production” (95). This shift in interpretation reveals humanity in gangster rap, which is what 
West either does not look for or cannot find, and what Wallace ultimately wishes to show to his 
readership. Genova links Native Son’s Bigger Thomas with the figure of the gangster rapper: “it 
is imperative to consider that what made Bigger Thomas incorrigibly inclined to estrangement, 
violence, and even self-destruction was, under the dehumanizing conditions of racist oppression, 
what was finally irreducible about his humanity” (98). In a violent environment, the rapper 
strives to remain an individual. This is reminiscent of Wallace’s awareness of rap’s birth within 
formal, technological, and economic confinements; Genova’s reading of Wright suggests that 
the rapper’s persona is created within confinements as a way to break from them. It further 
explains why successful rappers remain within certain limits, even after the economical 
limitations have evaporated, and that to the rapper, the only way to actually ‘sell-out’ is by 
taking West’s stance towards the oppressor. Here is the rapper: “The most basic example of this 
personality is that of the alienated individual who maintains a sense of his own dignity through 
a ruthless nihilism” (98). The outsider’s reaction to this nihilism may be to dismiss rap or at 
least to keep it at bay (Genova discusses the white audience’s reactions to rap further on). 
Wallace and Genova defend the depth of rap, the contradictions that, when not reflected on, lead 
to dismissal. “This elemental quest for dignity, which is here expressed as a crude masculinist 
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will to dominate others, should not be too quickly disregarded” (98). This dismissal also 
includes the rapper’s black audience, the mirrored converted, for they too experience this 
nihilism, it is the struggle for the survival of their humanity that is represented by the rapper and 
that the outsider fails to grasp: “Although he acts very much alone and tests fate as an individual, 
his nihilistic posture is a source of deep pride for the other Black people who bear witness [...] 
This same nihilism is nonetheless a structure of thought, sentiment, and action which stands 
against the onslaught of racist terror and is thus profoundly (and inevitably) located within both 
African American cultural life and Black experience” (100-1). This interpretation of nihilism 
reveals the motor behind rap music, and it also ties it to a wider cultural creation of black 
America, one that is in itself a road of survival for the individual. The expression of this survival 
is what takes rap outside of the ironic cycle of image-fiction. The truth that rap offers is neither 
romanticized nor ironic, it’s not asking for pity or comfort, a characteristic that Genova 
highlights by bringing in another production of that same nihilism: “The violent truth of 
Beloved’s love ethic should leave us without the consolation of tears” (97). 
Genova turns towards the relation between the white, secondary audience, and the 
rapper. Wallace’s white-at-the-window image is seen from the ‘other side’, revealing how 
violence also permeates the window-image:  
As a self-styled product of “the ghetto,” gangster rap musically and lyrically reproduces 
the hyperboles of the ghetto and thus stands as the fantastical reproduction of 
destruction, a production of irrepressible and bombastic “Blackness,” the self-styled 
product of, and symbolic reproduction of, “niggers” and their destruction. Gangster rap 
is the expression of an urban American “culture of terror” and “space of death.” (106) 
 
The consumption of gangster rap reveals and clarifies the oppressive relations between 
vocabularies. The ‘joy ride’ consumption of rap reveals the absence of conversations between 
communities, instead of listening to the rapper’s descriptions and hoping to reduce the suffering 
told, gangsta rap, despite its uniqueness and innovation as a new musical genre, was easily and 
immediately fitted into pre-existing modes of subjugation. In Rortyan terms, the white 
vocabulary resisted the redescription and expansion offered by rap and instead understood the 
genre with the pre-existing vocabulary of segregation and oppression, not synecdochic but 
stereotypical. It’s this kind of conservatism that makes it fitting for Genova to use ‘colonizers’ 
in his descriptions: “Colonizers conjure for themselves a vivid mythology which they come to 
believe and which justifies for them the real savagery that they perpetrate against the colonized 
population” (106). This conjuration reminds us of Wallace’s Safari-like image of the urban train 
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passing through the ghetto. It also fits West’s stance on gangster rap: it represents the savagery 
the colonized ‘chose.’ Hip-hop problematizes race relations by forcing the white audience to 
reveal itself to the rapper’s act. In other words, the consumption and dismissal of rap by the 
white community is more telling of the ideology behind race relations and oppressions than 
about taste or musical preferences. Genova highlights this subtle complexity by stating that 
gangster rap “exposes the multivalence and equivocation of racial essentialism; it evokes all of 
the conflicted meanings and opposed values which congeal simultaneously around a shared set 
of socially charged signifiers that comprise a single racial nomenclature” (107). In a Rortyan 
reading, ‘essentialism’ is the word to highlight, since there can be no conscious acceptance of 
redescriptions if vocabularies are guarded by foundational beliefs. Wallace instead notices one 
of the overlaps between vocabularies in the Horatio-Alger-type of character the rappers 
represent, further pushing them as a sort of cowboy-entrepreneur archetype, while 
simultaneously taking the place of the nightmarish Other in the white vocabulary. Once again, 
the complexity of rap is shown as a closed act related to general U.S. culture: “hip-hop is a living 
and lively cultural form, inextricable from wider social contexts of meaning and political 
conflict, while also intrinsically entangled--discursively, ideologically, politically--with its own 
diverse and contradictory configurations” (110). The rapper as the American dream and the 
American Other; it is with this dichotomy in mind that Genova approaches the critique of sexism 
in rap. Genova does not deny that there is a female objectification in hip-hop culture, yet he is 
interested in highlighting that “an almost exclusive focus on this aspect of gangster rap (in 
scholarly writing as well as the mass media) has effectively precluded any careful attention to 
other dimensions of the complicated politics of the genre” (110). The critique of sexism in rap 
functions more as another dismissal than as an interest in solving an issue. Wallace mentions 
rap’s sexism in Signifying Rappers but he doesn’t delve into the subject. In my reading, Wallace 
doesn’t criticize sexism in hip-hop for two reasons. First, because it would immediately create 
a ‘white telling black what to do’ relationship. But also, maybe most importantly, because, in 
the context of his text, it would characterize sexism as an essential part of hip-hop when it’s 
another overlap, like that of the capitalist entrepreneur. Genova argues that rap’s sexism, 
integrated into a wider political conflict, forms part of hip-hop’s attraction for young suburban 
white-males, it adds to “the seduction of the dangerous” and it plays out in an 
oppressor/oppressed dynamic in which men have an indirect contest: “the safe distance secured 
through this kind of commodified danger is often (and conveniently) further removed--displaced 
onto women’s bodies [...] Women are reduced to the property of men, the control of which will 
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apparently be sorted out in the contest” (110). Genova sees the overlaps between vocabularies 
not as points of unison, as the commonalities that could lead to understanding and integration, 
but as points of heightened conflict. As if an overlap between vocabularies, which reveal a 
fallible essentialism, should be repressed and destroyed instead of celebrated.  
Genova and Wallace also coincide on the importance of rap and the rapper for the black 
community. Once more, their arguments are not identical but are representative of parallax view. 
Genova’s description comes from within the black vocabulary: “For its African American 
audiences (not at all exclusively male or adolescent), but particularly for poor and working-class 
Black male youth, there is a form of transcendence made possible by gangster rap, in particular, 
as well as by much of hip-hop in general” (112). Wallace’s description of this effect reads more 
distanced even though it makes the same observation: “[i]t’s the flip-flopped mix that’s so 
riveting about the rap Scene’s special elitist/Everyman aesthetic” (131). It’s curious that the 
stylistic difference between the two is that Genova writes in the neutral style of academia while 
Wallace’s tries to recreate the urban and oral. Both point at how the appreciation of rap’s 
transcendence-aesthetic is readily available to the Black listener. Wallace noticed and accepted 
that the rapper did not address him. This acceptance requires grasping the present and historic 
conditions of the African American community, not doing so leads to the error of judging it 
through an alien vocabulary. Such is Genova’s critique of West’s view of rap, where there is 
“nostalgia for a time when there were purportedly other (and implicitly, better) forms of 
transcendence available.” This view negates rap’s inheritance from a tradition of music and a 
resistance against oppression, placing it as a pessimistic turn rather than as an organic reaction 
to the latest circumstances in a history of oppression. The subtleties of this cannot be overstated, 
yet, for Genova they are simplified in West’s interpretation: “It appears that [the rapper’s] 
history is far more defined by welfare and drugs than by themselves; indeed, theirs appears to 
be a ‘culture of poverty’” (112). One must instead understand hip-hop as “a potentially 
oppositional consciousness” that sprouted “in a rich legacy of postbellum Black folklore” 
(Genova 113). This definition then allows for a robust definition of rap:  
A merely formal analogy between Black folktales and mass-mediated, commodified rap 
music can appear to invoke a transhistorical identity of the two. But the historicity of 
this continuity of African American oral and performative traditions resides precisely in 
their transformations across different regimes of representation. Mass-mediated hip-hop 
is saturated in commodification, and it is articulated by the historic dislocations and 




Rap’s ability to transform and adapt is part of the heritage and vocabulary from its tradition and 
community. By conversing with its community, rap describes the conditions of an oppressed 
group, the one excluded to a periphery. This condition requires a centre, one outlined by that 
same exclusion. Rap culture is a critique of the environment that births it, a critique of the 
oppressive system that keeps it ‘outside.’ This centre is the post-’60s American society at the 
end of the Cold War, the same culture of Image-Fiction. One of the few times Wallace references 
black and white communities as a group is as consumers: “No one’s a yuppie because everyone’s 
a yuppie, a consummate consumer, for U.S. purposes, today” (21). The borders between the 
centre and the periphery are not just permeable to violence but for commerce as well, the clear 
overlaps in late 20th century United States.  
Signifying Rappers registers and addresses white America’s description of hip-hop and 
the community rap represents. These descriptions can be separated into a passive dismissal, 
“[rap is] the most street-level view yet of a subcommunity we tend to think we favor by 
ignoring,” and an active and violent reaction, turning the ghetto communities into “a culture 
we’re at ‘War-On’ with” (SR 50). The accuracy in denouncing these stances is proven by 
Genova’s depiction of the black community’s pushback: “The potency of gangster rap for poor 
and working-class Black listeners may well be partly attributed to its capacity to inspire white 
fear and repulsion, especially through the depiction of the gangster’s unrepentant opposition to 
all social order and control” (116). Gangsta rap is more than protest music, it is both adaptation 
and rebellion, a way out and a move against, and the ties between Wallace’s and Genova’s texts 
validate the approach of taking rap as a story. It seems that once these qualities of rap are 
delineated and understood Genova can open gangster rap to its political possibilities: “It is 
possible to discern multiple linkages between gangster rap and the political vision that aspires 
for a radical transformation of the street gangs, a project which inspired earlier generations of 
black nationalists and continues to do so” (121). Could this political assessment of rap music 
have fitted in the analysis of Signifying Rappers? From the start, Wallace places the ‘we’ of 
Costello and him within the ‘We’ of the white community in America, and, no matter how much 
auditory attention and rhetorical breakdown is done, their interaction with the rapper’s 
vocabulary is limited. Again, Genova’s study once again justifies Wallace’s position: “Nihilism 
is not a romantic revolutionary ideal. It is blunt and brutal [...] [it] could not be rejected; rather, 
it had to be approached with utter seriousness and urgency, and thoroughly inhabited” (126). 
Signifying Rappers is both serious and urgent (which does not require solemnity), it does not 
put forth ‘radical transformations’ of hip-hop and gangster rap into an organized political front, 
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by now it should be clear that Wallace never had intentions of that kind. He was, however, 
interested in the recognition of the shared struggles present in rap’s narrations, and in 
transforming the white attitudes towards the black community. Both establish and defend rap as 
a form of human expression with the potential to reduce a kind of suffering in the future. This 
can be specified by the conclusion in Genova’s essay: 
However, we also confront the social realities in which the most tenuous modicum of 
human dignity is possible only through pure negation. And instead of a politics which 
begs for more police to kick in our doors and murder our children, we can discern the 
beginnings of a new cultural politics of uncompromising and indefatigable resistance. 
(127) 
 
Signifying Rappers stands as a counterpart to this conclusion. It does not place or propose a 
political project for rap and rappers because it is not its place to do so, but it does recognize the 
‘complex lyrical space’ of rap and concludes that no doors should be kicked down. Does it 
notice the ‘beginnings of a new cultural politics’? It certainly recognizes the circumstances 
(institutionalized oppression; a lively tradition; access to new, cheap music technology) that 
lead to a new musical genre. The text’s call to listen is a demand for empathy which in turn can 
become political when a listener understands the constrained space in which rap performs, i.e., 
a space of systemic violence. The ‘Us’ to which Wallace belongs can hear the rapper’s message 
and lift the constraints it has placed around ‘Them.’ This may allow the growth and development 
of the portion of freedom and humanity within the rapper’s nihilism. 
The first edition of Signifying Rappers had a painting by Jean Michel Basquiat in its 
cover which, to my eyes, remixes certain elements from Picasso’s Guernica: a man shouting, 
his hands in the air; an animal with its mouth open, showing teeth; a simple flower in the middle; 
a circle of light overhead. Picasso’s painting uses only black, white, and shades of grey. 
Basquiat’s image uses various colours, the man’s face is black. The Guernica is an artistic 
response to the bombing of a Spanish town of the same name by Nazi and Italian planes before 
WWII; it depicts suffering endured by beings. Given the context, Basquiat’s painting depicts 
the ghetto’s Guernica: the suffering endured by the black community. It is a fitting choice, for, 






Wallace’s empathic approach may be better understood and appreciated when compared to texts 
that lack it. Write in Tune (2014) looks at the use of music in the work of writers from Wallace’s 
generation such as Jonathan Franzen, Jennifer Egan, and Bret Easton Ellis. Wallace goes 
unmentioned; the essays analyse works of fiction, so Signifying Rappers is automatically 
ignored, nonetheless the comparison can still be made with the compilation’s interests. In the 
introduction of Write in Tune, the editors, leaning on Walter Benjamin, present what was lost 
and gained with the decline of high art and the rise of pop music: “If something was lost in not 
experiencing the “original” artwork, something was gained by democratizing art so that its 
reception was not limited by one’s social class” (2). Rap music and the black community can 
certainly fit into the scope of the Marxist superstructure, but it seems that the cultural movement 
traced in the introduction is from a specific view of Western culture and civilization, i.e. the 
white vocabulary. This becomes clearer as they develop their view and analysis:  
How do you define your identity in terms of the musical commodities you consume? 
How do you embrace what’s popular in order to merge with the crowd, or resist it to 
stand out? Popular music easily becomes a contested cultural space, in which hating the 
right music is as important as liking the right music. (4) 
 
Rap music can fit into this description, but it is closer to describing the situation of rap’s white 
audience than the audience the rapper ‘mirrors.’ Because the analysis places consumers at a 
level playing (or buying) field, where they are free to pick between commodities as a form of 
social expression. This stance glosses over the details examined in Signifying Rappers; the 
social, economic, and political constraints the black community faced in Reagan’s America, as 
well as the narrative of a musical tradition that changes to become an appealing commodity does 
not fully account for the survival and existence of rap’s African lineage. Hip-hop offers option 
for the black community to create an identity that offers more than a past defined by oppression 
from the white community. It seems like only in rap music does the ‘contested cultural space’ 
of American culture becomes a matter of life or death, a possible escape route from a life of 
poverty and violence.  
 The introduction to Write in Tune plays with the premise that identity can be defined and 
understood through the consumption of musical commodities. Wallace turns this premise 
around in E Unibus Pluram:  
Commercials targeted at the ’80s’ upscale Boomers, for example, are notorious for using 
processed versions of tunes from the rock culture of the ’60s’ and ’70s’ both to elicit the 
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yearning that accompanies nostalgia and to yoke purchase of products with what for 
yuppies is a lost era of genuine conviction. (FT 54) 
 
In other words, it can be reduced to revolve around “the new old” challenge of “how to get you 
to buy” (SR 50). Rap openly takes up this challenge but is not limited by it; in Signifying Rappers 
Wallace finds that rap is the only interesting genre on the pop landscape because it speaks with 
a different vocabulary. Wallace definition of realism fits both his experience as a rap listener 
and the Rortyan function of narratives: 
For one of realistic fiction’s big jobs used to be to afford easements across borders, to 
help readers lean over the walls of the self and locate and show us unseen or undreamed-
of people and cultures and ways to be. (FT 51) 
 
It seems Wallace found this when he listened to rap music, and in Signifying Rappers he shows 
the reader how to find it too. Despite its anxious, apologetic style, Signifying Rappers does face 
and engage with a racially and historically charged issue. This included an effort to engage in 
direct conversation with members of the black community. Wallace asks his editor at Ecco 
Press, Cathy Jewell, to send advance copies of the book to “Prof. Philippe Bourgois in 
Anthropology at San Francisco State” and “Dr. Gates of English at Duke University” Because 
“[b]oth these guys are scholars/critics who are carving out a niche in race and rap and culture; 
if nothing else at least they’ll be interesting parts of the debate” (85). Signifying Rappers, ‘at 
least,’ wanted to create debate; the text’s process accepts its social-cultural constraints to then 
address a white American audience, but it is clear that Wallace also wanted his text to be read 
and commented upon by black readers.  
The archive also reveals that the co-authors tried to get hip-hop artists like Afrika 
Bambaataa and Public Enemy’s Flavor Flav to write the book’s introduction (9, 15). Signifying 
Rappers therefore wished to interact with both black and white communities and to have as 
much public participation as possible. Wallace’s concern with the book’s place and function is 
also seen in the same letter to his editor: 
It’d probably be good to send Bonnie ten advance copies earmarked for her to distribute 
to her friends in the rap music industry -- it was these connections that helped us get the 
lyric-permissions so smoothly. With the 2 Live Crew obscenity thing [archive includes 
related newspaper clippings], there is going to be a lot of debate about rap, race and 
obscenity in the next few months, and even if people in the industry disagree with some 
of the book’s theses, it seems transparent that it’s in our/your interest to have the book 




The “2 Live Crew obscenity thing” was, according to the clippings Wallace sent along with the 
letter, a legal case in which the song “As Nasty as They Wanna Be” was declared “obscene in 
three counties” in Florida, “making it the first recording to be declared obscene by a Federal 
court” (88). A record-store owner was arrested for selling the album, and two of the band 
members also were arrested for performing the song “before an adults-only audience” (88). Both 
professor Philippe Bourgois and Dr. Henry Louis Gates are quoted in the article, the former “rap 
is about making something of yourself - it’s the American dream” and the latter “the rappers 
take the white Western culture’s worst fear about black men and make a game out of it” (88). 
As I’ve shown, Signifying Rappers, addresses these issues extensively, so one can understand 
why Wallace believes that his text can and should participate in such discussions and why he 
wanted both men to read it.  
One could argue that in the letter Wallace is making a case of ‘free publicity,’ but this is 
more in the ‘your interest’ side of the proposal, a motivation for the publisher to hand out the 
book. For Wallace, ‘our interest’ is the book’s circulation amongst people in the ‘rap music 
industry.’ It seems that a main objective was ‘to have the book become part of the debate’s 
language,’ which is a Rortyan Pragmatist goal for it wants to participate in a public democratic 
conversation, ultimately hoping to change the descriptions and attitudes of one community 
towards another.  
Wallace’s creation of empathy through comprehension leads him to a historical 
understanding of rap music. By going beyond the circumstances of the ‘80’s and establishing a 
sort of genealogy linking rap and African myths, Wallace establishes a Rortyan evolution of a 
concept instead of a progression in which rap was the cusp to reach. This is better explained in 
a long and pertinent quote from Rorty from the essay ‘Holism and historicism’, collected in the 
fourth volume of his Philosophical Papers: 
Hegel taught us how to think of a concept on the model of a person--as the kind of thing 
that is understood only when one understands its history. The best answer to a question 
about who a person really is is a story about her past that provides a context in which to 
place her recent conduct. Analogously, the most useful response to questions about a 
concept is to tell a story about the ways in which the uses of certain words have changed 
in the past, leading up to a description of the different ways in which these words are 
being used now. The clarity that is achieved when these different ways are distinguished 
from one another, and when each is rendered intelligible by being placed within a 
narrative of past usage, is analogous to the increased sympathy we bring to the situation 




Signifying Rappers carries out this person-like model by looking at the origins of rap through 
black American music in the 20th century, creating a genealogy that reaches the traditions and 
myths of Africa. Wallace does not quote sources on African myths and Afro American culture 
but it seems likely that Wallace read the work of Henry Louis Gates, specifically The Signifying 
Monkey (1988). In it, Gates traces the movement of “the act of signifying and of black 
mythology’s archetypal signifier, the Signifying Monkey” and the “trickster figures” in various 
myths, the ‘mask’ that Wallace found most suitable for the rapper. In the essay ‘The Blackness 
of Blackness: A critique on the Sign and the Signifying Monkey’, Gates’ definition of ‘the act 
of Signifying’ serves to prove its use in the work of modern Afro-American novelists. This ‘act’ 
also fits the rapper’s work and, for my purposes, helps shape Wallace’s definition into a more 
academic style. Gates begins by placing the act of signifying outside the Western tradition; after 
listing tropes mentioned by various Western thinkers he writes:  
[…] we might think of these as the master’s tropes and of signifying as the slave’s tropes 
[…] Signifying is a trope in which are subsumed several other rhetorical tropes, 
including metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony (the master tropes), and also 
hyperbole and litotes, and metalepsis (Bloom’s supplement to Burke). To this list we 
could easily add aporia, chiasmus, and catachresis, all of which are used in the ritual of 
signifying.  
           Signifying, it is clear, in black discourse means modes of figuration itself. (988) 
 
He is essentially carrying out a differentiation of vocabularies reminiscent of Wallace’s list of 
rap’s characteristics. The robust meaning of rap is lost when it is only judged by Western tropes, 
for the rapper’s work belongs to the tradition of signifying; the placing and understanding of the 
rapper in the right tradition provides a richer understanding of the rap’s lyrics. It also takes into 
account, as Wallace does, the image of the rapper, both the self-description in the rap and the 
visual image. The reciprocity of the text to rap brings Signifying Rappers close to signifying: 
packing as many elements of it as possible into the text, its style adding to the message as much 
as to the content. Compare Wallace’s understanding of the rapper figure with Gates’ description 
of the trickster figure from the Esu myth: “Esu is guardian of the crossroads, master of style and 
the stylus, phallic god of generation and fecundity, master of the mystical barrier that separates 
the divine from the profane worlds” (988). We can update (i.e. remix) the notions of the divine 
and the profane with the two socio-economic choices that Wallace finds available to the black 
community: poverty and riches. The rapper carries both choices in his image, successfully rich 
and a representative of the ghetto. Wallace’s success in Signifying Rappers lies in unfolding the 
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complexity of rap to a reader that is neither part of the tradition, culture, or audience of rap but 
certainly a customer. In the end, the reader must grasp what the signifying rapper synthesises: 
“The Monkey, in short, is not only a master of technique, as Abrahams concludes; he is 
technique, or style, or the literariness of literary language; he is the great Signifier. In this sense 
one does not signify something, one signifies in some way” (Gates 990). The reader of 
Signifying Rappers should understand what the rapper’s ‘way’ is, how it can work, and how to 
approach it. I consider Wallace’s redescription of rap as successful, whether it was socially 
accepted and incorporated is a different matter. It’s also not a redescription on the scale of 
Copernicus’ or Hegel’s, yet it nonetheless follows Rorty’s definition of cultural shifts: 
The kind of understanding that narratives of this sort [cultural evolution] gives us is not 
the sort that we get from seeing many disparate things as manifestations of the same 
underlying processes, but rather the sort that comes from expanding our imagination by 
comparing the social practices of our day with those of past times and possible future 
times. (74) 
 
The narrative Wallace offers his readers is to see hip-hop as the latest evolution in a tradition 
that stems back to African mythology, instead of another symptom of urban crime. In the 
Rortyan vocabulary the phrase ‘expanding our imagination’ is synonymous with ‘expanding our 
vocabularies,’ ‘redescription,’ and ‘paradigm shift.’ Wallace’s expansion works by showing a 
white middle-class community their past and present attitudes towards African American 
culture, and proposes a rich ‘possible future’ to be gained by adopting a new social practice of 
engaging with the rapper’s rap instead of fearing it. It’s an attempt to begin a new conversation, 
one that is enriched by incorporating critical work like that of Genova and Gates. With this 
redescription in mind, it’s undeniable that Signifying Rappers has political intentions: its thesis 
could be reduced to an aesthetic, i.e. rap as poetry, yet his reading is incomplete without a 
critique of the Reagan administration and the history of racial segregation and violence of the 
United States. Consequently, the acceptance of Wallace’s redescription of hip-hop as a musical 
genre must include new social practices. I hope to have shown that Signifying Rappers is a work 
with undeniable political and social intentions, written by a young Wallace looking to expand 
the public vocabulary of the United States. This ambition reappears with greater intensity in The 
Pale King, his unfinished posthumous novel. In the next and final chapter, I’ll present The Pale 
King as a great imaginative effort by Wallace that not only describes ‘possible future times’ for 




The Pale King and the Creation of Hope 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will focus on David Foster Wallace’s third novel, The Pale King, a posthumous 
and unfinished text. Despite these two factors, this novel is an imaginative effort to expand the 
civic vocabulary of the United States. It attempts to redescribe the way Americans understand, 
describe, and speak of themselves as citizens of a democracy, with an emphasis on democratic 
participation. I read this effort as the culmination of the Pragmatist elements I’ve shown to exist 
in his oeuvre; the representation and recognition of the suffering of others, contingent 
vocabularies, and the effort to both redescribe private vocabularies and bridge public ones. 
Wallace published sections of the novel as short fiction and even as poetry in various 
magazines,73 and a 250-page draft was found after Wallace’s untimely death, which he 
considered sending to his publishers for an advance. It was his longtime editor Michael Pietsch 
who went through “hundreds and hundreds of pages […] designated with the title ‘The Pale 
King’” (vi) to create the novel that was published in 2011. Under these circumstances, how do 
we read a text like The Pale King? Although my reading is not directly concerned with the 
novel’s classification as an unfinished text, that classification is part of the ongoing conversation 
about Wallace as well as a starting point for talking about the novel.  
One of the spurs for this conversation was the opening of the Wallace archive in Austin, 
Texas, which contains, among other things, the “hundreds of pages” Pietsch read, including 
those he left out.74 An example of an article focused on the novel’s composition is Tim 
Groenland’s ‘A King of Shreds and Patches: Assembling Wallace’s Final Novel’ (2015) which, 
in the end, can only conclude with the question “to what extent does the fragmentary, incomplete 
form of The Pale King reflect the conscious intention of its author, and to what extent is it a 
function of the work’s unfinished condition?” Groenland thinks the “question may not be 
definitely answerable” yet is also “unavoidable” (234) for critical readers of the novel. He also 
considers an open electronic archive where the many manuscripts and fragments will be 
available to Wallace’s readers75 (235). While an open and freely accessible archive may be ideal, 
                                               
73 The New Yorker, Harper’s, and The Lifted Brow. Publication in magazines with national circulation suggests 
an interest in reaching the widest possible audience 
74  “Work in Progress: A Genesis for The Pale King” (2014) by Toon Staes is the seminal article for this reading. 




I think it’s just as important to abandon the temptation to imagine the novel’s ‘true’ form. The 
perils of this conversation are detailed in the essay “What is an Unfinished Work?” by James 
Wallen, where he criticizes the “intellectual poverty of the unfinished label” since it doesn’t 
allow readings to move away from a “rhetoric of failure” (137) that claims that if the text is 
incomplete, then so will be any reading of it. Wallen also points out that the failure of the 
unfinished implies an “ideal of perfection” that the author couldn’t reach. A Rortyan approach 
eschews absolute concepts like perfection and is therefore unconcerned with the novel’s relation 
to an ideal. In this sense, it bypasses the perfection-based readings Wallen warns us of. This 
reading also avoids what Wallen calls the “rhetoric of transgression” because it readily accepts 
the “irredeemably blurry line between editor and co-author” (131). In other words, it does not 
reject or minimize Pietsch’s co-authorial role in The Pale King since his labour is not seen as a 
barrier between the reader and Wallace’s text. The reading also considers the novel’s 
implications ‘beyond-the-page,’ and the role it can have on a democratic readership.76 This is 
another reason to set aside matters concerning the “unfinished label,” since I’m interested in the 
text that reaches readers, that is ‘out there’ as a publication. Suffice it for now to conclude that 
although I’m aware of The Pale King’s editing difficulties, I won’t grapple with these issues 
(even though I’ll continue to reference them) and will treat the published text as a finished novel. 
Pietsch also wrote a preface to the novel, which means he had a considerable influence 
on the initial readings of the text. Marshall Boswell’s essay “Trickle-Down Citizenship: Taxes 
and Civic Responsibility in The Pale King.” accurately notes Pietsch’s role in this initial reaction 
to The Pale King, since in his preface we’re told the novel is about “boredom and sadness” yet 
“[n]owhere in his introduction does he touch upon the novel’s political concerns.” Boswell 
registers this influence, noting that “[m]ost of the book’s initial reviewers described the book 
as, primarily, an IRS novel about boredom” (210). These concerns are not minor. My reading 
starts from the same critical point as Boswell’s: “The Pale King wrestles directly with matters 
of real world politics and […] civics” (209) which is not to say that boredom is not a main topic 
                                               
76 I don’t mean to imply that the novel only offers a redescription to citizens of the United States. However, 
similar to how Signifying Rappers addresses a white middle class, the redescription established in my reading of 
The Pale King is addressed to the middle class of the United States. This can be seen, like in the previous chapter, 
as Wallace speaking to those within his own vocabulary. Rorty describes “[t]op-down leftist initiatives” that 
“come from people who have enough security, money, and power themselves, but nevertheless worry about the 
fate of people who have less.” With examples such as “Upton Sinclair on immigrant workers in the Chicago 
Slaughterhouses, Noam Chomsky on the State Department’s lies” (AOC 53), this chapter tries to redescribe The 
Pale King as part of these initiatives, those that try to “convince the voters” that something must be done to stop 
the suffering of others. “Bottom-up leftist initiatives” would be acts like the “the General Motors sit-down strike 
of 1936, the Montgomery bus boycott” (AOC 53), which Wallace never participated in. 
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of the novel, or that it is secondary to that of civics and politics. To explain the relationship 
between boredom and politics, Boswell makes use of Wallace’s notes on his novel (included at 
the end of the book) to brand the two main arcs of the story under each concept. My reading is 
a kind of heir to Boswell’s effort to validate the ‘political arc’ and the belief that Wallace’s 
“hopes for the book were not just aesthetic but, in a very real sense of the term, political” (224). 
I plan to unpack this “real sense” by focusing on what I consider to be the novel’s most political 
sections. Rorty’s philosophy will be essential for this task since the political features infuse the 
narrative. Boswell recognizes the novel’s strategies when he states that “complexity is 
absolutely essential to the governing ethics of The Pale King” (215). My reading interprets the 
democratic and civics parts of this ‘complexity’ that I believe have received insufficient or 
underdeveloped attention. By placing my interpretation in the context of this dissertation, I hope 
to continue Boswell’s effort to bring attention to the novel’s political arc.  
 Given its scope and content, The Pale King arguably offers the best receptacle for my 
reading of Wallace’s work, since it engages with many of the same issues that Richard Rorty’s 
American Pragmatist project tried to name and resolve, with both often voicing similar concerns 
and opinions. Apart from the extensive scholarship on The Pale King, in this chapter I will make 
constant use of Rorty’s Achieving Our Country (1998), a book I do not reference in the previous 
chapters. In it, we find a Rorty that has progressed from the anti-epistemological debate to 
matters of American politics and civics. By engaging with The Pale King via Rorty’s Achieving 
Our Country I aim to show aspects of Wallace’s novel that look to not only describe but 
influence civic practices in the United States. I plan to demonstrate that The Pale King is not 
only an anti-foundationalist novel that uses both private and public vocabularies —like the 
works discussed in previous chapters— but also a work of social hope, one that is “likely to be 
of much use in building a cooperative commonwealth” (140). This could be called a democratic 
novel, not only through representation but with the intent to participate in the democratic sphere.  
 I will also, once again, make use of “E Unibus Pluram” although in a manner different 
from my previous chapter. Here, I focus on its interpretation of the history and culture of the 
United States, particularly in the second half of the 20th century. By connecting the essay to The 
Pale King, I plan to prove Wallace’s career-long interest in civics and democracy. The essay’s 
astute observations warrant attention, yet it seems that part of the essay’s success within Wallace 
studies comes from offering a theoretical framework into Wallace’s own fiction, and for the 
same reasons it became, first, “established orthodoxy” (Kelly 2010) and by now an interpretative 
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commonplace that I wish to avoid. In the recent Cambridge Companion to David Foster 
Wallace, Marshall Boswell writes: 
Wallace critics have tended to regard the one-two punch of “E Unibus Pluram: 
Television and U.S. fiction” and the 1993 Contemporary Fiction interview with Larry 
McCaffrey as David Foster Wallace’s attempt both to situate himself firmly in the 
tradition of American postmodern fiction […] while also carving out a new direction for 
postmodernism. (19) 
 
My use of “E Unibus Pluram” will instead be genealogical, linking its arguments to various 
concepts in The Pale King, and through that connection argue for both their importance in the 
oeuvre and their development over time.  
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to present a total reading of a novel as intricate, 
complex, and problematic as The Pale King. I will therefore use Wallace’s synecdochic 
approach from Signifying Rappers by establishing a detailed reading of two sections of the novel 
(19 and 25) that both justify and exemplify my reading of the novel’s civic and democratic 
intent. To introduce and unfold my reading of both sections, I’ll make use of the Jeffrey Severs’s 
book mentioned in the Introduction, David Foster Wallace’s Balancing Books, for his reading 
of the novel offers an interpretation that is similar to mine even though it is created with a 
different critical apparatus. 
 
2. Richard Rorty’s American hope 
Is national pride appropriate? This is a question the political reader of The Pale King will find 
herself asking, and to which Rorty’s Achieving Our Country answers an emphatic yes. Similar 
to Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty presents both philosophy and literature as the 
driving forces of his argument, also drawing on the history of the American Left, to forge a 
stance regarding the political future of the United States. In this section I plan to describe that 
stance, focusing on the arguments that lead up to it, and leaving its finer points for the analysis 
of The Pale King. 
 It should come as no surprise that an anti-foundationalist philosopher does not see 
political struggle as clashes between a False system and a True system, instead “[c]ompetition 
for political leadership is in part a competition between different stories about a nation’s self-
identity, and between differing symbols of its greatness” (4). In this sense, Rorty offers his 
narrative for identity, history, and politics in the United States, a narrative that (in a move 
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reminiscent of his reading of Proust and Nietzsche with regards to private vocabularies) 
interprets the nation’s past in a manner that benefits its future. 
Because of this, Rorty writes against a “[r]esigned pessimism” (10) that sees the evils 
and sins in his nation’s history as too great to support the nation’s progress, let alone develop a 
sense of pride for that nation. This pessimism is more or less unique to the American Left, 
conservatives by definition do not strive for change (for their struggle seeks to maintain the 
status quo);77 it is members of the American Left who seek progress but are repelled by their 
country’s past. Rorty places writers and thinkers like Fredric Jameson, Leslie Silko, and William 
Gibson in the camp of resignation, he also establishes a genealogy for this pessimism, with 
Henry Adams as the historical example of the person who abandoned the political struggle of 
the Left.  
The other camp in the American Left is characterized by William James’s sentiment that 
“disgust with American hypocrisy and self-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an 
effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future” (9). Rorty is not making a case 
for censorship: there should be conversations and remembrance of America’s acts of war, 
genocide, and oppression but he sees no point to such discussions if they do not lead to political 
involvement, or if their memory causes an exodus from the political Left instead of its growth. 
In Rorty’s contingent, future-oriented view, these conversations should serve to “raise questions 
about our individual or national identity as part of the process of deciding what we will do next, 
what we will try to become” (11). That ‘process’ is the framework for examining The Pale King 
in the latter part of this chapter, for now I will focus on detailing Rorty’s stance and the 
arguments behind his ‘hope’. 
Rorty’s Leftist politics reject Marxist philosophy, which he believes is partially 
responsible for the Left’s ‘resigned pessimism’. He suggests the Left take up a different student 
of Hegel, John Dewey: while Marxist philosophy tries to create a predictive reading of history, 
“Dewey’s philosophy is an attempt to temporalize everything, to leave nothing fixed” (20). 
Foundations are dissolved, a nation’s future is not headed towards an inevitable endpoint, be it 
utopia or cataclysm, nor is there a ‘true’ way of interpreting its past; “[t]he price of 
temporalization is contingency” (23). This could also be a practicality on Rorty’s part: he grew 
                                               
77 Rorty may seem to be ignoring the alterations to government and culture the right has carried out but, from the 
viewpoint of vocabularies, conservatives don’t seek to expand their own, instead, they strive to cement their 
ideology, even if this results in the humiliation and suffering of others.  
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up with Trotskyite parents and understood the inner turmoil of communist movements, (cf. PSH 
6) as well as the negative connotations Marxism has in post-Cold War American culture.  
At this point of the dissertation, the following claim by Rorty should sound somewhat 
repetitive: “objectivity is a matter of intersubjective consensus among human beings, not of 
accurate representations of something nonhuman” (35). Yet it’s worth repeating because the 
negation of the ‘consensus’ leads to quests for Truth and to a belief in epistemological and 
historical certainties. In the context of this chapter, it implies the enforcement of a ‘True’ 
political system and the belief that history is a fixed process that can be deciphered and 
predicted. This stance gives the aforementioned ‘resigned pessimist’ the excuse to abandon 
connections to the intersubjective consensus, and therefore any type of political democratic 
conversations. For Rorty, said stance highlights “[t]he contrast between agents and spectators” 
(35). ‘Agents’ being those who promote Leftist politics with the decent and civilized society as 
an objective, while the ‘spectators’ can afford a lack of political involvement since, to them, the 
search for objectivity does not require a consensus but only the finding of the Absolute. Again, 
in Rortyan terms, this distinction should not be understood as one between right and wrong, 
True and False, instead, the distinction describes a “preference of knowledge over hope” (37). 
But what exactly is Rorty ‘hoping’ for? Between his critiques of both the Right and Left 
he does not seem to leave much space for another option. Rorty traces the history of an American 
“reformist Left” (44) that existed and participated in the United States without the need of 
Marxist philosophy and its call for a historical and moral “purity” (45). Yet it is not necessary 
to engage with that history to get a sense of what Rorty considered “[a] functioning political 
Left,” (AOC 107). We can instead look at his readings of the aforementioned John Dewey and 
of Walt Whitman, which make up both the beliefs and the vocabulary of his hopes for his 
country. In the former he finds the description of “a decent society, defined as one in which 
institutions do not humiliate,” and in the latter the description of “a civilized society, defined as 
one in which individuals do not humiliate.” These descriptions are the only viable proposals for 
a future-oriented democratic project that does not claim an epistemological or historic 
foundation as its justification. Its implementation cannot come from a call to arms or a divine 
right, nor can its maintenance be enforced in an unethical manner. In a pluralistic democracy, it 
is the aforementioned “intersubjective consensus”78 which will resolve contingencies in a 
manner that achieves a decent and civilized society: “[t]he resolution can only be political: one 
                                               
78 It’s worth remembering the concept of the public sphere by Jurgen Habermas presented in the Introduction.  
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must use democratic institutions and procedures to conciliate these various needs, and thereby 
widen the range of consensus about how things are” (35).  
It’s worth remembering the readings of Wallace’s “Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature”, such as Clare Hayes-Brady’s, that saw Rorty’s anti-epistemology as a philosophical 
nihilism, a casting of the world into absolute uncertainty and despair. Achieving Our Country is 
the best text to refute accusations that Rorty’s philosophy relativises communication and 
commitment. The text argues for the freedom and opportunities that can appear with the 
abandonment of absolute systems and beliefs79 and invites the reader to adopt, instead of 
nihilism, a Deweyan hope driven by the belief “that the only point of society is to construct 
subjects capable of ever more novel, ever richer, forms of human happiness” (31). I will argue 
for The Pale King to be considered in the camp of political hope and pride, a textual agent rather 
than a spectator; one that looks to participate in the “intersubjective consensus” of the United 
States. However, I won’t argue that Wallace read Achieving Our Country or that it directly 
influenced The Pale King, since I have only circumstantial evidence to sustain such claims. 
Achieving Our Country will instead be a tool to categorize The Pale King and highlight the 
democratic reading the novel offers.  
 
3. Reader’s experience  
In his book, David Foster Wallace’s Balancing Books; Fictions of Value, Jeffrey Severs 
analyses Wallace’s fiction in chronological order. The Pale King appears as the furthest 
development of a group of concepts and themes that Severs reads throughout Wallace’s career. 
These could be summarized as an investigation into, and representation of, the grounding and 
balancing of value. Severs’s use of the term ‘value’ is as flexible as the word allows, and its 
representations range from the numismatic to the ethical, exploring and attempting to execute 
art’s role in communication, the construction of the human self, and the organization of 
communities.  
 Although Severs does not mention or reference Richard Rorty in Balancing Books, it is 
easy to notice the overlap between both approaches: the preference for immanent values over 
transcendental ones, the role of mutual agreement in the establishment of values, and the 
                                               
79 Rorty’s anti-foundational ethics appear in line to Michel Onfray’s inversion of the famous Karamazov 
aphorism: “Because God exists, everything is permitted.” (“Parce que Dieu existe, alors tout est permis” 73) If 
there is no Divine Justice or Law to balance morality in the afterlife with reward or punishment, then we are 
compelled to make the best of humanity without adhering to infinity. 
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edifying role of literature. For my reading of The Pale King, I will focus on some sections (which 
I will present later on) to exemplify the novel’s connection to Achieving Our Country and “E 
Unibus Pluram,” adding Severs’s commentary on the novel to an anti-foundational reading of 
Wallace’s fiction. I will first present the novel with Severs’s reading, starting with the series of 
‘aligned objectives’ he finds in The Pale King: “Attending to the foundations of value in 
monetary, moral, and civic senses and devising idiosyncratic rituals through which a shared 
sense of these values might be restored” (198). The mention of foundations should send anti-
epistemological alarms ringing, but reading on we find that, unlike Rorty, Severs is not 
interested in using a language free from the epistemological vocabulary; nonetheless, his reading 
does not find or rely on absolute concepts. This is clear when he discusses the novel’s 
establishment of values again: “[Wallace] wants both the country’s and the tax agency’s 
foundational values to remain untranslated, alien, and in a process of making” (225). These 
‘foundations’ sound closer to the belief in contingency rather than to an eternal epistemological 
foundation. In other words, these values serve the purpose of future-orientation, like Rorty’s 
utopia, in guiding actions, beliefs, and vocabularies. To read these foundations in flux rather 
than fixed implies a culture of contingent politics rather than one geared to keep an identity 
intact (this is reminiscent of Rorty’s critique of right-wing politics presented in footnote 69 from 
this dissertation). A democracy of unfixed values is one that can continuously adapt to new ways 
to reduce human suffering. Severs reaches this conclusion by arguing for Wallace’s planned 
misuse of Latin. For this he turns to the title of the famous essay, “E Unibus Pluram,” observing 
that the “title has received little commentary amid much on the essay itself” and that Wallace, 
instead of choosing the grammatically correct alteration to the title (“Ex Uno Plures”), picks a 
title that “mangles the Latin”, a decision that suggests “the aged formula’s failure to ‘translate’ 
logically to postmodernity” (224). The issue of translating and interpreting mottos in Latin, 
mangled or not, is discussed explicitly by IRS examiners, including both E pluribus unum as 
well as the IRS’s fictional motto: Alicui tamen faciendum est, which appears on an also fictional 
IRS seal. (TPK 102). The examiners notice that the motto is paraphrased in a presentation video, 
instead of a close or literal translation of the Latin phrases, and the novel later offers another 
interpretation of the motto and seal. Severs links these different readings to Moby-Dick’s “The 
Doubloon” chapter, and the motto’s openness towards interpretation is reminiscent of the 
novel’s epigraph from Frank Bidart, “We fill pre-existing forms and when we fill them we 
change them and are changed” (1), and of the IRS examination building where most of the novel 
takes place, with its facade recreating a blank IRS form, waiting to be filled.  
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 Severs argues that issues of translation and interpretation are prevalent in Wallace’s 
work, and they are never more accessible in his fiction than in The Pale King, where the reader 
is asked to ‘fill’ the novel, a request that can go beyond an assertion of subjectivity and turn into 
an act of democratic and civic participation: “The Pale King has to be Wallace’s most social 
novel yet, in which themes of commonwealth and shared values that I have often had to extract 
from hiding places in earlier work had become manifest” (238). Severs’s recognition of this 
social aspect is the main reason why I find his critical reading akin to mine.  
A similar chord is struck in Jon Doyle’s recent article, “The Changing Face of Post-
Postmodern Fiction: Irony, Sincerity, and Populism”, which begins by stating that “David Foster 
Wallace aims for an optimistic post-postmodernism, where empathy and sincerity counter what 
he considers an increasingly otiose postmodern movement” (259). Both his concerns and 
‘optimism’ connect his reading to Severs’s reading, as well as to Rorty’s hopes for “a decent 
and civilized society”. I believe my reading also grapples with the challenges that, according to 
Doyle, contemporary fiction faces in the world: “intolerant, potentially extremist forms of 
sincerity” (259). 
 As shown in my introduction, where I discussed Marshall Boswell’s Understanding 
David Foster Wallace and Adam Kelly’s ‘David Foster Wallace: The Critical Reception’, 
Wallace’s oeuvre established a division, which his critical readers took up and developed, 
between postmodern irony and post-postmodern sincerity. Doyle, however, believes that 
contemporary literature needs both irony and sincerity as critical tools to respond to our 
contemporary complexity. The novels of, for example, Jonathan Franzen, Colson Whitehead, 
and George Saunders, he argues, embrace sincerity and move away from the characteristic irony 
of the early novels of Pynchon and DeLillo. However, that same move also helps to 
“inadvertently create conditions conducive for a rejuvenation of extremism and conspiracism 
[…] it stands to reason that a post-ironic society will be one divided by partisan populism where 
harmful views are expressed freely” (260). Doyle’s concern implies beliefs similar to those from 
my reading: that literature is not only descriptive, that it interacts with the cultural and political 
issues of its time, however, I think that the Rortyan concept of hope provides a clearer structure 
to understand and respond to such harmful views. After a bleak survey of his present literary 
landscape, Doyle concludes that fiction’s “struggle” against the “rejuvenation of extremism” 
demands “sincerity in order to question and challenge irony, while requiring irony to illuminate 
the exact nature of sincerity and its ethical, ideological, and sociological transformations” (268). 
This duality is similar to Rorty’s placement of irony in what he called private vocabularies, and 
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sincerity in public vocabularies, each informed by literature and geared towards promoting a 
continuous conversation between humans. Yet while Doyle considers recent novels like Nathan 
Hill’s The Nix (2016) as texts that balance irony and sincerity, I argue that we can find that 
balance earlier in Wallace’s writing, specifically in The Pale King. The IRS is neither idealized 
nor romanticized in the novel and even its employees treat its role in society with irony. At the 
same time, its political stance and proposals are sincere, they are not reactionary but tied to a 
larger democratic program. 
The presence of this balance functions as a conversation with the public sphere of the 
United States, where the novel depicts the sphere's vocabulary, while it also attempts to critique 
and expand it. In this sense, the manifest and the social are linked in The Pale King. As I will 
demonstrate, the reader is invited to engage with the novel like the workers engage with the 
motto. This is not to suggest that the novel falls into simple didactics or prescriptions, for the 
reader is required to make an effort similar to the one exerted by the workers. Here we can notice 
the shift in my position from that of Severs. His focus on the textual presence of value is not 
greatly concerned with the concept’s possibilities ‘beyond the page’ (although there is mention 
of it). Also, Severs’s critical reading revolves around his developed concepts of value, 
currencies, pulleys, and the work of Heidegger, Freud, Derrida, and Cavell, whereas mine is 
obviously based on Rorty’s branch of American Pragmatism. For my reading, the best example 
of the manifest-social effort is section 25. This section is presented in two columns and it’s the 
only section in the novel, and Wallace’s oeuvre, with that format. In general terms, the section 
describes work inside the REC building with a focus on the examiners’ labour. We are told that 
each examiner “turns a page”, a phrase that is repeated more than 90 times in four pages (310-
313). The four opening sentences of the section are: “‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle turns a page. 
Howard Cardwell turns a page. Ken Wax turns a page. Matt Redgate turns a page” (310). There 
are variations to the repetitive description, such as “Jay Landauer and Ann Williams turn a page 
almost precisely in sync although they are in different rows and cannot see each other.” There 
are also some descriptions of work organization: “Six wigglers per Chalk, four Chalks per Team, 
six Teams per group” (311). It’s fair to assume that after a certain number of repetitions a reader 
will find the section tedious if not boring, which might also lead them to skim or abandon the 
section. However, there are two phrases in the latter part of the section that break with the 
monotony of the style: “Devils are actually angels” and “Every love story is a ghost story” (312). 
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Their presence in section 25 is the crux of my argument.80 Their aphoristic content calls for a 
more open or varied reading than the realist and repetitive descriptions of rote labour. My 
interpretation, however, does not hinge so much on a reading of their content as of their formal 
effect in the section. It’s important to note that nothing announces the appearance of these two 
phrases in the section: only the diligent reader will find them. Section 25 offers both a 
synecdochic reading of The Pale King, and a theoretical approach to how the novel can 
participate in a democratic vocabulary. I will expand upon these points. Section 25 is one of the 
novel’s many mirrors, Jeffrey Severs notes this: “this section holds a mirror up to its reader, 
who also repeatedly ‘turns a page’” (Severs 209). Like the accountants, the reader not only turns 
pages but also makes careful (and maybe tedious) effort to find value on each page. It’s possible 
that the reader’s approach to the novel will be changed, as Bidart’s epigraph suggests, by this 
section. That Wallace considered opening the novel with Section 25 (idem) strengthens the 
interpretation of the section as containing a reading-ethics or -theory for The Pale King, since 
its ‘mirror’ role would have worked as an overture for the rest of the novel. If we accept this, 
we can also understand the beyond-the-page implications of the novel in private vocabularies 
and democratic practices. This mirror is not epistemological, it’s not trying to capture True, 
objective reality. It’s a hermeneutical mirror that presents a redescribed image, in this case of 
the reader. This appeared in the previous chapter; when the rapper ‘mirrored’ his black 
community he didn’t so much offer precision as tradition, identity, and hope, while the mirror 
for the white community emphasized a suffering they either caused or ignored.  
The mirror can therefore highlight what was previously ignored or taken for granted. It’s 
clear that the protagonist of “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” pays a great deal of attention 
to black widows. Would he sympathize with his mother if he payed a similar amount of attention 
to her suffering? In that short story we read about someone making a self-centered use of 
attention. In section 25, attention is turned towards an unselfish task that can benefit a vast 
community, with brief and discrete rewards. The reader can understand this through the formal 
experience offered by the section. How does this translate into civics and democracy? A citizen 
has certain duties to fulfill in a democracy. Paying taxes and filling out forms is one of them, 
understanding the policies of candidates before voting for them is another. This convergence 
                                               
80 There is a case to be made for a third phrase on the same page: “Two clocks, two ghosts, one square acre of 
hidden mirror.” It’s a clear break from the turn-a-page phrasing and the un-attentive reader will miss out on its 
magical-realist and mysterious information. However, I consider this to be another descriptive phrase since part 
of it refers to objects in the workspace. The mention of ghosts is also descriptive: in the following section, 26, we 
are told that “there are two actual, non-hallucinatory ghosts haunting Post 047’s wiggle room” (315). 
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between the two arcs mentioned by Boswell, boredom and civics, are proven to be deeply 
connected in the essay “The Politics of Boredom and the Boredom of Politics in The Pale King” 
by Ralph Clare. Clare shows that the novel contains “a historically informed understanding of 
boredom” (195) as well as the political ideology around tax cuts and the IRS in the ’70’s. For 
people living in the neoliberal United States81 “[w]hat has meaning and what is a distraction is 
a true dilemma” (203) during the age of information, and the complications of this dilemma 
resulted in making boredom “a symptom of […] an entire generation’s attitude towards the 
world” (198). Clare’s reading of boredom is similar to Genova’s reading of nihilism in gangsta 
rap, since they both find an element of social disengagement in boredom and nihilism, 
respectively. At the same time, they both find political potential in both attitudes. For Genova, 
that nihilism is fertile ground for a communal political movement. For Clare, boredom in The 
Pale King can “lead to something positive, perhaps even constructive” (200).  With this in mind, 
he calls section 25 an “instructive readerly allegory” for understanding both the form and 
concept of the novel’s “aesthetic of boredom.” Clare’s notion of a ‘reward’ is similar to my 
reading; section 25 is an exercise or a “test” for the reader’s attention, coupled with the rest of 
the novel, the reader can link the lesson of the “test” to civics. I agree with Clare that the lesson 
could lead the reader to “paying active attention to economic and political policy, not being 
easily distracted by the latest consumer trends and entertainment”, since its call for attention, 
including a civic one, reveals that “withdrawing from the world is a choice to cede one’s 
opportunity and freedom to change that world” (204). Clare also considers that a completed 
novel might have presented Wallace’s “theory of attentiveness” and his article tries to grasp the 
direction of the theory through the novel’s aesthetic, hence his reading of section 25. This is not 
to say, however, that Clare considers the novel as incomplete in the sense that it requires other 
sources to complete an interpretation of it. Instead, Clare defends the civic message82 of the 
novel, concluding that if it’s a boring one “so much the better” (204). 
Coupled with my arguments, Sever’s reading of grounded values and Clare’s instructive 
aesthetic show that The Pale King is a novel that diagnoses a social and cultural issue (which I 
place under Rorty’s pessimism) but also, and this is part of the novel’s genius, that it tries to 
grapple with that issue. However, the novel does more than diagnose and interpret the civic 
                                               
81  Given the novel’s setting and the arguments in “E Unibus Pluram”, these arguments can refer to the 
mainstream culture of the United States after the sixties. However, to be specific, The Pale King hoped to address 
the readers from the start of the 21st century and address the culture of that time.  
82 “The Pale King reminds us that it takes work to pay attention, to recognize responsibilities that go beyond the 
immeditate self, and to parse social, political, and cultural narratives for relevance and meaning” (Clare 204). 
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vocabulary of the U.S., it tries to grapple and redescribe it. To exemplify this point, I would say 
that Fredric Jameson’s essay “Postmodernism, of the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” 
provides an original and broad interpretation of American culture, yet his analysis does not end 
in a new proposal, instead he calls for someone to develop a “new political art” (92). I believe 
this chapter shows that The Pale King not only critiques a malaise of American culture. Through 
its narrative, the novel itself, as a text with an American readership, hopes to counteract the 
malaise with a sort of textual agency that goes beyond critical argumentation. In other words, it 
not only describes, it also leads the reader to enact, when reading the novel, the civics it wishes 
to promote and disseminate. 
 The connection between the manifest and the social in the novel is made by the act of 
reading. Section 25 implicitly compares the labour of the reader to that of the examiner; the 
effort and concentration of the accountants must be equalled by the work the reader puts into 
the text.  Severs expands this call for reader-work with the disagreement between Wallace and 
Jonathan Franzen83 over the novel JR by William Gaddis: 
Franzen prefers “Contract” books that “sustain a sense of connectedness” and reader 
“pleasure,” whereas “Status” works like Gaddis’s, sure of their “art-historical 
importance,” do not worry about the “average reader.” Wallace argues the inverse, 
disdaining Contract models of reading. (220) 
 
Wallace sides with Gaddis and refutes Franzen in section 9 of The Pale King, subtitled 
“AUTHOR’S FOREWORD”, where the novel’s fictional author, named David Wallace, 
discussed the legalities of publishing autobiographies and focuses on the relationship between 
text and author, which, as we’ll see, functions with a code that eschews Franzen’s contract. It 
may sound contradictory that a novel about accountants and fiscal labour refutes the concept of 
a contract, yet Severs finds that Wallace aimed for something more complex and flexible than 
a contract:  
[T]he author-reader relationship is too enigmatic to be reduced to a business contract. At 
his most ambitious, in the ecstatic, quasi-religious mystery with which he treats civic 
bonds, Wallace sought a path from the articulated philosophy of social contract to 
something like the unspoken code of democracy. (222) 
 
This code is explicitly discussed in section 19, the section that best exemplifies my reading of 
this novel. I’ll start by mentioning the possibility that this chapter is an unfinished draft, albeit 
                                               
83 It’s worth noting that Aine Mahon, in ‘Achieving Their Country: Richard Rorty and Jonathan Franzen’, a 
reading is made of Franzen’s The Corrections and Freedom as successfully fulfilling the call of Rorty’s 
Achieving Our Country.  
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a highly developed one. Although the chapter revolves around many recurring characters, we 
also have the presence of a character named simply “X”, who is never again mentioned and 
could be taken as an unnamed character or an unfilled role for one of the various examiners in 
the novel. One could argue that is IRS examiner Shane Drinion, because in section 46 we’re 
told that his co-workers gave him the nickname “‘Mr. X,’ short for ‘Mr. Excitement’” (448). 
However, I would point out that the taciturn Drinion, who is capable of concentrating so much 
he levitates, is a very different character from the nagging and obtuse one in section 19, whose 
interjections are found so irritating by some characters that he is threatened with getting thrown 
on top of the elevator. Recalling Wallace’s regret about using Rorty’s book title as the title for 
his own story, it’s probably advantageous for my reading that the section did not go through a 
final edit that might have dimmed the clear use of political terms and references. 
 In this section, a group of IRS workers have been stuck inside an elevator for more than 
three hours. The narration almost exclusively registers their dialogue, and it begins in medias 
res as the characters discuss American civics and politics. Their direct engagement with these 
topics is what makes it ideal for its pairing with Achieving Our Country. It is vital to once again 
keep in mind the distance between philosophy and literature since there is a risk of forgetting it 
when characters are discussing various theoretical concepts. But if section 19 is the bureaucratic 
equivalent of a Platonic Dialogue, it is one where the speakers are overworked and fatigued, and 
probably cramped and dehydrated, if not with the strong desire to visit a toilet; they can’t walk 
away from the conversation, and their IRS rankings might influence their sincerity. Yet there is 
no Socrates-like character to dominate the dialogue or treat others as audience. We instead get 
the positive qualities of a conversation, the unstructured debate and the un-hierarchical 
participation. Although the dialogue itself is not difficult to understand, the reader is not given 
many bearings to understand the scene; more often than not, we are not told who it is that is 
speaking, with only the register and content for guidance and the elevator itself is only 
mentioned six pages into section 19 (135). Only the reader willing to do the work the narration 
demands will find the “themes of commonwealth and shared values” Severs spoke of. To clarify, 
I’m not arguing that a narrative that requires work is unique to this novel, most of Wallace’s 
text require a certain effort from the reader. My reading of “Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature” exemplifies this, relying on subtle details to enlighten the text. One could look at how 
many of the literary techniques that Wallace developed over his literary career are present in 
The Pale King and understand said difficulty as part of a career-long development. My argument 
(and I believe Severs’s as well) will be that never before in his career was the result of this effort 
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supposed to have as great a beyond-the-text effect as with his posthumous novel. However, I 
differ from Severs in the interpretation of this ambition, since I read it as an attempt to expand 
a public vocabulary in the United States. It’s worth restating Rorty’s belief in an “intersubjective 
consensus” (35), as my reading describes The Pale King as a tool for creating said democratic 
consensus, hopeful for the future a democratic public sphere can achieve.  
 DeWitt Glendenning opens the chapter, stating: “There’s something very interesting 
about civics and selfishness, and we get to ride the crest of it” (130). A historicism of civics and 
selfishness in American culture should remind a Wallace scholar of “E Unibus Pluram,” and, as 
I hope to show, section 19 rephrases, continues, or expands on many of the essay’s arguments. 
This matters to my reading for two reasons: first, it clarifies Wallace’s interest in the democratic 
citizen’s civic identity; second, it historicizes Wallace’s analysis and steers it away from 
absolute concepts or statements. Contingent proposals seek to converse, not dictate. “E Unibus 
Pluram” moves from its cultural analysis to a possible solution with regards to how American 
fiction can react to the ‘crest’ of selfishness; section 19 keeps its focus on American civics and 
culture. 
 Glendenning restates the argument in “E Unibus Pluram” that links the 
commercialization of the 60s social movements to a decline in American civics. One of the other 
accountants in the elevator, Stuart A. Nichols Jr., effectively summarizes this point: “The 
fulcrum was the moment in the sixties when rebellion against conformity became fashionable” 
(144). Compare this to the essay’s “[student protesters] may have hated the war, but they also 
wanted to be seen protesting the war” (34). The essay supports the accountants’ description of 
this shift as the “decline into decadence and selfish individualism”, the disappearance of civics 
from the public sphere. This is why for Glendenning fashionable protesting opened the door to, 
“[t]he end of the democratic experiment” (132). The novel, the essay, and Rorty’s Achieving 
Our Country try to find solutions to the civic-less culture.  
 The subtitle of “E Unibus Pluram” is “Television and U.S. Fiction,” which marks the 
limits of the essay. Wallace’s cultural critique is based around the influence television has on 
his nation and his interest in understanding that influence is to figure out how literature can 
respond to it, or even exist in it. These, of course, are not the interests of the trapped accountants 
but it seems obvious that Wallace returned to the same critical apparatus to construct the elevator 
conversation. Wallace sets the critical stage for his essay with a general duality: “U.S. pop 
culture is just like U.S. serious culture in that its central tension has always set the nobility of 
individualism against the warmth of belonging” (54). This tension is present in The Pale King 
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around the payment of taxes and the importance of civics. In “E Unibus Pluram,” the tension is 
clearly unbalanced. In U.S. culture, TV became the “ultimate arbiter of human worth,” (56) and 
even though it produces “mass” culture, “[t]he well-trained viewer becomes even more allergic 
to people. Lonelier” (63). The responsibility for this is shared not only by T.V.’s programming 
but also by its ads. Maybe the crux of Wallace’s argument is the use of irony and the relation 
between literature and marketing. The early postmodernists used irony as a tool for critique and 
rebellion, it was “downright socially useful” (66). However, irony was taken up by marketing 
to give the viewer a “permission slip” to take “a pose of passive reception to comfort, escape, 
reassurance” when feeling “confused and guilty” (41). It is with irony that ads and shows can 
‘wink’ at the viewer, let them know that they are self-conscious enough to not be part of the 
mass and they can enjoy themselves, or that they can be rebels, part of the counterculture, if 
they consume a specific kind of product. Enter Nichols’ quote from the previous paragraph 
about fashionable rebellion, the accountant’s conversation accepts and revolves around many of 
“E Unibus Pluram”’s arguments. Another observation by Nichols could easily be inserted into 
“E Unibus Pluram”: “[y]ou make buying a certain brand […] into a gesture of the same level of 
ideological significance as wearing a beard or protesting the war” (145). Obviously, the trapped 
accountants don’t have the same critical interest as Wallace’s essay but they operate with a 
similar historicized view of U.S. culture. In the essay, the language of ads and consumer 
entertainment has subsumed culture. In the conversation, DeWitt notes that Stuart’s argument 
is “tracing the move from the production-model of American democracy to something like a 
consumption-model […] a consumer is a solo venture” (146). So we read a similar analysis of 
a shift in culture, but where the essay stays with the image of passive citizens, the accountants 
discuss the effect a corporation-minded citizenship has on democracy: “[t]he whole dark genius 
of corporations is that they allow for individual reward without individual obligation […] It’s 
like a fugue of evaded responsibility” (136). In the essay, responsibility is mostly allotted to 
writers and literature’s role in society. The conversation instead focuses on the individual’s 
abandonment of responsibilities: “corporations and marketing and PR and the creation of desire 
[…] seduce the individual […] enabling the delusion that the individual is the center of the 
universe, the most important thing” (144). Placing the self at the center of existence is an 
ontological requirement for a consumer-mind. Politics, public debate, and civics are, at best, 
relegated to the vocabulary of advertisement, brand competition, and consumer satisfaction. The 
accountants notice this from the vantage point the IRS gives them:  
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We’ve changed the way we think of ourselves as citizens. We don’t think of ourselves 
as citizens in the old sense of being small parts of something larger and infinitely more 
important to which we have serious responsibilities. We do think of ourselves as citizens 
in the sense of being beneficiaries -- we’re actually conscious of our rights as Americans 
citizens and the nation’s responsibilities to us and ensuring we get our share of the 
American pie. We think of ourselves now as eaters of the pie instead of makers of the 
pie.84 (136) 
 
Although the conversation has no single argument or definite conclusion, I believe this is one 
of the main points reached by the conversation. The democratic government is seen as a 
provider, a kind of customer service, and not an institution on which citizens can participate in, 
contribute towards, and control.85 Much less an instrument of social cohesion to which they owe 
certain duties or responsibilities.  
 To extend the tracing of images (and complete the “essay-interview nexus”), I will also 
point out an image that appears in section 22 with a root in Wallace’s 1993 interview with Larry 
McCaffery. Throughout the conversation, different accountants make their point about the 
situation of civics in the U.S. by comparing citizens to minors: “We infantilize ourselves” (130), 
“I don’t think the American nation today is infantile so much as adolescent” (147). They also 
compare the government and the IRS as the parents of said minors:  “We’re the government 
[…] the stern parent” (134), “In loco parentis” (135), “It’s like they expect the government to 
be the parent that takes away the dangerous toy” (138), “The government will be the parent” 
(146),  “Rest assured that Daddy’s in control” (147), as well as a comparison to the police: 
“We’ll be the cops they call when the party gets out of hand” (148). This image of parents and 
their kids and an unsupervised partying is repeated at the end of the McCaffery interview with 
regards to the postmodern literary tradition. It’s a section that is often quoted to understand 
Wallace’s relation to the literary climate in which he developed as a writer. In this case, it will 
show a connection to the previous excerpts of The Pale King: 
The last few years of the postmodern era have seemed a bit like the way you feel when 
you’re in high school and your parents go on a trip, and you throw a party […] you 
gradually start wishing your parents would come back and restore some fucking order 
in the house […] The postmodern founders’ patricidal work was great, but patricide 
produces orphans […] We’re kind of wishing some parents would come back […] we 
                                               
84 The ‘pie’ metaphor is also used by another accountant (233) in Section 22, which I mention later on. Another 
image that is repeated in Section 19 and 22 and voices by different accountants is that of civic-less citizens being 
like leaves in the wind: “Now I choose to blow this way; this is my decision” (142). “Now I think I’ll blow this 
way, now I think I’ll blow that way” (154). In Section 19, it’s based on the Tocquevillian image of a citizen as a 
leaf that is part of a tree (141), which by the ‘70’s shifted to the citizen believing “that he is the tree, that his first 
responsibility is to his own happiness” (144).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
85 “I think the syndrome is more the not-voting one” (TPK 139). 
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start gradually to realize that parents in fact aren’t ever coming back — which means 
we’re going to have to be the parents. (52) 
 
The similarity of the images and of their argumentation makes the same point as the “E Unibus 
Pluram” connection: that Wallace developed his approach to pertinent cultural problematics 
early in his career, expanding and maturing his response in later works. This specific connection 
between the early interview and the posthumous novel expands the mirroring qualities of The 
Pale King, with the accountants not only mirroring the reader, but authors as well. By this I 
mean that authors have a similar civic duty as citizens. Chronologically, these comparisons 
indicate that Wallace first developed critical observations on the writer’s role in a democracy, 
and from there moved to a more civic theory.  The critique in section 19 of a civic-less culture 
is a critique of a widespread “passive reception” and its effect on politics. One could say that 
the main difference between both texts, apart from the obvious formal one, is that the essay 
wonders how literature can engage with consumer culture, while the fiction asks how can civics 
engage with it.  
 In The Pale King, the disappearance of civics results in the individual’s disengagement 
from their democratic government. In “E Unibus Pluram,” its disappearance results in the eye-
rolling banality that annuls sincere conversation. For Rorty, it’s the pessimism that renounces 
any optimism for the country’s future, the hope of Achieving Our Country “regards self-loathing 
as a luxury which agents—either individuals or nations—cannot afford” (33). Section 19 is an 
imaginative effort to move from political pessimism to civic hope, both in terms of the 
characters’ arguments and Wallace’s writing. There is a similar effort in “E Unibus Pluram” but 
its diagnosis of the cultural malaise takes up most of the essay, and its hopeful proposal is 
focused on literary creation. Glendenning’s speech on his country’s origins would not seem out 
of place in Rorty’s book: “I think the Constitution and the Federalist Papers of this country 
were an incredible moral and imaginative achievement” (133). It is necessary for Rortyan hope 
to find achievements that inspire a belief in reaching a cooperative commonwealth.86 
                                               
86  To expand on this statement, consider the following quote by Rorty: “If there is a connection between artistic 
freedom and creativity and the spirit of democracy, it is that the former provide examples of the kind of 
courageous self-transformation of which we hope democratic societies will become increasingly capable---
transformation which is conscious and willed, rather than semiconsciously endured”. Glendenning’s description 
of the Constitution and the Federalist Papers as an incredible achievement turns them into examples of 
‘courageous self-transformation’, works that inspire and provide hope, aiming to “make the future different from 
the past” (AOC 122). Glendenning’s praise of the political and moral creativity of both works is therefore not a 
conservative statement nor a desire for a fixed identity but rather the recognition of tools that can provide hope 
and inspiration for the growth of democracy. 
140 
 
Glendenning aims to counterbalance the post-’60’s nihilism by praising the founding fathers’ 
“sense of civics”: he is not looking to idealize the past but to create hope for the future.  
 Rorty argues delicately that his theory does not look to justify or ignore the crimes and 
suffering committed by the American government. Wallace presents these complications 
through the voice of another accountant “It’s certainly an imaginative and ingenious 
rationalization of racism and male chauvinism”87 (134). Glendenning knows these replies, 
though he does not try to hide or negate them but remains hopeful by continuing the 
conversation. By including interjections like this in the conversation, Wallace is not censoring 
any voices; instead he also exemplifies Rorty’s point that no contingent proposals can come 
from only focusing on America’s tragedies. Rorty’s description of James Baldwin’s stance on 
his country’s terrors is axiomatic for his own approach: finding America unforgivable, yet also 
achievable (cf. AOC 12).  
 Severs reads the setting itself, the “stalled elevator”, “as a failed act of weight lifting by 
pulleys” where a group of individuals are engaged in the “difficult collective venture” of 
knowing “how to rise” (238). I think that, to keep with his images of grounding, a successful 
elevator for Severs should have gone to the ground floor. More importantly, it seems he is too 
quick to call their effort a failure. The scene has no ending, as readers we are tempted to continue 
reading and find a conclusion later in the novel. I read the scene as a reflection of Rorty’s 
description of American politics in the late ‘90’s, where once can “ridicule anything but can 
hope for nothing, can explain everything but can idolize nothing” (AOC 127). A stalled political 
situation between a Right that does not believe America’s values need to change and a Left too 
disillusioned with their nation’s history to participate in it. It is also not far from American 
literature’s entrapment described in “E Unibus Pluram”, where rebellion equals conformity.  
 Section 19 ends without a clear resolution, the elevator does not budge, the doors do not 
open, the trapped accountants don’t reach an agreement. There are some shifts in the narration, 
half-way through the section, Glendenning, possibly falling ill, stops leading the conversation88 
with Nichols taking his place as main speaker. The study of civics turns from historicism to a 
kind of consumer existentialism, “Everything is on fire, slow fire” (143), which also meets some 
resistance “Christ, the death thing again” (149). Considering that the section appears in the first 
                                               
87 A similar note appears on “E Unibus Pluram”: “postmodern fiction—authored almost exclusively by young 
white overeducated males” (65). 
88 This shift seems evident on page 141 but it’s on page 145 that two characters say: “Is Mr. Glendenning even 
awake?” / “He looks awful pale”. 
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half of the book, the open end is an invitation to continue turning the page. Pietsch deserves 
credit for recognizing the depth of the section as well as the impact it could have setting specific 
political themes and tones for the novel.  
 Whether or not it is a finished draft, Section 19 indicates that Wallace still thought about 
the social circumstances and dilemmas he analyzed in “E Unibus Pluram”, the importance of 
which cannot be ignored since the period in between the two almost spans his whole career. 
Severs’s reading of Section 19, like his reading of the novel, is positive: “There is definitely 
hope for a democratic, humane bureaucracy pulling the levers of society in The Pale King” 
(239).  
 I hope to have shown that both sections 19 and 25 contain the democratic and civic 
guidelines and capabilities the novel. They also offer creative representations of public and 
private vocabularies, which in turn become redescriptions for a specific period of American 
democracy. Here, it’s worth remembering my reading of “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,” 
where I focused on the son’s inability to notice his mother’s suffering, caught up in his interests 
and obsessions. If that short story narrates the damage caused when one is unaware of the 
suffering of others, then section 25 shows the value of attention, becoming a sort of counterpart 
to the short story. However, we don’t notice anyone suffering in section 25, except maybe the 
reader from tedium or impatience. As mentioned, my understanding of one section depends on 
the other. In the second part of section 19, Stuart J Nicols Jr observes that “Americans now vote 
with their wallets” (147), indicating where contemporary civic participation takes place. The 
Pale King can be read as an attempt to shift this participation on to a political and democratic 
stage. Consider how taxes and the IRS work as theme and setting for the novel; Wallace takes 
a disliked, if not demonized, government institution that is often scapegoated as an ‘enemy’ by 
political candidates and redescribes it as the institution that exemplifies civic duty and 
participation, as an institution of great democratic capacity, in other words, as an institution that 
does not humiliate. A comprehension and incorporation of such a redescription requires the 
probity necessary to also read section 25. In this sense, and to continue with the images of 
consumerism, a shift in a vocabulary is not mere rebranding. An American citizen would benefit 
from incorporating the careful reading required by section 25 into their vocabulary. One of the 
descriptions of Rorty’s ‘ironist’, one aware of private vocabularies, is that “insofar as she 
philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than 
others, that it is in touch with a power not herself” (73). Wallace, in ‘philosophising his 
situation,’ does not look for a vocabulary that is ‘closer to reality’ rather he is aware of the 
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impact that a cultural vocabulary determined by TV and advertising has, and tries to provide 
one more apt for a sincere communication between individuals. The approach of section 25 is 
tuned to the “adolescent” consumerist culture of Wallace’s America since it counters the ad-
trained habit that a message must be entertaining to receive attention. This clash is present in 
Section 19, when an accountant complains about the dullness of the conversation: “This whole 
conversation is dull”. To which another accountant replies: “Sometimes what’s important is 
dull. Sometimes it’s work” (138). The message of this argument can also be found in “E Unibus 
Pluram,” which describes attention as “our chief commodity, our social capital, and we are loath 
to fritter it” (64).  However, it seems more poignant in The Pale King because of narratives like 
section 25: the argument goes beyond the manifesto or critical proposition and turns to an 
aesthetic with both ethical and political implications. 
 The pragmatic openness of Rorty’s philosophy allows my reading to interact with the 
rest of the novel as well as other readings of The Pale King. Consider the ease with which, as 
exemplified throughout this dissertation, Rorty is able to use descriptions and concepts created 
by other thinkers. This quality is recreated in my interpretations of sections 19 and 25 as the 
reading guides or distilled examples of the novel’s political and democratic qualities. Briefly 
put, the elevator scene presents the issues pertinent to the sincere conversation U.S. democracy 
should have, while section 25 gives a practical example of how the ethics of a complex reading 
function, rewarding the patient examiner. These interpretations open the sections to further 
discussion,  and with them the whole of the novel, since each other section can be weighed in 
relation to 19 and/or 25. The role of civic and democratic themes in other key passages of the 
novel can be found in Mark West’s study of Chris Fogle’s section in “‘Observation of these 
Articles’: Surveillance and the 1970s in David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King” (2018). Section 
22 is the longest in the novel and many argue the most accomplished. West ties Fogle’s narrative 
from ‘wastoid’ to IRS examiner to the history of “the state of civic-mindedness between the 
1960s and the first decade of the twenty-first century” (224). West shows that Wallace plays 
with the prejudice that the ‘70’s were a decade when ‘nothing happened’ by representing its 
historical importance: “foregrounding concerns with notions of privatism and civic 
commitment, Fogle’s story reflects key ideological debates that took place in the 1970s”(232). 
While Fogle makes choices in the ‘70’s that will determine his life in the following decade, the 




 It’s interesting that both West and the aforementioned Jon Doyle critique the simplicity 
of nostalgic representations of the past. Doyle critiques contemporary novels like George 
Saunders’ Lincoln in the Bardo “for reacting to a fractured present with patriotic mythologies” 
since the “mythological reduction of ethics and morality to symptoms of geography and nation 
does nothing to challenge the ideology of populist nationalism” (264). Although Wallace set his 
novel in the past, there is no desire to romanticise the ‘70’s or to lament the passing of an era. It 
seems that he instead tried to find a possible origin for contemporary issues. West’s research 
reveals that Fogle’s conversion from a personal commitment to a “public commitment, or a 
commitment to the public” actually runs against conversions of “others in the 1970s, which were 
propelled by a revelation that personal growth was more important than social transformation” 
(232). Fogle’s narrative not only casts aside the mythologies and symbols of power, it also 
fulfills Doyle’s call for a management of irony and sincerity in fiction. In my reading, it presents 
the interaction between the public and private vocabularies, to quote again from West: “Fogle’s 
conversion […] involves both the inward or personal and the outward or national components 
[…] and rejects the 1970s focus on the individual self”89 (232). In more Rortyan terms, we read 
a self-realization or a redescription of a private vocabulary and an expansion of a public 
democratic vocabulary. These two overlap where the self-realization involves a commitment to 
public service, which is defined by the public vocabulary of democracy. Once adopted, this 
vocabulary in turn redescribes the civic beliefs and commitments of the individual. We see this 
overlap between sections 25 and 19, where the former looks to redescribe the attitudes of 
attention and boredom one can have towards civic duties and democratic processes, while the 
latter offers a hopeful redescription of a public democratic vocabulary. If this redescription from 
section 19 is successful, then one would have good reason to accept the private redescription 
offered in section 25. 
 Despite the possible usefulness and intricacy of my reading, it would be fair to say that 
sections 19 and 25 do not add much to the novel’s various plots and narratives; the clever fiasco 
is not mentioned again in the novel nor does any character seem to be changed by it; descriptions 
of accountancy labour are a constant in the novel and the turning of pages is not the only 
description of the examiner’s job. Although at the start of the chapter I mentioned the absence 
of a political stance in Pietsch’s introduction to the novel, it was thanks to his choice that these 
two sections appeared in the published novel. It is possible that he found them publishable on 
                                               
89 It’s worth noting that Fogle's conversion narrative contains a direct reference to the start of James Joyce’s 
Ulysses: “fearful Jesuit” (TPK 215; page 1 in Ulysses). 
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the merit of the sections formal or aesthetic peculiarities (no other section with 2 columns, other 
dialogue heavy chapters are not as long). Nonetheless, both sections are a testament to Wallace’s 
experimental interest in using unconventional narrative forms to represent and face the world 
he lived in. Such is the impetus behind “E Unibus Pluram” as well, which is condensed in the 
question “What responses to television’s commercialization of the modes of literary protest 
seem possible, then, today?” (69) However, while the essay takes most of its time to construct 
its question, The Pale King is mostly the construction of an answer. In other words, its answer 
to how a novel can protest and participate in a democratic setting. Despite its ‘unfinished’ label, 
I believe the novel’s attempt is successful, something that is often overlooked in other readings. 
Through Rorty’s philosophy, one should understand the significance of Wallace’s achievement.  
 This chapter attempts to redescribe The Pale King as a tool for civic and democratic 
participation, however, the novel is too oblivious to its limited representation of women and 
minorities. For example, the accountants stuck inside the elevator are all males, at least those 
who participate in the discussion. Following a similar line of criticism, I find that Wallace’s 
analysis of the narcissistic turn of the ’60’s downplays or overlooks the importance and 
achievements of the civil rights and anti-war movements. Why, then, grant this novel democratic 
value? My arguments contain a reading similar to the one I made for Signifying Rappers, as well 
as the belief that the novel promotes the Rortyan concept of hope. Wallace is not trying to speak 
for the disenfranchised groups of a democracy but instead from and to the white middle class 
he belonged to. This can be noticed in the novel’s setting, Philo, Illinois instead of a major 
American city, and in its characters, some may have impoverished backgrounds (cf. Toni 
Ware’s violent trailer park upbringing) but as IRS employees they represent the spectrum of the 
middle class, lacking individuals at the top of the economic hierarchy. We are told that the IRS 
itself is headed by a triumvirate instead of a single leader (108). Like section 19, the novel is 
not an individual’s speech but a conversation, and if section 25 mirrors the reader’s act then the 
novel offers an eloquent mirror to the male white middle-class, where they might see themselves 
as part of a vast democratic society, as citizens instead of consumers, as beholden to utilize their 
privilege and over-representation with civic responsibility, which in turn would dissolve said 
privilege in the effort to prevent humiliation. I am not trying to limit the message or audience 
of The Pale King, since its content is both pluralistic and democratic. But similar to how 
Signifying Rappers did not try to speak for rappers, The Pale King does not try to speak for all 
American citizens. It does try to start and participate in a conversation about civics, redescribing 
the payment of taxes as a communal act that annuls the anti-democratic impulses of consumer 
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individualism. The novel as a whole, even as an unfinished text, constitutes a work of democratic 
literature that hoped to participate, like a voter at a booth, in the ethical and political conversation 






“Have you read Infinite Jest? […] We are living in the ‘Year of the 
Perdue Chicken.’ We’re looking at our phones until we literally lose 
consciousness. If our leaders don’t learn to communicate in an engaging 
manner, our entertainers will become politicians. That’s what we have 
now.” 
-Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, youngest woman elected to the U.S. 
Congress, in an interview for Vogue Magazine, November 2018. 
 
During the writing of this dissertation, allegations of sexual harassment were made against 
David Foster Wallace as part of the #MeToo movement.90 Although the core arguments of this 
dissertation are not based on biographical information, it is concerned with the suffering of 
others. After Wallace’s untimely death a sort of cult grew around his image, partly fueled by the 
free access to a live recording of the speech This is Water, that culminated with the term ‘Saint 
Dave.’91 Yet there is nothing saintly about sexual harassment, nor is there a justice that can reach 
the deceased. It should be part of our public vocabulary to express solidarity with victims of 
sexual harassment, and it’s the responsibility of Wallace studies to not allow these accusations 
to shamefully fade away. It’s likely that the cusp of Wallace’s popularity is behind us. I doubt 
that the 2015 biopic,92 the ‘Saint Dave’ cultural event, or the attempts to catalog Wallace as a 
Christian author would have appeared if the allegations were made during his lifetime or soon 
after his death. The direct relevance of these events to the field of literary criticism, where this 
dissertation belongs, is the destruction of the pedestal under the writer’s image.  
 In this conclusion, I analyze a brief text by Wallace that summarizes the capabilities and 
intentions of the democratic vein I find in his work. Before doing so, I will consider the 
allegations through a more critical stance. Again, although my work isn’t biographical, it 
investigates literature’s capacity for reducing the pain of others. How can the writings of 
someone who allegedly caused physical and emotional abuse on another human serve this 
purpose? Not surprisingly, I’ll make use of Rorty to approach this issue, specifically an essay 
from 1990 called “On Heidegger’s Nazism” (PSH 190-7). As the title suggests, Rorty explains 
his extensive use of Heidegger’s philosophy despite his membership to the Nazi party and his 
post-war silence on the Holocaust. 




92 The End of the Tour (2015). 
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With a strategy similar to Virginia Woolf’s creation of a fictional sister for Shakespeare 
in A Room of One’s Own, Rorty builds his argument on a fictional Jewish woman Heidegger 
falls in love with and marries before the war. This leads him to renounce Nazism and leave 
Germany. In that world, Heidegger would “have his nose rubbed in the torment of the Jews until 
he finally noticed what was going on, until his sense of pity and his sense of shame were finally 
awakened.” However, Rorty doesn’t stray far from the actual philosopher that stayed in 
Germany: “In our actual world Heidegger was a Nazi, a cowardly hypocrite, and the greatest 
European thinker of our time” (PSH 196). Rorty’s argument is that the philosophical books 
Heidegger wrote in that fictional world are “[a]lmost exactly the same ones as he wrote in the 
actual one” (PSH 195). In this sense, Heidegger’s “denial” and “silence” on his Nazism and the 
holocaust “do not tell us much about the books he wrote, nor conversely” (PSH 196). As an 
anti-essentialist, Rorty doesn’t read Heidegger’s nazism permeating all his writings. To clarify 
his reading of Heidegger’s philosophy, he describes it as a “toolbox” where “Heidegger 
deposited the tools that he invented at various times to accomplish one or another project” (PSH 
191). This ‘toolbox’ interpretation should not surprise a reader of this thesis. Conceptually, it is 
similar to Rorty’s approach to his country’s history: not ignoring the bad and making use of the 
good. Not surprisingly, this is my current suggestion and position with regards to the work of 
David Foster Wallace. This thesis proves my conviction in the usefulness of a democratic tool 
in Wallace’s ‘literary toolbox.’ The same way I’m convinced by Rorty’s philosophical belief 
that “there is no such thing as the essential Heidegger,” I believe it is critically valid to claim 
there is no ‘essential Wallace.’ I also believe that, in time, future readers of Wallace will also 
find, like Rorty reading Heidegger, “a toolbox containing some splendid things lying next to a 
lot of outdated junk” (PSH 192). It’s possible that Wallace’s democratic tool will prove useful 
for the development of a civic literature. This doesn’t mean that a better one can’t be made or 
that it won’t become outdated at some point. Of course, I’m not trying to say that Wallace was 
a card-carrying member of the Nazi party. Rather, that we should not let an image of Wallace, 
be it as the saint or the harasser, dictate readings of this text. 
My contingent argument is built on my readings and so it is limited. As far as my 
readings let me see, if we decide not to read Wallace as a result of the alleged suffering he 
caused to others in life then it makes sense to apply this approach to, at the very least, all 
humanist creators, since I can’t think of a reason for why this criteria and response would only 
apply to Wallace. Caravaggio the murderer, Dostoevsky the rapist, Pound the fascist, slavery in 
Ancient Greece are some of the first examples that come to mind. It may be that the laborious 
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task of discarding the work of humans that caused them is necessary for establishing a culture 
that diminishes said harm. I find Rorty’s approach, exemplified in his essay on Heidegger, as 
more useful and effective, making good use of whatever helps us reduce human suffering. 
Allegations aside, this stance also rejects the aforementioned Saint Dave image that places 
Wallace, to put it in a way that recalls my reading of ‘Octet’, in an ‘Olympian HQ’. This stance, 
for example, has hijacked the This Is Water speech, which is only published in an edition that 
Zadie Smith described as “repackaged as a Chicken Soup for the Soul-style toilet book 
(sentences artificially separated from one another and left, like Zen koans, alone on the page) to 
be sold next to the cash register” (265). It also results in books like Adam S. Miller’s The Gospel 
According to David Foster Wallace, which reduces Wallace’s literature to a self-help or advice 
approach were we read his ‘take’ on different topics such as “Clichés” and “Silence”.  
 It should be expected that after a continuous use of Rortyian philosophy I won’t conclude 
by declaring Wallace’s oeuvre (or even The Pale King, for that matter) as the absolute, ideal, or 
essential work of democratic American literature. I do believe that this dissertation proves that 
there is a robust democratic dimension to Wallace’s literature and that Rorty’s theory shows 
there is much to be gained by adding this dimension to conversations on Wallace’s work, both 
academic and non-academic ones.  
 The last complete text Wallace published in his lifetime is a brief article titled “Just 
Asking”. It appeared in the November, 2007 issue of The Atlantic, along with the work of other 
public figures invited to consider the future of the ‘American idea’.93 The essay analyzed in my 
Introduction, “Deciderization 2007”, appeared in January 2007, and it is safe to guess that 
Wallace wrote it at least a year before “Just Asking”. I mention this because it adds weight to 
the idea that Wallace paid consistent attention to his contemporary American Democracy, at 
least during the ‘late period’ of his career. “Just Asking” is brief, under 500 words long, divided 
into four paragraphs, the first and the last one each start with a capitalized Q and a colon in the 
anthologized version. The argument of the text is driven by a kind of maieutic method, where 
one open question leads to another one. The opening pair sets the unanswered focal point of the 
text: “Are some things worth dying for? Is the American idea one such thing?” In a footnote to 
the second question, Wallace gives his definition of the ‘American idea’: 
Given the Gramm-Rudmanesque space limit here, let’s just all agree that we generally 
know what this term connotes--open society, consent of the governed, enumerated 
                                               
93 This includes texts by people such as American Pragmatist Cornel West, Joyce Carol Oates, and even a comic 
by Stan Lee. 
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powers, Federalist 10, pluralism, due process, transparency…the whole messy 
democratic roil. (BF 321) 
 
Wallace’s hasty declaration of consensus is somewhat comical considering that the main 
argument of the first paragraph is the question: “Why now can we not have a serious national 
conversation?” This desire is tied to the American idea listed in the footnote above. The ‘now’ 
of the question is the second term of the Bush administration, the War on Terror, and the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The ‘now’ is also set in contrast to a different historical 
period: “Is monstrousness why no serious public figure now will speak of the delusory trade-off 
of liberty for safety that Ben Franklin warned of more than 200 years ago?” (BF 322) I don’t 
read this question as a fall into idealistic nostalgia. Like Rorty, Wallace aligns his argument and 
himself with the American tradition of democratic hope: the belief that upholding the American 
idea defined above can lead to a better future. His argument gains historical validation with that 
question, as well as a grounding in the actual creation of the United States. The paraphrased 
quote comes from a letter Franklin, on behalf of the Pennsylvania Assembly, wrote to the 
Governor of Pennsylvania in 1755 (Franklin 238-43) and it reads: “Those who would give up 
essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety” (Franklin 
242). Wallace observed that the national response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was to cede 
‘essential liberty’ in exchange for safety. But the trade-off was partially an avoidance of 
democratic civic responsibilities. Considering both Wallace’s and Rorty’s argument about 
citizenry that absconded participation, it follows that the liberty/security trade-off was no 
surprise. In my reading, Wallace’s great democratic lament is voiced in the first quote of this 
paragraph: the absence of a ‘serious national conversation.’ In the last paragraph of the text 
Wallace lists some of the results of that absence:  
What are the effects on the American idea of Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, PATRIOT Acts 
I and II, warrantless surveillance, Executive Order 13233, corporate contractors 
performing military functions, the Military Commissions Act, NSPD 51, etc., etc.? (BF 
322) 
 
On one level, this list testifies to Wallace’s attention to the politics of his country. On another, 
it appears as an all-too-real example of the point made in The Pale King: in a culture of 
entertainment and instant gratification, the controversial aspects of government can be hidden 
in plain sight through boredom and bureaucracy. In the months following 9/11, whose attention 
was caught by the name ‘Executive Order 13233’? Who called for a national debate to decide 
if such a legislation, that runs counter to the concepts of ‘open society’ and ‘transparency’, 
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should be enacted? Where was the ‘consent of the governed’? For Wallace, there wasn’t even a 
debate to give up said liberty. Consider how quickly the Patriot Act was passed after the attacks 
of 9/11. The name Guantánamo (still open to this day) and the images out of Abu Ghraib are 
probably the elements of that list that received the most media attention. Are “warrantless 
surveillance” and “corporate contractors performing military functions” acceptable and viable 
in American democracy even if one assumes “for the moment that some of these really have 
helped make our persons and property safer”? Wallace’s question is as pertinent as when first 
published, and the obscurity and political taboo around the events listed still stands as proof of 
the absence of a ‘serious national conversation’ around them.  
A month before the publication of “Just Asking” the U.S. war in Afghanistan passed its 
6th year mark and was halfway through its 4th year in Iraq. Despite Wallace’s critique of the 
movement against the Vietnam War, one can still claim that the national debate around that 
war’s justification, along with the opposition to it, increased during its 19 years of conflict. For 
Rorty, not only did it increase but it was said movement that ended the war. There he again 
reveals his Pragmatism for, despite his critique of the pessimist Left, he attributes the end of the 
Vietnam War to the conviction and resistance of those without hope in an American future. This 
is why he offers an olive branch half-way through Achieving Our Country: 
I want to suggest that such a reconciliation could be started by agreeing that the New 
Left accomplished something enormously important, something of which the reformist 
Left would probably have been incapable. It ended the Vietnam War. It may have saved 
our country from becoming a garrison state. (67) 
 
I hope this quote stands as a testament to the possibility of reconciliation when one disavows 
absolutes, and upholds conversation, mutability, and hope. But also, without falling into a socio-
historical analysis, to posit a pair of open questions: To whom could Wallace have offered 
reconciliation in the absence of an open debate? Is his list of events proofs that his country took 
a step forward to becoming the once-avoided garrison state? 
The last two questions of “Just Asking” are: “Have we become so selfish and frightened 
that we don’t even want to think about whether some things trump safety? What kind of future 
does that augur?” (BF 323) Infinite Jest alone can stand as proof that Wallace thought about the 
future of his country as much as Rorty, and that he also understood how thinking about our 
future can guide the actions of our present.94 Earlier in “Just Asking”, Wallace wonders if it’s 
                                               
94 It’s worth mentioning that Wallace’s undergraduate thesis (republished in 2010 as Fate, Time, and Language: 
An Essay of Free Will) is an attack on Fatalism. 
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worth “sacrificing” aspects of the “democratic idea” (BF 322), such as due process, 
transparency, and an open society, for safety. Would it be worth it even if said safety was 
guaranteed? Trying to guess Wallace’s answer to these questions would be missing the point. 
The text instead shows that these pertinent questions were never asked and debated. If in 2007, 
Wallace’s vantage point showed him that the absence of these questions led to events such as, 
for example, the Torture memos and Abu Ghraib, our vantage point in 2019 says that the damage 
caused by the absence of dialogue only increased, and that, in general terms, said public debate 
is still absent. The current state of politics and culture in the US could serve as an answer to the 
final question on the augured future. Maybe that’s why, in today’s context, it seems almost 
obvious that a culture of selfishness and fear leads to nationalism and discrimination, to travel 
bans and border walls, troop worship and jingoism.  
It’s important to highlight that there is no demand for a moral or political purity in 
Wallace’s work. Rortyan hermeneutics is useful for capturing the democratic vistas of Wallace’s 
oeuvre because he avoided writing on and with prescriptive totalities and absolute dogmas in a 
positive light. My chapter on Infinite Jest showed this; Wallace’s vocabulary and narratives 
contain absolute and metaphysical terms which do not equal an endorsement, the same way that 
a representation of violence can be a critique and not a defense of violence. The vocabulary of 
metaphysical absolutes and the belief in systems that claim absolute knowledge is as alive and 
pertinent during the writing of this dissertation as it is in the fictional future of Infinite Jest. The 
critique of these systems in Wallace is not as clear and direct as is, for example, the critique of 
totalitarian states in George Orwell’s 1984. Nonetheless, I have tried to show that said critique 
is present and pertinent in Wallace’s novel. To expand on that reasoning, this dissertation 
celebrates the limits of Wallace’s literature as proof of the need for public debate and 
conversation. It follows that with accepting the impossibility of a metaphysical lookout or an 
epistemological absolute, we also accept that no single voice can encompass all representation. 
There is an anecdote in D.T. Max’s biography of Wallace that illustrates said position with 
regards to his literary work, it appears as an endnote: 
At a panel discussion on ethnicity and literature in 1998 held in Seattle, Wallace 
indicated that he knew his privileged status. When the moderator announced that the 
authors--the others were Sherman Alexie, Cristina García, and Gish Jen--would discuss 
their experience as members of marginalized minorities, Wallace picked up his chair and 




The key detail of this image is that Wallace neither abandons the stage nor hogs the microphone, 
he instead ‘pointed’ at those capable of giving a more accurate description to the audience. This 
is what he did at the start of his career Signifying Rappers: gesture to those whose vocabulary 
should be payed attention to because it can enlarge the listener’s vocabulary, as well as a 
community’s own vocabulary. I assume his reaction at the panel would’ve been different if the 
topic was closer to his vocabulary (e.g. the Midwest, tennis, Wittgenstein), the exaggerated 
stepping-away movement seems almost performative of the distance set by vocabularies, but 
also of the possibility of communication, the value of staying onstage instead of departing. By 
conceding the floor to those who might better understand a kind of suffering he appears to avoid 
the moral solipsism of the narrator and protagonist from “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature”. 
If someone believed they possess epistemological certainty, conversations would have a 
minimal role in the ‘discovery’ of knowledge, since their epistemological structure would let 
them know what is true and what isn’t without the need of a second opinion. The collector of 
Black Widows is certain he understands his mother’s suffering, so why confirm it with her? 
Wallace’s movement implies a choice to listen to the vocabulary of others, it’s an instigation to 
converse.  
 To return to, and conclude, the interpretation of “Just Asking”, in the context of my 
reading, such a text is undoubtedly an effort to instigate a national conversation on the American 
institutions and individuals who humiliate and hurt other beings. This is ultimately the objective 
of the democratic elements in Wallace’s oeuvre, it comes from a “conviction that the vast 
inequalities within American society could be corrected by using the institutions of a 
constitutional democracy” (AOC 54). If each moral and political action betrays a utopia, since 
they’re based on your best imaginable hope, then “Just Asking” posits that Wallace believed the 
‘American idea’ could be saved by asking the right questions and sustaining the conversations 
they would engender, despite how uncomfortable or boring they may become.  
We can also understand the democratic quality of Wallace’s writing through what Rorty 
called ‘inspirational value.’ These are works of literature, philosophy, and critical theory that 
are able to “recontextualize most of what you previously thought you knew” (AOC 133). It’s 
another way of naming and understanding the Rortyan redescription discussed throughout the 
dissertation. Whatever ideas and notions a reader might have of themselves as members of a 
democracy, Wallace’s writings will alter it in some way. The main candidate for this 
recontextualization is The Pale King, and I believe I’ve done enough in this dissertation to show 
that his posthumous novel is a culmination rather than an exception in the oeuvre, and that 
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Wallace’s democratic vista is developed and present throughout his career. Like Francisco de 
Quevedo wrote on ‘learned books’, the democratic redescriptions in Wallace will either ‘amend 
or enrich’ the reader’s civics.  
In general philosophical terms, this dissertation is a pushback against “[t]he Platonist 
subordination of time to eternity, and of hope and inspiration to knowledge” (AOC 137) since it 
defends Wallace’s literature as a useful humanist tool for our present time. In Achieving Our 
Country, Rorty defends Harold Bloom’s canon from accusations of and conversations on 
absolute knowledge by explaining that its function is “to offer suggestions to the young about 
where they might find excitement and hope” (136-7). Similarly, this dissertation offers a 
suggestion for reconsidering the writings of David Foster Wallace, with a possible contagion of 
the hope his work might offer. I’ll add, however, the amendment that said hope is available to 
all and not just the ‘young’, and the notice that, since this argument is made by someone who 
finds The Pale King to be invigorating and electrifying, your understanding of ‘excitement’ 
might require some Pragmatist re-definition.  
I believe that, in the end, Rorty’s hope is a defense of imagination, love, and possibility, 
it is a concept free of a bad faith towards existence and life that wishes to negate reality and 
desire a world beyond, a metaphysics. Wallace’s literature, despite its darkness, is driven by this 
hope, it succeeds in “taking the world by the throat and insisting that there is more to life than 
we have ever imagined” (AOC 138). Following both thinkers, the way for communities and 
individuals to achieve said ‘more to life’ in our time is through an engaged democratic 
conversation between the various vocabularies of society. Hopefully, Wallace’s fellow 
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